Kenworth Sales Company v. Skinner Trucking, Inc. Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 45764 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
4-12-2018 
Kenworth Sales Company v. Skinner Trucking, Inc. Clerk's Record 
Dckt. 45764 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Kenworth Sales Company v. Skinner Trucking, Inc. Clerk's Record Dckt. 45764" (2018). Idaho Supreme 
Court Records & Briefs, All. 7446. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7446 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) SUPREME COURT NO. 45764 
Corporation, doing business in the )  SUPREME COURT NO. 45883 
State of Idaho, )  CASE NO. CV42-16-2539 
  ) 
 Plaintiff/Appellant ) 
  )  
vs  )  
  )   
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho  ) 
Corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an ) 
Individual and DAVID C. SKINNER, an  ) 
Individual, ) 
  ) 
 Defendants/Respondents ) 
 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND 
CLERK’S LIMITED RECORD ON APPEAL 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls 
 
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER 
District Judge 
 
 Michael Danielson    Joseph Rockstahl 
126 2nd Avenue North   510 Lincoln Street 
P. O. Box 366    Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366 
 
 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
  
1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) SUPREME COURT NO. 45764 
Corporation, doing business in the )  CASE NO. CV42-16-2539 
State of Idaho, ) 
  ) 
 Plaintiff/Appellant ) 
  )  
vs  )  
  )   
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho  ) 
Corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an ) 
Individual and DAVID C. SKINNER, an  ) 
Individual, ) 
  ) 
 Defendants/Respondents ) 
 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls 
 
HONORABLE RANDY J. STOKER 
District Judge 
 
 Michael Danielson    Joseph Rockstahl 
126 2nd Avenue North   510 Lincoln Street 
P. O. Box 366    Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366 
 














Twin Falls County District 
Court
Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J.
Filed on: 07/26/2016
Appellate Case Number: 45764
CASE INFORMATION
Case Type:
AA- All Initial District Court 








Court Twin Falls County District Court
Date Assigned 07/26/2016
Judicial Officer Stoker, Randy J.
PARTY INFORMATION
Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff Company, Kenworth Sales Danielson, Michael David
Retained
208-733-5463(W)
Defendant Inc., Skinner Trucking, Rockstahl, Joseph R.
Retained
208-734-8810(W)
Skinner, David C. Rockstahl, Joseph R.
Retained
208-734-8810(W)
Skinner, James E. Rockstahl, Joseph R.
Retained
208-734-8810(W)
DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX
07/26/2016 Initiating Document - District
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TWIN FALLS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV42-16-2539













07/29/2016 Affidavit of Service
Edward Skinner, registered agent for Skinner Trucking Inc, 07/27/2016
07/29/2016 Affidavit of Service
Nicole Steward, wife, for James Skinner, 07/27/2016
07/29/2016 Affidavit of Service
Kim Daigh for David Skinner, 07/28/2016
08/17/2016 Motion for Entry of Default
Re Defendant Skinner Trucking, Inc.
08/17/2016 Affidavit




08/17/2016 Motion for Entry of Default
Re Defendant James E. Skinner
08/17/2016 Affidavit
of Michael D. Danielson in Support of Motion for Entry of Default Re Defendant James E.
Skinner
08/17/2016 Default
Default James E. Skinner
08/18/2016 Motion for Entry of Default
Re Defendant David C. Skinner
08/18/2016 Affidavit in Support of Motion
for Entry of Default Re Defendant David C. Skinner - Michael D. Danielson
08/18/2016 Answer
08/23/2016 Stipulation
to Set Aside Defaults and to Allow Withdrawal of Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Entry of Default 
Re Defendant David C. Skinner
08/23/2016 Motion to Withdraw
Motion for Entry of Default Re Defendant David C. Skinner
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09/15/2016 Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
discovery to all 3 Defendants
10/18/2016 Notice
of Defendants' Failure to Comply With I.R.C.P. 36 Re: Requests for Admission
10/19/2016 Notice of Service
10/19/2016 Response
10/19/2016 Notice of Service
10/19/2016 Response
10/19/2016 Notice of Service
10/19/2016 Response
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Interragatories to David C. Skinner)
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Request for Production of Documents to David C. Skinner)
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Interrogatories to James E Skinner)
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Interragatories to Skinner Trucking, Inc.)
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Request for Production of Documents of Documents to James E. Skinner)
10/20/2016 Notice of Service
(First Set of Request for Production of Documents to Skinner Trucking Inc.)
10/31/2016 Notice of Service
12/01/2016 Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
(Answers to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production)
02/02/2017 Notice of Hearing
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment




TWIN FALLS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV42-16-2539





















of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
02/06/2017 Motion
to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions
02/06/2017 Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions
02/07/2017 Notice of Hearing
02/16/2017 Response
to Defendants' Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions
02/17/2017 Response
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed
Admissions
02/21/2017 Motion Hearing - Civil (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy
J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Defendant s Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions




of Michael D. Danielson Re Summary Judgment Costs & Fees
03/01/2017 Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice and Objection to Attorney Fees
03/01/2017 Response
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice and Objection to Attorney Fees
03/01/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant's Countermotion
03/01/2017 Brief Filed
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
03/01/2017 Affidavit in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment
03/02/2017 Notice of Hearing
03/02/2017 Notice of Taking Deposition
Upon Oral Examination of James E. Skinner
03/02/2017 Notice of Taking Deposition
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Upon Oral Examination of David C. Skinner
03/02/2017 Notice
of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Duces Tecum for Skinner Trucking, Inc.





Order to Vacate Hearing- Defendant's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment
03/20/2017 CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, 
Randy J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Vacated
Motion to Withdraw Admissions. Also Motion to Dismiss & Objection to Costs & Fees. 
Defendant's Counter-motion for Summary Judgment Reset. Other hearings still on.
03/20/2017 Motion to Dismiss (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Fees
03/20/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
TBarksdale
03/20/2017 Court Minutes
03/23/2017 Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
Plaintiff's First Supplemental Answers to Defendants First Set of Interrogatories and 
Responses to Request for Production
04/21/2017 Order
Order for Scheduling Conference (cancelled per Judge)
04/21/2017 Order
Civil Pre-Trial Order (cancelled per Judge)
06/12/2017
CANCELED Scheduling Conference (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy
J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Vacated
06/12/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
TBarksdale
06/12/2017 Court Minutes
06/13/2017 Notice of Hearing
Scheduling Conference
06/27/2017 Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel of Record
06/27/2017
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(notified to amend date to 7-24-17)
07/05/2017 Non-Opposition
to Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record
07/06/2017 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning
07/06/2017 Notice of Hearing
on Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record- Amended





of Withdraw of Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record
07/12/2017 Order








Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure
08/21/2017 Pre-trial Conference (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy
J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)





Defendants Expert and Lay Witness Disclosure
08/28/2017 Witness Disclosure
Plaintiff's Lay Witness Disclosure
08/29/2017 Motion
Motion to Strike Staymer Warner and Andrew Lott
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08/30/2017 Notice of Hearing
(Motion to Strike Staymer Warner and Andrew Lott)
08/30/2017 Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
09/07/2017 Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum
of James E. Skinner
09/13/2017 Motion
to Strike Expert Testimony of James Skinner
09/13/2017 Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Strike Expert - of Counsel
09/14/2017 Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing (Mot to Strike Expert Test of James Skinner)
09/15/2017 Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
09/15/2017 Amended
Defendant's Amended Witness List
09/15/2017 Response
to Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of James Skinner
09/18/2017 Motion to Strike (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Staymer Warner and Andrew Lott.




Order Re Defendants Expert Witnesses
09/19/2017 Notice of Service
09/20/2017 Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
09/25/2017 Reply
to Defendants Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony of James Skinner
09/25/2017 Affidavit
of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to 
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to Defendants' Additional Briefing
10/02/2017 Motion to Strike (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Motion to Strike Expert Test of James Skinner





10/04/2017 Acceptance of Service
Subpoena for Trial - Nicole Steward, 10/04/2017
10/10/2017 Stipulation
Re Trial Exhibits
10/19/2017 Notice of Hearing







12/04/2017 Acceptance of Service
Joe Rockstahl, for Nicole Steward, 12/04/2017
12/04/2017 Subpoena Returned
12/06/2017 Court Trial - Civil (9:30 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
12/06/2017 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
TBarksdale
12/06/2017 Court Minutes
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12/19/2017 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
12/19/2017 Judgment
12/19/2017 Final Judgment, Order Or Decree Entered
12/19/2017 Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Stoker, Randy J.)
Comment ()
Party (Company, Kenworth Sales; Inc., Skinner Trucking,; Skinner, James E.; Skinner, David C.)
plaintiff's claim denied- case dismissed with prejudice
12/19/2017 Civil Disposition Entered
12/26/2017 Exhibit List/Log
12-6-17 Court Trial Exhibts
12/29/2017 Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Memorandum of Fees and Costs
12/29/2017 Motion
for Fees and Costs
12/29/2017 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Declaration in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
12/29/2017 Motion for Reconsideration
12/29/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Reconsideration
12/29/2017 Declaration
in support of Memorandum of Fees and Costs
01/04/2018 Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
01/04/2018 Objection
to Defendant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs
01/08/2018 Motion to Shorten Time
for Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Fee's and Costs
01/08/2018 Notice of Hearing
01/11/2018 Order
Order to Shorten Time For Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion 
for Fees and Costs
01/16/2018 Motion Hearing - Civil (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Shindurling, Jon
J. ;Location: Courtroom 2)
Events: 01/08/2018 Notice of Hearing
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Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Fees and Costs
01/16/2018 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
CChilders
01/16/2018 Court Minutes
01/16/2018 Case Taken Under Advisement
01/26/2018 Notice of Appeal
01/26/2018 Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
01/30/2018 Clerk's Certificate of Appeal
02/28/2018 Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
03/01/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Notice of Appeal - Transcripts Requested - Due Date Set - Transcripts (Reporter's lodging date 
is 4-02-18) and Clerk's Record Shall be Filed with this Court by 5-7-18
03/08/2018 Notice
of Transcript Lodged
03/08/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Notice of Transcript Lodged - By C. Childers (25 pages)
03/14/2018 Decision or Opinion
Corrected Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Partially 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs
03/19/2018 Notice
of Lodging
03/19/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Notice of Transcript Lodged - By T. Barksdale (186 pages)
03/19/2018 Notice
Of Lodging (Corrected Transcript)
03/19/2018 Notice
of Balance Due on Clerk's Record
03/20/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Notice of Transcript Lodged - By T. Barksdale (All Hearing Requested)
03/20/2018 Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Notice of Balance Due on Clerk's Record
03/23/2018 Notice of Appeal
Defendant's
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Total Payments and Credits 368.00
Balance Due as of  4/12/2018 0.00
Plaintiff  Company, Kenworth Sales
Total Charges 590.40
Total Payments and Credits 590.40
Balance Due as of  4/12/2018 0.00
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Bren E. Mollerup, ISB No. 7959 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HAR WOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box 366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: mollerup@benoitlaw.com 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
( 16449\Complaint\M DD) 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TlIE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, TNC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 





Fee Category: A.A. 
Fee: $221.00 
COMES NOW, the above entitled Plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff'), by and through its attorneys of record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, 
PLLC, and for its cause of action against Defendants, complains and alleges as follows: 
COMPLATNT-1 
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation that does business throughout Idaho, including Twin 
Falls County. 
2. Defendant Skinner Trucking, Inc. is an Idaho corporation, with its principal place of 
business in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
3. Defendant James Skinner is a res ident of Twin Falls, Idaho. 
4. Defendant David Skinner is a resident of Twin Falls, Idaho 
5. Venue in Twin Falls County, ldaho is proper pursuant to J.C. § 5-404. 
GENERAL FACTS 
6. Plaintiff sold three tractors (the "Tractors") to GE TF Trust ("GE") on 08/ 18/2011 , for 
lease to Defendant Skinner Trucking, Inc. ("STI"). 
7. The lease agreement between GE and Defendant STI, also signed on 08/18/20 11 , 
included persona l guarantees signed by Defendants James and David Skinner (together, the 
"Skinners"). 
8. STI fell behind on its lease obl igations to GE. 
9. As a longtime customer of Plaintiff, STI openly discussed its business and financial 
challenges with Plaintiff. 
l 0. In October of 2015, erroneously believing that it was somehow obligated under the 
GE/STI contract, Plaintiff paid STI's obligation to GE. 
11 . STI and the Skinners were aware of Plaintiff' s action and following that payment, STI 
turned the Tractors over to Plaintiff, who placed them in its inventory to be sold. 
12. In January of 2016, P la intiff bi lied STJ for $55,226.77, the total contract payoff to GE 
less a credit for anticipated wholesale value of the Tractors. 
COMPLAfNT-2 
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13. Plaintiff has requested payment from STI through Defendant James Skinner. 
14. Defendant James Skinner has not disputed STI 's obligation to Plaintiff; however, he 
has refused to pay the bill. 
UNJUST ENRICIIM ENT 
15. Plajntiff re-alleges by reference each and every allegation contained in the above 
paragraphs and incorporates the same as if full y set forth here in. 
16. By paying STI 's obligation to GE, Plaintiff conferred a direct financial benefit on the 
Defendants, to the Defendants' advantage. 
17. The Defendants are aware of and have appreciated that benefit, as their obligation 
under the lease agreement with GE was sati sfi ed. 
I 8. The Defendants have accepted that benefit and under the circumstances it would be 
inequitable and unjust to allow the Defendants to retain that benefit without payment to Plaintiff for 
the value thereof. 
19. Plaintiff has been damaged due to the unjust retention in excess of $ 10,000.00. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a result of the Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of 
Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC, to bring this action and is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Idaho Code, including, but not limited to, Idaho 
Code§§ 12- 120 and 12-12 1, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment, order and decree against the Defendants, as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff be granted a Judgment against the Defendants for $55,226.77, with 
interest accruing thereon at the statutory rate on money owed; and 
COMPLAINT-3 
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2. That Plaintiff be granted a Judgment against the Defendants awarding Plaintiff 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred herein, pursuant to applicable Statute and Rule; and 
matter. 
3. For such 0U1er and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable in this 
DATED this d(,tl!-day of July, 2016. 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
By 
HIGH & MOLLER , PLLC 
Bren E. Mollerup 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
COMPLAINT-4 
JOE ROCKSTAHL [ISBN #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd. 
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile (208) 734-8820 
ioe@ioerocksthl.com
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) CASE NO: CV42-16-2539






) Fee Category: II 
) Fee: $136.00
vs
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 








COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Joe 
Rockstahl of Rockstahl Law Office, Chtd. and answers Plaintiffs Complaint herein as 
follows:
I.
Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiff s Complaint no herein 
expressly and specifically admitted. Defendants further reserve the right to amend this or 
any other answer or denial stated herein once they have had an opportunity to complete 
discovery regarding any of the claims and allegations in the Plaintiffs Complaint.
II.
As to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, Defendants
admit.
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Fee Category: I1 
Fee: $136.00 
S  the efendants, by and through their counsel of record, Joe 
ockstahl of ockstahl a  ffice, htd. and ans ers laintiffs o plaint herein as 
follo s: 
I. 
efendants deny each and every allegation of laintiffs o plaint no herein 
expressly and specifically ad itted. efendants further reserve the right to a end this or 
any other ans er or denial stated herein once they have had an opportunity to co plete 
discovery regarding any of the clai s and allegations in the Plaintiffs o plaint. 
II. 
s to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13 , efendants 
ad it. 
 I  
S ER 
III.
As to the allegation contained in paragraph 3, Defendants denies; Defendant Jim 
Skinner lives in Kimberly, Idaho.
IV.
As to the allegations contained in paragraph 7, Defendants admit except they 
believe the lease was signed on 08/26/2011.
V.
As to the allegations contained in paragraph 9, Defendants deny.
VI.
As to the allegations contained in paragraph 10, Defendants have insufficient 
information and therefore deny the same.
VII.
As to the allegations contained in paragraph 12, Defendants admit they received a 
bill from Plaintiff, but have insufficient information to know if there was a proper credit 
given for anticipated wholesale value of the tractors and therefore deny that portion.
VIII.




First Defense: As a further, separate and affirmative defense, the Defendants 
allege that Plaintiffs damages, if any, were directly and proximately caused by Plaintiffs 
own negligent or intentional conduct.
Second Defense: As a further, separate and affirmative defense, the Defendants 
allege that the conduct of third parties may be the direct and proximate cause of any 
alleged injuries sustained by Plaintiff.
Third Defense: As a further, separate and affirmative defense, the Defendants 
allege that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate their damages, if any.
Fourth Defense: Portions of Plaintiff s Complaint fail to state a cause of action.
Fifth Defense: The Defendants are not the real parties in interest.




s to the allegation contained in paragraph 3, efendants denies; efendant Ji  
Skinner lives in i berly, Idaho. 
I . 
s to the allegations contained in paragraph 7, efendants ad it except they 
believe the lease as signed on 08/26/2011. 
. 
s to the allegations contained in paragraph 9, efendants deny. 
I. 
s t  t e alle ati s c tai e  i  ara ra  , efe a ts a e i s fficie t 
i f r ati  a  t eref re e  t e sa e. 
II. 
s to the allegations contained in paragraph 12, efendants ad it they received a 
bill fro  Plaintiff, but have insufficient infor ation to kno  if there as a proper credit 
i e  f r a tici ate  lesale al e f t e tract rs a  t eref re e  t at rti . 
III. 
s to the allegations contained in paragraph 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, efendants 
deny. 
I . 
FFI TI E EFE SES 
irst efe se: s a f rt er, se arate a  affir ati e efe se, t e efe a ts 
allege that laintiffs da ages, if any, ere directly and proxi ately caused by laintiffs 
o n negligent or intentional conduct. 
Second efense: s a further, separate and affir ative defense, the efendants 
allege that the conduct f third parties ay be the direct and proxi ate cause of any 
alleged injuries sustained by Plaintiff. 
hird efense: s a further, separate and affir ative defense, the efendants 
allege that Plaintiff has failed to itigate their da ages, if any. 
ourth efense: ortions f laintiffs o plaint fail to state a cause f action. 
Fifth efense: he efendants are not the real parties in interest. 
1  
S ER 
Sixth Defense: The Plaintiff assumed the risk in their actions regarding the subject
semi-tractors.
Seventh Defense: The Plaintiffs action is barred by the economic loss rule. 
Eighth Defense: The Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses, 
including affirmative defenses, which may arise during the course and scope of 
discovery.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants prays judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint against the Defendants be dismissed with 
prejudice.
2. That the Defendants be awarded their attorney fees and costs of suit; and
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
(£'DATED this day of August, 2016.
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Sixth efense: he laintiff assu ed the ris  i  t eir acti s re r i  t  s j t 
se i-tractors. 
Seventh efense: he laintiffs action is barre   t e ec ic l ss r l . 
Eighth efense : The efendants reserve the right to assert additional efe ses, 
including affir ative defenses, hich ay arise ri  t e c rse a  s  f 
discovery. 
E EF E, the efendants prays judg ent as follo s: 
1. That Plaintiffs o plaint against the efendants be dis issed it  
prejudice. 
2. That the efendants be a arded their attorney fees and costs f suit; a  
3. For such other relief as the omt ay dee  just and proper. 
 this -ti!~ of ugust, 2016. 
S   I  t . 
~ 
Joe ockstahl 




I HEREBY CERTIFY that on / #^day of August, 2016,1 served a true and 




BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, HIGH 
& MOLLERUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 366
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CE TIFI TE F SE I  
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on /~th.day of August, 2016, I served a true and 
conect copy of the ithin foregoing docu ent upo  t e att r e  a e  l  i  t  
anner noted: 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
ren ollerup ( ) efile 
BE IT, LE E , , I  
 LLER P, PLL  ( ) facsi ile 
P.O. Box 366 
T in Falls, I  83303-0366 
Fax: 208-734- 1438 
ollerup benoitla .co  
ANS ER 
~I~~ 
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Bren E. Mollerup, ISB No. 7959 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: mollerup@benoitlaw.com 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DA YID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the above entitled Plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company, by and through its 
attorneys of record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC, and moves this Court 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for entry of summary judgment in favor of 
said Plaintiff on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and said Plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I 
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----------------
This Motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Affidavit of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and all 
pleadings on file in the above entitled action. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2017. 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
By_.c.~___c_____----=----' _.,,,_,d_=-----cy'----------=-----
Michael D. Danielson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 126 2nd Avenue North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho, certifies that on the 2nd day of February, 2017, he caused a true and correct copy of 
the PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be forwarded by the method 
indicated below, to the following: 
Joe Rockstahl 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 















Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Elisha Raney, Deputy Clerk
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Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box 366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: mollemp@benoitlaw.com 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the above entitled plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company, by and through its 
attorneys or record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollemp, PLLC, and submits this 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-I 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate in this matter because on the undisputed facts, the Defendants have been 
unjustly enriched. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
(1) Plaintiff sold three tractors (the "Tractors") to GE TF Trust ("GE") on 08/18/2011, who 
then leased the Tractors to Defendant Skinner Trucking, Inc. ("STI"). Complaint, ~ 6; Answer, ~ II. 
(2) The lease agreement (the "Lease") between GE and STI, also signed on 08/18/2011, 
included personal guarantees signed by Defendants James and David Skinner (together, the 
"Skinners"). Complaint,~ 7; Answer,~ IV; Response to Interrogatory No. 3 (all three Defendants). 
(3) The Lease was for a term of four years. Response to Requests for Admission No. 2 
( all three Defendants). 
( 4) The Lease included a residual/payoff payment that was due at the termination of the Lease. 
Response to Requests for Admission No. 3 (STI). 1 
(5) The total residual/payoff payment contemplated by the Lease was for $174,153.60 
($58,051.20 for each of the three Tractors). Response to Requests for Admission No. 4 (all three 
Defendants). 
(6) STI fell behind on its lease obligations to GE. Complaint,~ 8; Answer,~ II. 
(7) On 10/30/15, Plaintiff paid off the outstanding residual/payoff payments owed by STI 
on the two of the three Tractors to GE. The amount of that payment was $116,102.40 ($58,051.20 
per truck). Complaint,~ 10; Affidavit of Bill Pahl,~ 8 and Exhibit A. 
1 The Skinners admitted this too, but limited their admissions to "only if it was exercised." However, it must be noted 
that the Skinners' are deemed to have admitted all Requests for Admissions. 
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(8) Additionally, on 12/02/15, Plaintiff paid off the outstanding residual/payoff payment 
owed by STI on the third tractor to GE. The amount of that payment was $58,051.20. On that same 
date, Plaintiff paid GE $7,073.17, the amount that STI was behind on its lease payments. Affidavit 
of Bill Pahl, ,r 9 and Exhibit A. 
(9) STI, which was undergoing financial difficulties, turned the three Tractors over to 
Plaintiff. Response to Requests for Admission Nos. 6 and 7 (all three Defendants); Affidavit of Bill 
Pahl, ,r,r 6, 9. 
(10) Plaintiffs District Manager evaluated the three Tractors and it was determined at the 
time that they were surrendered that they were each worth $42,000.00. Affidavit of Bill Pahl, ,r 11. 
(11) In January of 2016, Plaintiff billed STI for $55,226.77. That amount consisted of 
$ I 6,051.20 per tractor (lease residual of $58,051.20 minus dealer resale allowance of $42,000.00), 
plus a late lease payment charge of$7,073.17. Complaint, ,r 12; Answer, ,r VII; Affidavit of Bill Pahl, 
,r 11 and Exhibit B. 
(12) Plaintiff requested payment from STI through the Defendant James Skinner. 
Complaint, ,r 13; Answer, ,r II; Response to Requests/or Admission No. 13 (STI) and 12 (Skinners). 
(13) STI never reimbursed Plaintiff for the payments that Plaintiff made to GE on STI's 
behalf. Response to Requests/or Admission No. 12 (STI) and II (Skinners). 
Ill. FACTS DEEMED ADMITTED2 
(14) Because of Plaintiffs payment to GE, the Defendants' financial obligation to GE on 
the Lease was satisfied. Response to Requests/or Admission Nos. JO (Skinners) and 11 (STI). 
2 The Defendants were untimely in responding to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions in this case, and as such, Plaintiff 
has deemed each of its Requests as admitted, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 36(4). For purposes of clarity, Plaintiff has separated 
those facts actually admitted from those facts deemed admitted. 
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(15) The Defendants have benefitted financially as a result of Plaintiffs payment to GE on 
their behalf. Response to Requests for Admission Nos. 13 (Skinners) and 14 (STI). 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden of proving 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests on the moving party. Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., 
inc., 145 Idaho 346, 349, 179 P.3d 309, 312 (2008). All disputed facts are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the non-moving party; likewise, all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion, J-U-B Eng'rs, inc. v. Sec. Ins. 
Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311,314, 193 P.3d 858,861 (2008). 
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence before the court, the motion must be denied. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 
484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994). However, flimsy or transparent contentions or theoretical questions of fact 
which are not genuine do not create genuine issues which will preclude summary judgment. Weisel 
v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass 'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519,524,272 P.3d 491,496 (2012). A mere scintilla 
of evidence is not enough to create an issue. id. 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff has Established, on the Undisputed Facts, the Requisite Elements of 
Unjust Enrichment. 
Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be inequitable 
for the defendant to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust. 
Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 
802, 805 (2014). A prima facie unjust enrichment claim therefore consists of three elements: (!) a 
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benefit conferred on a defendant by a plaintiff, (2) appreciation of that benefit by the defendant, and 
(3) acceptance of that benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Id. 
Here, the undisputed facts establish that STI and the Skinners were obligated under the terms 
of the Lease, at the end of the Lease's term, to either(!) purchase the Tractors for the residual/payoff 
amounts or (2) turn the Tractors in to GE. If the Tractors were turned in to GE, GE was then then to 
sell the Tractors and if there was a shortfall between the sales price and the residual/payoff amount, 
STI and the Skinners were liable for that amount. Conversely, if there was a surplus after such sale, 
STI would have been entitled to the excess. 
The undisputed facts also establish that STI found itself in financial difficulties at the end of 
the Lease, that representatives of Plaintiff were aware of those difficulties, and that Plaintiff made 
two payments to GE on STI' s behalf for the value of the residual/payoff amounts on all three Tractors, 
as well as a late fee owing on one of them. These payments totaled $181,226.77. STI, whose 
obligation to GE had been satisfied, then turned the Tractors over to Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff 
discovered that the value of the Tractors was below the residual/payoff amounts that had been 
satisfied by Plaintiff. Each tractor was valued at $42,000.00 instead of $58,051.20. 
Plaintiff subsequently billed STI for $55,226.77, which consisted of $16,051.20 per tractor 
(lease residual of $58,051.20 minus value of $42,000.00), plus a late lease payment charge of 
$7,073.17. Neither STI nor the Skinners have made any attempt to pay Plaintiff these amounts. 
Plaintiffs payment of $181,226.77 to GE on STI's behalf terminated STI's financial 
obligation to GE under the Lease. As such, Plaintiff conferred a benefit on STI of $55,226.77 by 
relieving it of its obligation to pay deficiencies on the Tractors, as well as late lease payments. The 
same benefit was conferred on both of the Skinners, who were personally liable under the terms of 
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the Lease. The Defendants appreciated that benefit, as they were relieved of their obligation to GE. 
Finally, the Defendants have steadfastly refused to compensate Plaintiff for its action on their behalf. 
Therefore, the Defendants have accepted a benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for 
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts before the Court establish all three elements of a prima facie case of 
unjust enrichment. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in this case as a matter of law. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2017. 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
By __ ~--·-~_s_. J_'.J_~~· _- __ 
Michael D. Danielson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 126 2nd Avenue North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho, certifies that on the 2nd day of February, 2017, he caused a true and correct copy of 
the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be forwarded by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Joe Rockstahl 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
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BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box 366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF OREGON) 
) ss. 
County of Malheur ) 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL PAHL 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Bill Pahl, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
I. I make this Affidavit in my individual capacity as an employee of the Plaintiff in the 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL PAHL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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above-entitled action and in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. I also make this affidavit based on personal knowledge of all matters contained therein. 
3. I have worked for Plaintiff for sixteen years and am currently a District Manager. I 
have held that position for the last four years. Pursuant to this position, I am responsible for truck 
sales, parts and service. 
4. Prior to my employment witli Plaintiff, I worked for ten years for a trucking company 
as an equipment superintendent and was responsible for buying, selling, and leasing equipment. 
5. In my capacity as Plaintiff's employee, I have had dealings with the Defendants, who 
were long term clients/customers of Plaintiff. · 
6. In October of 2015, the Defendants expressed that they were experiencing financial 
difficulties and that they wished to get rid of two of the three trucks that they were leasing from GE 
TF Trust (VIN #'s 1XKADP9X6CJ316247 and 1XKADP9X8CJ316248). Because they were long 
term customers, it was decided that Plaintiff would help them out by paying off the TRAC residual 
amounts on the two trucks and then placing them h:1 Plaintiff's inventory for resale. 
7. Atno time were the Defendaµts told that they would not owe a deficiency if the trucks 
were valued at less than the payoff amounts. 
8. On 10/30/15, Plaintiff satisfied the Defendants' obligations with regard to those two 
trucks to GE TF Trust for $ I 16, l 02.40. The Defendants surrendered those two trucks to Plaintiff. 
9. In December of 2015, the Defendants expressed that they wished to get rid of the third 
truck (Vin# 1XKADP9XXCJ316249) and that they were behind on their lease payments. On 
12/02/15, Plaintiff satisfied the Defendants' obligations with regard to that truck for $65,124.37, 
which included the $58,051.20 residual/payoff and $7,073.17 for overdue rent/lease payments. The 
Defendants then surrendered that truck to Plaintiff. 
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10. I was responsible for inspecting and valuating the three trucks for resale at the time 
that they were surrendered. In my twenty-six years of employment in the trucking industry, I have 
learned and practiced the methods employed within the industry to evaluate trucks such as these for 
the resale market. To determine trade values on commercial vehicles, I use two different sources that 
are standard for the industry. One is the NADA Blue Book and the other is the Black Book, both of 
' wiJtlch yield similar information. Based thereon, I determined a resale value for the trucks at the time 
and in the condition that they were surrendered at $42,000.00 each. 
11. Because the trucks were valued at less than the amount that Plaintiff paid to satisfy the 
Defendants' obligations to GE TF Trust, a bill was sent to the Defendants for the difference 
($16,051.20 per truck) plus $7,073.17 for the Defendants' unpaid rent on .the third truck, for a total 
of$55,226.77. 
12. As an einployee of Plaintiff and in my role as District Manager, I am personally 
familiar with the sales, credit, billing, and other business records created and stored by Plaintiff in the 
ordinary course of its business. It is standard practice for Plaintiff to retain financial records pertaining 
to purchases, leases, payoffs, credit arrangements, etc. involving Plaintiff and its customers or clients. 
Such records are created and maintained in the ordinary course of Plaintiffs business and it is the regular 
practice of Plaintiff to do so: 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of two separate documents, 
each titled Equipment Purchase Invoice and Bill of Sale, whereby the three trucks leased by STI were 
paid off by Plaintiff. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are true and correct copies of invoices sent by Plaintiff to 
STI for the difference between the lease residual/payoff amount and the actual value of the trucks. 
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15. Each of the attached documents were created as part of Plaintiff's ongoing business 
dealings with the Defendants, at or near the time of the events described therein, m the ordinary course 
of the Plaintiff's business and none of these documents were created in anticipation of litigation. 
16. I certify that the attached documents are true and correct copies of the documents 
described above and have been maintained in the ordinary course and scope ofbnsiness of Plaintiff. 
DATED this ..Li_ day of January, 2017. 
BILL PAHL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /(/ day of January, 2017. 
OFFICIAL STAMP 
ADRIANA ROJAS 
NOTARY PUBLIC- OREGON 
COMMISSION NO. 943182 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 24, 2019 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: {])11, bt'o) 6 ~ 
My Commission Expires: 09-Jl(~JO, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 126 2nd A venue North, 
Twin Falls, Idaho, certifies that on the 2nd day of February, 2017, he caused a true and correct copy of 
the AFFIDAVIT OF BILL PAHL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be forwarded by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Joe Rockstahl 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 


















GE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 
10/30/2015 
Skinner Trucking, 1nc, 
P.O. Box 709 
Twin Palls, !D, 83303 
Attn: Diane 
RE: Contract u.nder Account No:# 5908919~001 ("Contract") between you ("Customer'') and us C'Seller") 
Dear Diane: 
Attached please find an Equipment Purchase Invoice and BiU of Sale for the Contract and the equipment/collateral/property 
subject to such Contract (11Property"). Please forward pnymcnfto the following address: 
Overnight Mulling lnstrucfions: Wire Insttllctions (Pay without Delay): Standard ~ailing lnstructloos: 
OE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE Deutsche :Sank OE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 
Rt 38 && East Gate Dr. 60 Wall Steet P.O. Box 820024 
Lockbox # 820024 New York, NY 10005 Philadelphia, PA 19182-0024 
Moorei;;town, NJ 08057-0024 Account# 50279855 
ABA#021001033 
Please reference account# and invoice# on Customer's wire transfer to ensure it is applied pro~erly. 
If tbe Pro'perty subject to and securing the Contract secures any other account(,'1)/contract(s) that Customer has 'With 
Seller, then the payoff/bu·ytmt of Urn Contract will NOT, in tjJe absence of Seller's express written agn.:omenl to do so, 
release and/or terminate SCllcr's interest in such Property nor obliglltc Seller to-release and/or terminate such interest. 
If the Property sobject to and securing the Contract docs not secure any other account(s)/contract(s) that Customer has 
with Scller1 then a wire transfer Is required If Customer would like to have any Ucns/titles released and/or transferred 
within a commercially reasonable time. Providing that any and all amounts paid have been recognized as good and 
available funds 1 lions/titles will be released and/or trnnsforrcd by Sc-lier (at Customer's prior ·written requcsl and 
expense) within twenty .. one (21} d:lys after Customer1s prior written request for such release and/or transfer instrument 
which shall he in form satisfactory to Seller. 





Account Number: 5908919-001 
EQUIPMENT PURCHASE INVOICE AND BILL OF SALE 
Account Number: 5908919-001 
Invoice Number: 4034074 
BUYER: 
Skinner Trucking, Inc. 
P.O. Box 709 
Twin Falls, ID, 83303 
PurchasePrice $174,153.60 
Total Due $174,153.60 




Billing as GE TRANSPORTATION 
FINANCE 
REMIT TO: 
GE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 
P.O. Box 820024 
Philadelphia, PA 19 I 82-0024 
Description of Equipment/Collateral/Properly ("Property") 
subject to the Contract under the above-referenced Account Number {"Contract") 
Please, See attached Schedule (A). 
Payment by Buyer pursuant to this Invoice and Bill of Sale shall be conclusive evidence of Buyer's agreement to be bound by 
this Invoice and Bill of Sale and BLt;:rer•s 1·eceipt and acceptance of the Property pursuant to the terms of this Invoice and Bill of 
Sale, whether or not Buyer countersigns this Invoice and Bill of Sale. 
BE IT KNOWN that in consideration of the Total Due quoted above {plus applicable Taxes as defined below) and for other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt. adequacy and legal sufficiency of which are hereby ack.now!cdgcd, the Seller, hereby 
sells, transfers and dGlivers to Buyer and its successors and assigns forever, all of Seller's right, title and interest in and to the 
Property, including without Jimitatiou all tights under or with respect to any representations, warranties or similar rights in favor 
of Seller and given to Seller by any previous seller of the Property, but explicitly excluding any right to use any software which 
may be embedded in the Property or any part thereof. Seller hereby represents and warrants to Buyer and its successors and 
assigns that there is hereby conveyed to Buyer on the dnte hereof title to the Property, free and clear of all liens or encumbrances 
of any person or entity claiming by, through or under Setler, Seller agrees with Buyer and its successors and assigns that it wit! 
wan·ant and defend such title forever against all claims-and demands whatsoever, 
EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED HEREIN, THE PROPERTY rs BEING SOLD AND DELIVERED BY SELLER 
TO BUYER AND PURCHASED AND ACCEPTED BY BUYER "AS IS" AND "WHERE IS" AND SUBJECT TO ALL 
OF THE DISCLAThIERS SET FORTH IN THE CONTRACT AND HEREIN. SE:LLER MAKES NO WARRANTIES, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF ANY KIND OR NATURE EXCEPT THAT (I) BUYJ.!."R WILL ACQOIRE BY THE 
TERMS OF nus INVOICE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM ALL ENCUMBRANCES CREATED BY 
SELLER AND (2) SELLER HAS THE RIGlIT TO SELL THE PROPER'fY. WITHOUT LIMl'flNG Tlill 
GENERALITY OF THE FOREGOING, SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT'fO 'fl!E QUALITY, 
CON'fENT, CONDITION, MERCHANTABIUTY, OR FITNESS !'ORA PARTICULAR PURPOSE OFTIIE 
PROPERTY AND NO WARRANTIES AGAINST PATENT INFRINGEMENT OR THE LIKE. BUYER 
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ITEMS SOLD HEREUNDER ARE USED AND THAT SELLER IS OR WAS THE 
FINANCING LESSOR THEREOF UNDER THE CONTRACT AND DID NOT USE, MAINTAIN OR HAVE 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TII.E PROPERTY. BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT HAS NOT RELIED AND 
1S NOT RELYING ON ANV REPRESENTATION OR STATEMENT OF CONDITION OF TfIE PROPERTY MADE 
BY SELLER IN CONNEC'r!ON WITH BUYER'S PURCHASE OF THE PROP8RTY, 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for, ond agrees to indemnify, savo und hold hannless Seller from and against any and all 
taxes1 license fees1 other fees and assessments of any kind or nature assessed or imposed by any domestic or foreign 
governmental entity or taxing authority, including, but not limited to, any and all license and registration fee.~, and all 
sales, use, personal property, excise, gross receipts, franchise, stamp or other taxes, imposts, duties and charges, 
together with any penalties, fines or interest thereon {collectively "Taxes"), and from and against any and all liabilities, 
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obligations, losses, diimages, penalties, claims, actions and suits resulting therefrom and imposed upon, incurred by or 
asserted as a consequence of, the sale of the Property to, or !he ownership, possession, operation or use of the Property 
by, Buyer. 
If the Pr6perty subject to and securing the Contract secures any other account(s)/contract(s) that Buyer has with Seller, 
!hen the payoWbuyolll of the Coutra1.:t will NOT, in the absonce of Seller's express wriUen agreement to do so, release 
and/or terminate Sener's interest ln such Properly nor obligitte Seller to release and/or tenninate such interest. If the 
Property .subject to and securing the Contract does not secure any other account(s)/contract(s) that Buyer has with 
Seller, then a wire transfer is required if Buyer would like to have any liens/litles released and/or transferred within a 
commercially reasonable time. Providing that any and all amounts paid have been recognized as good and available 
funds, liens/titles will be released nnd/or transferred by Seller (at Buyer's prior written request and expense) within 
twenty-one (2 l) days after Buycr1 s prior written request for such release and/or transfer instrument which shall be in 
form satisfacto1y to Seller. 
Anti-Money Laundering: To-help the government fight the fonding ofterrorisr_n and money Jaundering activities, 
Fedora] law requires all flna:uc1al institutions to obtain, verify and record lnfonnalion that identifies each person who 
enters into a transaction with us. What this means for you is lhat when a trnn1motion contemplated hereunder is 
consummated, we will nsk for your name, address, and other information that will allow us to identify your Identity, 
We may also ask to seo identifying documents, 
Acceptable Forms of Payments: We will accept payment in the fom1 of company checks, (or personal check in the 
case of sol~ proprietorships), direct debit, or wires 011ly. Cash, money orders, cashter•·s checks, travelet''s checks and 
other cash equivalents are not acceptable forms of payment and such forms of payment may delay processing or be 
returned; provided that we may elect to accept a bank check, cashier's check or certified check for payment 'involving 
the settlement of an account or the release ot'a lien or title if we can validate the sout'ce of payment to our satisfaction. 
Furthe1more, only you or your authorized agent as upproved may remit payments on these account<;. 
Dhputed Payments: Without prejudice to any of our rights and remedies under your contract with us, all wfltteu 
communication concerning disputed amounts, including any check or other payment instrument that (a) indicates that 
the written payment constitutes "payment in full" or is tendered as foll satisfaction ofa dispL1ted amount or (b) is 
tendered with other conditions or limitation must be mailed or delivered to us at the torrespondeoc~.Q!l.!x address and 
not to the payme!lt address. 
Correspondence Only Address: PO BOX 3083 , 
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52406-3083 
Tlte Total Due quoted above is quoted as of 10/30/2015 and such quote ls ·valid until10/3 l/20l5. If Seller received such amount 
after such dnte and further amount'l are due under the Contract {including any additional or supplemental rent~ due there lmder), 




Equipment Purchase Invoice And Bill Of Sale 
Description of Prope1ty 
ASSE:T#· -SERIAL# Quote Amt 
I JXKADP9X6CJ316247 $58,05L20 
2 JXKADP9X8CJ316248 558,051.20 
3 I XKADP9XXCJ3 I 6249 558,051.20 
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R£QUEST FOR AOVANC£ {TFS) 
To; Transportatio.n Truck and Trailer SoJutions; llC, as-successor tn hrterest to General Eled:rfc capftal Corp-oration {"'tENOEJ?'1) 
FAX: 1•866-872-3890 EMAIL! TW05@ge.com 
The below referenced Dealer heret,y ittevOc.ibty alJtJloti.:tes tind d'irects Lender to mal.ean<'!dvancc and pay the below p;,yee(s) tfle total sum risted ~low ( .. Advance"}whilTI wi11 be an addJtlonaJ umoUJ1t of (lt1tsfarufi11g Jmiebtedness: owed by Dea let to ten Der umf.e, thewholesalesecurity agreement or 1uventoIV nnandngagreeme11t!.s:} b1?lween De.ale, and L!!Mer (the "FlnanclngAgreemenrs-"')retating to the /nventoJy d?..otoocl below 1~1,mntof'/'). Dea let hereby O!ttlffes tlJat: {l) the l11ventotyl!i free anti dear of all enannbr,mces and Jtens other than those h_elttb'tthe bet ow payeejs}, artd {2} beaier is iJl J'{l!iSeSSlon ol the lnventOI'/, ot'l1iDtake pos.sessltm of the Inventory lmrnedmtely UJ'on Lender's payment of the Advance, and {3) the Inventory is in good, t.1$ilble and sellable ccmHtlolL Qealer agrees to pay row-est. OJrt.ailmentslllld all other l.lmO'tfrlts lo Lender at the agreed upon rate al such UmC$ ~nd a~ otllerY{ise5et forth Jn the Finan ting Agreements. Noiwith$1pnd'mg I.he foregoing provb!ons,OwlershaU lmml:ldiately pay to Leader the amount of tot:JI lmlehtedness (i11duding the rolate<I Advance} owed with respect to a ulllt ofrnvemoryas outlined In the Fina-ricing Ageeme.nts. Oealan:ertifie:s that Oevlet isnotlri default under the Financing Agreements or any other agreement with lend!:?t. Afr>/ Advail-ce m.sO.i pursuant to thls Request {or Advance vJill be subject to the. terms of the Financing Attreements. Dealer must prO\lldeall other doa:rmentatlon reqtJJted b)'lenderln it.s sole dlscretfan, Vealer rapresentsaiid wammts to tender tfJirt the Adlta11re wm be used to enable the Debtor ro acquire free 1ind dear fitle·1excep1 these:cvrttv Interest granted to LeTJder pur5uanttothe FirrnrninJ;Agt(lernents}to tM lnventory, 
y,,, 




Model ~ptlbn Serialll/V-mlJ Amown 
T6i50 Tr°"' '.l;o(4Dr'9X603:t6247 $58051.20 
T615l) Trucl< :D(l(ADP9Xll0316248 Sf,S,l5t.20 
Total ~' ---$_11_•_,1_0_2A_o~i 
lo GE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 
"' {Nome ond Address of Poyee-(1ttod1 b-Dllkinrri11fo} 
to 
(NClltle atld Acfdte55 of Puyee-attoth baNflng Info} 
Dealer: Ken worth Sate5 Co. 
/legof~ { .. 
Bv; _/,j . . QI\ 
7frg/10lure&le) 
) C.0-O-
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GE TRANSPOR)'ATION FINANCE 
12/22/2015 
Skinner Trucking, Inc. 
P.O. Box 709 
Twin Falls, ID, 83303 
Atln: Diane 
RE; Contract under Accounl No:# 5908919-00t (''Contract") belween you ("Customer") and us ("Seller11) 
Dear Diane: 
Attached please find an Equipment Purchase [nvo[ce and Bill of Sale for !be Contract and the equipmenf/colli'lternVproperty 
subject to such Contract ("PropertyH), Please 'forward payment to the following· address: 
' 
Overnight Malling lnstructlon.s; Wire Instructions (l?ay Wttllout Delay): Standard M,alling Instructions: 
GE TRANSPORTATION FJNANCE Deutsche Bank GE TRANSPORTATION F!NANCE 
Rt 38 &&1Enst Gate Dr. 60 Wall Steet P.O. Box 820024 
Lockbox # 320024 New York, NY 1 OOOS Philadelphia, PA 19\82-0024 
Moorestown, NJ 08057-0024 Account# 50279855 
ABA#02100l033 
Please reference account# and invoice# on Customer's wire trunsfer to en.rnre It Is ap1ilie~· properly. ' 
If the Property subject to and securing the Contract secures any other account(s)/contract(:1) that Customer bas with 
Seller, then tlie pa.yo ff/buyout of the Contract will NOT, in tbe absence of Setier1s expre!JS written agreement to do so, 
rclcusc nnd/or terminate Seller's interest in such Property nar·obl!gate Seller to release atid/or terminate such interest. 
If the.Property subject to and securing tlJe Contract does not secure any other account(s)/contract(s) that Customer has 
w'ith Seller, then a wire transfer ls required if•Custorner would llke to have any !lens/titles released and/or transferred 
wlthlti a <:ommcrciafly reasonable time. Providing that any and all amounts paid l1ave been recognized ns good and 
available runds, lieus/titles wiU be released tllld/or transferred hy Seller (at Customer's prior written request and 
expense) within twenty--one (21) days nfter Customer's 1>rior written request for sueb relenso and/or transfer instrument 
which shall be In form satisfactory to Seller. 
I 







Account Numbe1·: 5908919-001 
EQUIPMENT PURCHASE INVOICE AND BILL OF SALE 
Account Number: 5908919-001 
Invoice Number: 4102852 
BUYER: 
Skinner Trucldng, Inc. 
P.O. Box 709 







Invoice Date: 12/22/2015 
Due Date: 12/30/2015 
SELLER: 
GE,TFTRUST 
Billing as GE TRANSPORTATION 
FINANCE 
REMIT TO: 
GE TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 
P.O. Bt>x 820024 
Philadelphia, PA 19182-0024 
Description of Equipment/Collateral/Property {"Property") 
subject to the Contract under the above-referenced Account Numbet· ("Contract") 
Please, See attached Schedule (A). 
Payment by Buyer pursuant to this Invoke and Bill of Sa1e s:ha!l be conclusive evidence of Buyer's agrco~ent to t>e bound by 
this Invoice and Bill of Sale and Buyer's receipt and acceptance of !he Property pursuant to the terms of thls Invoice and Bill of 
Sale, whether or not Buyer countersigns this [nvoice and Bill of Sale, 
BE TT KNOWN that in consideration of the Total Due quoted .above (plus applicable Taxes as <.lefiued below) and for other good 
and vnhtuble consideration, the receipt, adequacy and legal sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Seller, hereby 
sells, U'ai\sfers and delivers to Buyer and its successors and assigns forever, all of Seller's right, title and interest in and to the 
Property, including without limitatlon all rights under or with rospect to any representations, warranties or similar rights in favor 
of Seller m,d given to Seller by any previous seller of the Property, but explicitly excluding any right to use any sonware which 
may be embedded in 'the Property or any part th~reof. Seller hereby represents and Warrants to Buyer and its' succeSsors and 
assigns· that there !s hereby conveyed to Buyer on the date hereof title to the Property, free and clear of nil liens or encumbrances 
of any per$on or entily claiming by, through or under Seller. Seller agrees wilfl Buyer and its successors and assigns that it will 
warrant and defend such title forever against nil claims and demands whatsoever. 
EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED HEREIN, THE PROPERTY IS BEING SOLD AND DELIVERED BY SELLER 
TO BUYER AND PURCHASED AND ACCEPTED BY BUYER" AS IS" AND •WHERE IS" AND SUBJEC.'T TO ALL 
OF THE DISCLAIMERS SET FORTH IN THE CONTRACT AND HEREIN. SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTIES, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF ANY KIND OR NATURE EXCEPT THAT (l) BUYER WILL A(:QUIRE BY THE 
TERMS OF TlllS INVOICE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY FREE FROM ALL ENC\ToIDRANCES CREATED BY 
SELLER AND (2) SELLER IIAS Tlill RIGHT TO SELL TUE PROPERTY, \VITHOUT LIMITING THE 
GENERALITY OF nm FOREGOING, SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE QUALITY, 
CONTENT, CONDITION, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF nm 
PROPEl<:I'Y AND NO WARRANTIES AGAINST PATENT [NFRINGEMENT OR 1'HE LIKE, BUYER 
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ITEMS SOLD HEREUNDER ARE USED AND THAT SELLER rs OR WAS THE 
l'INANCING LESSOR TllEREOF UNDER TllE CONTRACT AND DID NOT USE, MAINTAIN OR HA VE 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY. BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT HAS NOT RELIED AND 
JS NOT REL YlNG ON ANY REPRESENTATION OR STATEMENT OF COJl!DITION OF nm PRQPERTY MADE 
BY SELLER IN CONNECTION WITH BUYER'S PURCHASE o;• THE PROPERTY, 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for, alld agrees to indemnify, save and hold hannless Sellor from and against any and all 
taxes, license fees, other fees Md assessments of any kind or nt1Jure assessed or imposed by any domestic or foreign 
governmental entity or tnxing authority, including, but not limited to, any and all lico-nso and registration foes, and all 
sales, use, personal property, ex else, gross receipts, franchise, stamp or other tax.cs, imposts, duties and charges, 
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together wl!h any penalties, fines or interest thereon (collectively "Taxes"}, and from and against any and nll liabjJlties, 
obligations, losses, damages, penalties, claims, actions and suits resulting therefrom and imposed upon, incurred by or 
asserted as a consequence of, tile sale of the Property to, or the ownership, possession, operation or use of the Property 
by, Buyer. I , .. 
If the Property subject to and securing the Contract secures 1my other account(s)/cot1tract(s) that Buyer has with Seller, 
then tho payofflbuyout of the Contract will NOT, in the absence ofSe\Jer's express written agreement to do so, release 
andlor tcnninate Seller's interest in such Pro[Jerty nor obligate Seller to release and/or terminate such interest. If the 
Property subject to and securing the Contract does not secure any other account(s)/contract(s) that Buyer has with 
Seller, then a wire transfer is required if Buyer would lih to have nny liens/titles releiISecl and/or transferred within a 
commercinlly reasonable time. Providing that any and all amounts paid have been recognized as good and available 
funds, Hens/titles will be released and/or transferred by Seller (at Buyer's prior written request and expense) within 
twenty~one (21) days after Buyer's prior written request for such release and/or transfer instruntent which shall be in 
fonn satisfactory to Seller. 
Anti~Nloney Laundering: T-0 help the government fight the funding of terrorism and money laundering activities, 
Federal law requires nil financial instllutions to ob1ain, verify and record infonn_ation that .identifies each person who 
enters into a transaction with us. What this 1rieans for you is that when a transaction contemplated hereunder is 
consummated, we will ask for your narnO, address,.and other infonnation that will allow us to identify your identity. 
We may also ask to see identifying documents. 
Acceptable Forms or Payments: We wilt accept payment in the fonn of company checks, (or personal check in the 
case of sole proprietorships), direct debit, or wires only. Cash, money orders., cashier's.checks, traveler's checks and 
other cash equivalents are not acceptable forms of payment and such fomut of payment' may delay processing or be 
returned; provided that we may elect to accept a bnnk check. cn.shier1 s check or certified check for payme11t involving 
the settlement of an account or the- release of a lien or title ifwe can validate the source of payment to our satisfaction, 
Furthermore, only you or your authorized agent as-approved may remit payments on these accounts, 
Dis,puted Payments: Without pre-judlce to any of our rights and remedies under your contract with us, all written 
communiootion concen:1ing disputed ammmts, includ!ng any check or other payment instrument that (a) indicates that 
the written payment constit1ites "payment in full" or is tendered us full sa1isfoction ofn disputed amount or (b) hi 
tendered with other conditions or limitation must be mailed or delivered to us at the correspoildenCe only address and 
noJ to tlie payment add'ress. 
Correspondence Only Address: PO BOX 3083 , 
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52406-3083 
The Total Due quoted above is qu_oted as,of 12/22/2015 and such quote is valid untt! !2/30/2015.· If Seller received such amount 
after such date and further amounts are due under the Contract (including any additional or supplemental rents due there under), 




Equipment Purchase Invoice And Bill Of Sale 
Description of Property 
ACCOUNT Asset no YEAR TY MAKE MODE.L SIN nESClUPTlON 
5908919001 0003 ZOl2 I KENWORTH T660121"BBCCO IXKADP9XXCJ316249 TRACTOR 
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·····--~----------------
REQUEST FOR ADVANCE 
To: BMO Harris 8ank N.A. ("LENDE'.Rn) 
FAX: 1·866-872-~890 EMAIL: TWDS@ge.com 
The below referenced Dealer henibv lnevocably authorizes and dlrecfs Lender ta make an advance and pay the below payee(s) the total sum llsted below ("Advar1ce") which wlll'be 
an additional amount of outstanding Indebtedness owed by Dealer to Lender under the wholesale security agreement or Inventory flnancfng agreement(s) between Deal et arid 
Lender (the "Financing Agreements") relating to the Inventory described below (nlnventory11 ), Dealer hereby certlnes that (1) the Inventory !s free and clear of all encumbrances 
and liens other than those held by the below payee{s), and {2) Dealer 1s In possession of the Inventory, or will take possession of the Inventory Immediately upon Lender's payment 
of the Advance, and (3) the Inventory Is In good, usable and sell able condttlon. Dealer allrees to pay Interest, curtailments and all other amounts to Lender at the agreed upon rate 
at such tlmas and as otherwise set forth In the Flnanclng Agreements. NQtwlthstandlng the foregoing provisions, Dealer shall lmmedlatety pay-to Lender the amount of total 
Indebtedness (lndudlng 'the related Advance) owed with respect to a unit of Inventory as outlined In the Ftnanclng Ageements. Dealer cert!fles that Dealer ls not In default under 
the Financing Agreements or any other agreement with Lender. Any Advance made pursuant to this Request for Advance wllf be subject to the terms of the Financing Agreements. 
Dealer must provide all other documentation required by Lender In Its sole dlscretlon. Dealer represents and warrants to Lender that the Advance wll! be used to enable the Debtor 










Description serJ11I U / V!n I# Amount 




GE Transportation Finance, P,0, Box 820024, Philadelphia PA 19182-0024 
(Name and Address of Payee-attach banking Info) 
(Name and Address of Payee-attach btmklng Info) 
Dealer: Kenworth sales Co. 
(/eg,J,,ome/ .// V ~ 
By, U/4-1/v, ;T,;,-~ 












PO Box 15398 
Boise, ID 83715-5398 
FAX 208-342-5199 
1-800-395-6410 
Skinner Trucking, Inc. 
P.O. Box709 
Twin Falls ID 83303 
Invoice 







January 15, 2016 
_ _!X.,___ Used 
We invoice you for the difference between the TRAC lease residual and the actual dealer 
allowance value. (Refer to GE contract schedule #5908919-001) 
TRAC lease residual: 








PO Box 15398 
Boise, ID 83715-5398 
FAX 208-342-5199 
1-800-395-6410 
Skinner Trucking, Inc. 
P.O. Box 709 
Twin Falls ID 83303 
Invoice 







January 15, 2016 
X Used 
We invoice you for the difference between the TRAC lease residual and the actual dealer 
allowance value. (Refer to GE contract schedule #5908919-001) 
TRAC lease residual: 








PO Box 15398 
Boise, ID 83715-5398 
FAX 208•342-5199 
1-800-395-6410 
Skinner Trucking, Inc. 
P.O. Box 709 
Twin Falls ID 83303 
Invoice 







January 15, 2016 
_ _,x"-- Used 
We invoice you for the difference between the TRAC lease residual and the actual dealer 
allowance value. (Refer to GE contract schedule #5908919-001) 
TRAC lease residual: 
LESS: Dealer allowance 






JOE ROCKSTAHL [ISBN #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd. 
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile (208) 734-8820 
Email: service@ioerocksthl.com
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) CASE NO: CV42-16-2539 








SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 








COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney, and move the court for 
summary judgment pursuant to IRCP 56 on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This motion is made and based upon the records, files and pleadings in the above-entitled 
action, as well as the Memorandum and Affidavits in Support, filed concurrently herewith.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this $) / day of February, 2017.
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd.
Joe Rockstahl 
Attorney for Defendants
DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Electronically Filed
3/1/2017 5:44:59 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Tami Kirkham, Deputy Clerk
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S   FFI  htd. 
510 incoln St. 
T in Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsi ile (208) 734-8820 
ail: service ioeroc st l.c  
ttorney for efendants 
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ST TE F I , I   F     I   
E T  S LES P , a tah ) 




S I  I , I . , an Idaho 
corporation; J  . I , an 













efendants. ) - --------------
 :  42- -  
' 
S  J  
S  the efendants, by and tlu·  t eir att r e , a   t  mi f r 
su ary judg ent pursuant to I P 56 on the grounds that there is n  e i e iss e f at ri l 
fact and, therefore, efendants are entitled t  j e t as a atter f l . 
his otion is a e a  ase   t  r r s, fil s  l i  i  t  titl  
action, as ell as the e orandu  and ffi a its i  1i, file  rr tl  r it . 
ral argu ent is requested. 
DATED this J{/__ day of February, 2017. 
S   I  t . 
Joe ~ 
ttorney for efendants 
EFE TS' I  F  S  J  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
&I HEREBY CERTIFY that on «37 day of February, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons, and I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method 




BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, HIGH & 
MOLLERUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 366




[ ] First Class Mail 
[X] iCourt eFile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] electronic
or Legal Assistant
DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
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CERTIFI TE F SE I  
I  I  t at ~7r,!,. a  f r r , ,  tr   rr t   t  
foregoing docu ent as filed ith the lerk f the rt si  t e i rt fil  st  i  
sent~ otice of lectronic Filing to the follo ing ers s, a  I ser e   tr   rr t  
of the foregoing by delivering the sa e to each f the f ll i  i i i als  t  t  
indicated belo , addressed as follo s: 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
ichael anielson 
ren ollerup 
BE IT, LE E , , I   
P, P  
P . . ox 366 
in Falls, I  83303-0366 
Fax: 208-734-1438 
ollerup benoitla .c  
danielson@benoitla .co  
[ ] First lass ail 
[ ] i omi e ile 
[ ] and elivery 
[ ] Facsi ile 
[ ] electronic 
~k.~Wk 
loeockstahl 
or egal ssistant 
EFE TS ' TE TI  F  S  J   
JOE ROCKSTAHL [ISBN #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd. 
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile (208) 734-8820 
Email: service@ioerockstahl.com
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) CASE NO: CV42-16-2539
corporation, doing business in the state of 
Idaho,
)
) DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
OPPOSING PLAINTIFF’S 





SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 








COMES NOW the above named Defendants, Skinner Trucking, Inc., James Skinner and 
David Skinner, by and through their attorney or record, Joe Rockstahl of Rockstahl Law Office, 
Chtd., and submits their Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTS
1. Plaintiff sold three Kenworth tractors to GE TF Trust who then leased the tractors to 
Defendants on or about 08/18/2011. Complaint paragraph 6, Answer paragraph II.
2. At the end of the lease Defendants turned in two of the subject tractors and about two 
months later turned in the third tractor. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 12, 
Affidavit of Bill Pahl paragraphs 8 and 9.
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
OPPOSING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
Electronically Filed
3/1/2017 5:44:59 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Tami Kirkham, Deputy Clerk
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ST L L  FFI E htd. 
510 Lincoln St. 
in Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsi ile (208) 734-8820 
E ail: service ioerockstahl.co  
ttorney for efendants 
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I  I , I . , an Idaho 
corporation; J ES E. S I ER, an 













_________ _e_fe_n_d_a_nt_s_. ___  
CASE NO: CV42-16-2539 
S' I I  
S  J E T  
PP SI  PL I TIFF'S 
I   S  
J E T 
ES  the above na ed efendants, Skinner Trucking, Inc., Ja es Skinner and 
avid Skinner, by and through their attorney or record, Joe ockstahl of ockstahl a  ffice, 
htd. , and sub its their rief in upport f otion for u ary Judg ent and pposing 
Plaintiffs otion for Su ary Judg ent. 
S 
1. Plaintiff sold three en orth tractors to E TF Trust ho then leased the tractors to 
efendants on or about 08/18/2011. o plaint paragraph 6, Ans er paragraph 11. 
2. t the end of the lease efendants turned in t o of the subject tractors and about t o 
onths later turned in the third tractor. ffidavit f Ja es Skinner paragraph 12, 
Affidavit of ill ahl paragraphs 8 and 9. 
F T ' I F I  T F T I  F   J T  
I  L I TIFF'  TI  F   J T - I 
3. The Master Lease provides that at the end of the lease term the Lessee shall return the 
vehicle to the Lessor; if the Lessee does not surrender the vehicle he shall be in default of 
the lease and will pay as liquidated damages 110% of the monthly rental applicable to the 
subject vehicle. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 4 and Defendant’s Exhibit 1, 
paragraph 7.
4. The Master Lease provides for a Final Adjustment at the end of the lease term, which is 
defined in the TRAC Addendum to Master Vehicle Lease Agreement. After the vehicles 
are returned, as per paragraph 7 of the Master Lease, the Lessor shall sell the vehicles and 
if the net sales amount is less than the Residual Value set out in Schedule A Even 
Payments - (TRAC) then the lessee owes the difference to Lessor, or if the net sale 
proceeds are more than the Residual Value the Lessor owes that amount to the Lessee. 
Affidavit of James Skinner paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, attached to the Affidavit: 
Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and3.
5. At the end of the subject lease, the Defendants contacted a salesperson at Kenworth to 
discuss purchasing one of the tractors, the sales person said they would find financing for 
the deal and never called back, thereafter the Defendants gave up any thought of 
purchasing a tractor. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 10.
6. The Defendants turned in the three subject tractors and walked away to wait for the 
eventual sale and Final Adjustment. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 13.
1. Unbeknownst to Defendants, the Plaintiff had purchased the three subject tractors from 
GE TF Trust at full Residual Value. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 14, Affidavit of 
Bill Pahl paragraphs 8 and 9.
8. The Defendants only learned Plaintiff had purchased the subject tractors when
Defendants received an invoice from Plaintiff, claiming they somehow owed money to 
Plaintiff due to the purchase of the subject tractors. Affidavit of Jim Skinner, paragraph
19.
9. In their Complaint at paragraph 10., Plaintiff claims: “In October of 2015, erroneously 
believing that it was somehow obligated under the GE/STI contract, Plaintiff paid STI’s 
obligation to GE.”
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
OPPOSING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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.  aster ease r i es that at the end of the lease ter  the essee shall return the 
icle t  t e ess r; if t e essee does not surrender the vehicle he shall be in default of 
t e lease a  ill a  as liquidated da ages 110  of the onthly rental applicable to the 
s j ct e icle. ffi vit f Ja es Skinner paragraph 4 and efendant's Exhibit 1, 
paragraph 7. 
. e aster ease r i es for a inal djust ent at the end of the lease ter , hich is 
fi  i  t e  e u  to aster ehicle ease gree ent. fter the vehicles 
r  ret r e , as er ara raph 7 f the aster ease, the essor shall sell the vehicles and 
if t e et sales a t is less than the esidual alue set out in Schedule  Even 
ts - ( ) t e  t e lessee o es the difference to essor, or if the net sale 
roceeds are ore than the esidual alue the Lessor o es that a ount to the Lessee. 
ffi vit f J es ki er paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, attached to the Affidavit: 
efendant's xhibits 1, 2 and 3. 
. t t e e  f t e s ject lease, the efendants contacted a salesperson at en orth to 
isc ss rc asi  e f the tractors, the sales person said they ould find financing for 
t e eal a  e er called back, thereafter the efendants gave up any thought of 
rchasing a tractor. ffidavit f Ja es Skinner paragraph I 0. 
. e efe a ts t r e  i  the three subject tractors and alked a ay to ait for the 
eventual sale and inal djust ent. ffidavit of Ja es Skinner paragraph 13. 
7. st t  efe a ts, the laintiff had purchased the three subject tractors fro  
  r st t f ll si l al e. ffi vit f J es Skinner paragraph 14, ffidavit f 
ill ahl paragraphs 8 and 9. 
8. e efendants only learned Plaintiff had purchased the subject tractors hen 
f a ts recei e  a  i ice fro  laintiff, clai ing they so eho  o ed oney to 
l i tiff  t  t  r s  f t e s ject tract rs. ffidavit f Ji  Skinner, paragraph 
19. 
. I  t eir lai t at ara raph 10., laintiff clai s: "In ctober of 2015, erroneously 
li i  t t it s s  li ate  er t e / I contract, laintiff paid S I's 
obligation to ." 
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10. In the Affidavit of Bill Pahl at paragraph 6, second sentence, Plaintiff claims that because 
the Defendants were long term customers they would help us out by paying off the lease 
residual amounts.
11. In paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that the contract was between 
GE TF Trust and Skinner Trucking.
12. When the subject tractors were dropped off at Plaintiffs yard they were worth 
$72,000.00 each and Plaintiff stood to make a nice profit if they purchased for the 
Residual Value and flipped them. Shortly after Plaintiff purchased the subject tractors 
from GE TF Trust, the market was flooded with similar tractors coming off lease, all of 
which had similar troubles keeping them on the road as ours had - which then caused the 
fair market value of these tractors to fall to $52,000.00. Affidavit of James Skinner, 
paragraph 26.
13. Defendant James Skinner has been in the trucking business for approximately 41 years 
and kept himself apprised of the market trends for new and used tractors, new and used 
trailers and the going rates for different kinds of freight, among other things; this is how 
he knew about the changing values of the subject tractors. Affidavit of James Skinner, 
paragraph 29.
14. The Defendants never obtained an ownership interest in the subject tractors. Affidavit of 
James Skinner, paragraph 30.
15. There is no purchase option set forth in the Master Lease or Addendums thereto. Affidavit 
of James Skinner, paragraph 32, Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
16. At the end of the subject lease period the equipment is required to be turned in to it can 
be sold. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 33, Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
17. Plaintiff, a third party outside of the lease contract between GE TF Trust and Defendants, 
purchased the subject tractors at the Residual Value set forth in Defendant’s Exhibit 2, 
which resulted in the subject leases’ Final Adjustment being zero - Defendants neither 
gained nor lost from the sale. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 31, Defendant’s 
Exhibit 2.
18. In all the years, approximately 21, that we have leased Kenworth’s we have never been 
advised of a Final Adjustment or similar calculation at the end of a lease. Affidavit of 
James Skinner, paragraph 21.
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
OPPOSING PUAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -
54
10. In the ffidavit of ill Pahl at paragraph 6, second sentence, Plaintiff clai s that because 
the efendants ere long ter  custo ers they ould help us out by paying off the lease 
residual a ounts. 
11. In paragraph 10 of the o plaint, laintiff ackno ledges that the contract as bet een 
  rust and kinner rucking. 
12. hen the subject tractors ere dropped off at laintiff's yard they ere orth 
, .  eac  a  lai tiff st  t  a e a ice r fit if t e  rc ase  f r t e 
esidual alue and flipped the . hortly after laintiff purchased the subject tractors 
fro    rust, the arket as flooded ith si ilar tractors co ing off lease, all f 
hich had si ilar troubles keeping the  on the road as ours had - hich then caused the 
fair ar et al e f t ese tract rs t  fall t  , . . ffi vit f J es ki er, 
paragraph 26. 
13. efendant Ja es kinner has been in the trucking business for approxi ately 41 years 
and kept hi self apprised of the arket trends for ne  and used tractors, ne  and used 
trailers and the going rates for different kinds of freight, a ong other things; this is ho  
he kne  about the changing values of the subject tractors. ffidavit of Ja es Skinner, 
paragraph 2 9. 
14. he efendants never obtained an o nership interest in the subject tractors. ffidavit f 
Jeanes Skinner, paragraph 30. 
15. here is no purchase option set forth in the aster ease or ddendu s thereto. Affidavit 
f Ja es Skinner, paragraph 32, efendant's xhibits 1, 2 and 3. 
16. t the end of the subject lease period the equip ent is required to be turned in to it can 
be sold. ffidavit f Ja es Skinner, paragraph 33, efendant's xhibits 1, 2 and 3. 
17. laintiff, a third party outside of the lease contract bet een   rust and efendants, 
purchased the subject tractors at the esidual alue set forth in efendant's xhibit 2, 
hich resulted in the subject leases' inal djust ent being zero - efendants neither 
gained nor lost fro  the sale. ffidavit f Jmnes Skinner, paragraph 31, efendant's 
xhibit 2. 
18. In all the years, approxi ately 21, that e have leased en orth's e have never been 
a ise  f a i al j st e t r si ilar calc lati  at t e e  f a lease. ffi vit f 
Jmnes Skinner, paragraph 21. 
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19. After a lease turn in prior to the subject tractors, the GPS until remained working on that 
vehicle and we saw that it went from Salinas, California to New York every week until 
the GPS subscription expired several weeks later. There was no Final Adjustment on that 
vehicle and it had obviously been sold after turn in. Affidavit of James Skinner, 
paragraph 22.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
“Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in 
favor of the non-moving party. Dorea Enterprises, Inc, v. City of Blackfoot, 144 
Idaho 422, 424, 163 P.3d 211,213 (2007) (citation omitted). This Court exercises free 
review over questions of law. Id. ”
Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 61, 205 P.3d 1203 (Idaho, 2009).
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that they have unjustly enriched the Defendants by purchasing the 
three tractors at the Residual Value set forth in the Master Lease and Schedule A thereto.
Defendants would point out that their contract was with GE TF Trust; the only 
contact Defendants had with the Plaintiffs was for maintenance and repair of the subject 
tractors. Defendants never had an ownership interest in the subject tractors and after 
Plaintiffs salesperson failed to follow through on financing - no intention of purchasing 
the subject tractors.
In the Complaint at paragraph 10, the Plaintiff claims they erroneously thought 
they were obligated under Skinner Trucking’s lease with GE TF Trust and purchased the 
trucks, two in October and the third in December of 2015. If that were true, Plaintiff 
should have explained that to GE TF Trust and if something could not be worked out,
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19. fter a lease turn in prior to the s ject tract rs, t e  til r i  r i   t t 
vehicle and e sa  that it ent fr  ali as, alif r ia t   r  r   til 
the PS subscription expired several ee s later. ere s  i l j st t  t t 
vehicle an  it a  i sl  ee  s l  ft r t r  i . ffi it f  i , 
paragra  22. 
S  J   
" u ar  j e t is a r ri t  if "t  l i , iti ,  i i   
file, together ith the affidavits, if a , s  t at t ere is  i  iss  s t   
aterial fact and that the ovi  art  is e title  t   j t s  tt r fl ." 
I. . .P. 56(c). isputed facts sh l  e c str e  i  fa r f t  - i  rt , 
and all reasonable inferences that ca  e ra  fr  t e r r  r  t   r  i  
favor of the non- oving part . re  ter rises, I c. v. it  { l f t,  
Idaho 422,424, 163 .3d 211,  ( ) (citati  itt ). is rt r i  fr  
revie  over questions f la . Id." 
r strong v. ar ers Ins. o. f I ,  I a  7,  .   (I , ). 
 
Plaintiff argues that they ha e j stl  e ric e  t  f ts  r i  t  
three tractors at the esidual alue set f rt  i  t e aster s   l   t r t . 
efendants ould point out t at t eir c tract as it    r st; t  l  
contact efe a ts a  it  t  l i tiffs s f r i t   r ir  t  j t 
tractors. efendants never had an o ers i  i terest i  t e s j t tr t rs  ft r 
Plaintiff's salesperson failed to follo  t r   fi a ci  -  i t ti  f r i  
the subject tractors. 
In the o plaint at paragra  , t e lai tiff clai s t  rr sl  t t 
they ere obligated under kinner r c i 's lease it    r st  r s  t  
trucks, t o in ctober and the thir  i  ece er f . If t t r  tr , l i tiff 
should have explained that to   r st a  if s et i  l  t  r  t, 
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Plaintiff should have filed suit against GE TF Trust for return of the monies erroneously 
paid.
In their affidavit in support of summary judgment, Plaintiff claims they purchased 
the tractors to basically help Defendants out of a bind; Defendants deny this outright and 
state they never discussed Plaintiff purchasing the vehicles on their behalf. The 
Defendants story is true as evidenced by the problems they had trying to keep these three 
tractors on the road - why would they want to purchase these troublesome vehicles?
Defendants owed no obligation to GE TF Trust until the subject vehicles were 
sold and the Final Adjustment was calculated. As set forth in the Master Lease, Schedules 
and Addendums, the sale of the leased vehicles is the triggering event for the Final 
Adjustment and determination if the Defendants owed GE TF Trust anything. Over the 
years, Defendants never received a Final Adjustment, they just turned the tractors in at 
the end of the lease and walked away.
The Plaintiff is an outside third party not in privity of contract with Defendants 
who purchased the subject vehicles of their own accord.
“The district court held that existing Idaho law "fails to recognize a cause of 
action under either the theory of fraud or unjust enrichment where the alleged injured 
party has no relationship with the alleged injuring party." Therefore, the district court 
concluded that Bannock Paving was entitled to summary judgment.”
Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463,465-66, 797 P.2d 863, 865-66 
(1990)
As set forth above and in the Affidavit of James Skinner, there was no vehicle 
ownership interest between the parties and no purchase/sales relationship.
“If reasonable certainty is not attained and if it is speculative or doubtful whether 
a benefit would have been derived, then a complaining party must fail, because adequate 
proof is lacking. Hoskins v. Scott, 52 Or. 271, 96 P. 1112; Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 
185, 259 P.2d 810; McNichols v. J. R. Simplot Co., 74 Idaho 321, 262 P.2d 1012; 
OBrien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348, 194 P.2d 608.”
Head v. Crone. 76 Idaho 196, 200, 279 P.2d 1064, 1065 (1955)
“Damages need be proved only with a reasonable certainty and taken out of the 
realm of speculation. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-
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laintiff should have filed suit against   rust for return of the onies erroneously 
paid. 
In their affidavit in support f su ary judg ent, laintiff clai s they purchased 
the tractors to basically help efendants out f a bind; efendants deny this outright and 
state they never discussed laintiff purchasing the vehicles on their behalf. he 
efendants story is true as evidenced by the proble s they had trying to keep these three 
tractors on the road - hy ould they ant to purchase these troubleso e vehicles? 
efendants o ed no obligation to   rust until the subject vehicles ere 
sold and the inal djust ent as calculated. s set forth in the aster ease, chedules 
and ddendu s, the sale of the leased vehicles is the triggering event for the inal 
djust ent and deter ination if the efendants o ed   rust anything. ver the 
years, efendants never received a inal djust ent, they just turned the tractors in at 
the end of the lease and alked a ay. 
he laintiff is an outside third party not in privity f contract ith efendants 
ho purchased the subject vehicles of their o n accord. 
" he district court held that existing Idaho la  "fails to recognize a cause of 
action under either the theory of fraud or unjust enrich ent here the alleged injured 
party has no relationship ith the alleged injuring party." herefore, the district comi 
concluded that annock Paving as entitled to su ary judg ent." 
eco onstr. o. v. annock aving o., 118 Idaho 463, 465-66, 797 .2d 863, 865-66 
(1990) 
s set forth above and in the ffidavit of Ja es kinner, there as no vehicle 
o nership interest bet een the parties and no purchase/sales relationship. 
"If reasonable certainty is not attained and if it is speculative or doubtful hether 
a benefit ould have been derived, then a co plaining pmiy ust fail, because adequate 
proof is lacking. oskins v. Scott, 52 r. 271, 96 P. 1112; illia s v. one, 74 Idaho 
185,259 .2d 810; c ichols v. J. . i plot o., 74 Idaho 321,262 .2d 1012; 
' rien v. est, 68 Idaho 348, 194 P.2d 608." 
ead v. rone, 76 Idaho 196,200,279 P.2d 1064, 1065 (1955) 
" a ages need be proved only ith a reasonable certainty and taken out of the 
real  f speculation. nderson  afziger v. . . e co b, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-
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83, 595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979).”
Hake v. DeLane. 117 Idaho 1058, 1063, 793 P.2d 1230, 1235 (1990)
In this matter, damages are speculative at best, the Plaintiff claims estimated damages, 
the subject vehicles are still on the Plaintiffs lot waiting to be sold; and therefore any guess at a 
value for the subject vehicles is speculative and doubtful and should not be allowed.
“Appellant also advances the proposition that the damages are remote and 
speculative. These terms are defined in 25 C.J.S. Damages § 2, pp. 459 and 460 as 
follows:
"Remote damages. Remote damages are such as are the result of accident or an 
unusual combination of circumstances which could not reasonably be anticipated, and 
over which the party sought to be charged had no control."
"Speculative damages. The term 'speculative damages' is sometimes used as 
synonymous with 'exemplary damages'; but ordinarily damages are said to be speculative 
when the probability that a circumstance will exist as an element for compensation 
becomes conjectural."
From all of the evidence it must be concluded that the damages were remote and
speculative.
Having concluded the damages were remote and speculative, and therefore not 
recoverable by the respondents, the judgment on the cross-complaint is reversed and the 
cross-complaint ordered dismissed.”
Lockwood Graders v. Neibaur, 80 Idaho 123, 128-29, 326 P.2d 675, 677-78 (1958)
In the instant matter, re: remote damages: in all their years of leasing Kenworth’s 
the Defendants never received the results from a Final Adjustment, making the claimed 
damages not reasonably foreseeable and over which the Defendants’ had no control.
Re: speculative damages: the subject vehicles have not been sold and any attempt 
to estimate value is speculative and should not be allowed.
“Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable where the plaintiff 
in an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the benefit 
conferred upon the defendant.
Id. at 667, 619 P.2d at 1120. See also Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d' Alene 
Ltd., Ill Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062 (Ct.App.1986).”
Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990)
As set forth above, the plaintiff in the instant case cannot establish a value for any 
alleged benefit conferred upon the defendants and therefore the doctrine of unjust enrichment is 
inapplicable.
“The two theories, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, are simply different 
measures of recovery as equitable remedies.
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83,595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979)." 
akev. e ane, 117 Idaho 1058, 1063, 793 P.2d 1230, 1235 (1990) 
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the subject vehicles are still on the laintiffs lot aiting to be sold; and therefore any guess at a 
value for the subject vehicles is speculative and doubtful and should not be allo ed. 
" ppellant also advances the proposition that the da ages are re ote and 
speculative. hese ter s are defined in 25 .J. . a ages § 2, pp. 459 and 460 as 
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ro  all of the evidence it ust be concluded that the da ages ere re ote and 
speculative. 
aving concluded the da ages ere re ote and speculative, and therefore not 
recoverable by the respondents, the judg ent on the cross-co plaint is reversed and the 
cross-co plaint ordered dis issed." 
ock ood raders v. eibaur, 80 Idaho 123, 128-29, 326 .2d 675, 677-78 (1958) 
In the instant atter, re: re ote da ages: in all their years ofleasing en orth's 
the efendants never received the results fro  a inal djust ent, aking the clai ed 
da ages not reasonably foreseeable and over hich the efendants' had no control. 
e: speculative da ages: the subject vehicles have not been sold and any atte pt 
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" njust enrich ent is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable here the plaintiff 
in an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the benefit 
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Id. at 667,619 P.2d at 1120. See also ro n v. acht lub of oeur d' lene 
td., 111 Idaho 195, 722 .2d 1062 ( t. pp.1986)." 
eco onstr. o. v. annock aving o., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 .2d 863,866 (1990) 
s set forth above, the plaintiff in the instant case cannot establish a value for any 
alleged benefit conferred upon the defendants and therefore the doctrine of unjust enrich ent is 
inapplicable. 
" he t o theories, quantu  eruit and unjust enrich ent, are si ply different 
easures f recovery as equitable re edies. 
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Neither of these two theories allows recovery by a subcontractor who lacks a 
contractual relationship directly with a property owner.
Thus it is said that a landowner will not be held liable for work or material furnished by a 
subcontractor to a contractor, pursuant to a contractual arrangement between the 
contractor and subcontractor, where the landowner is not a party to this contractual 
arrangement.
It is true that there is an exception to this general rule under the mechanic's lien 
laws, where if a subcontractor is not paid, he may enforce his claim for compensation 
directly against the landowner.”
Great Plains Equip, v. Nw, Pipeline Corn.. 132 Idaho 754, 768, 979 P.2d 627, 641 (1999)
Great Plains, supra., makes it clear that unjust enrichment as between a subcontractor 
and a property owner requires a contract between the parties; and notes that the mechanic’s lien 
laws are an exception to this general rule. There was no contract, real or imagined, between 
Kenworth and the Defendants.
Somewhat similar to the instant case is the Independent School District, infra., case, 
where a purchaser bought a parcel of land from a developer, which parcel included restrictive 
covenants; the purchaser then sold the property at fair market value to a university, the university 
used its condemnation powers to do away with the restrictive covenants. The developer sought to 
sue the buyer claiming he was unjustly enriched in this transaction; the court disagreed.
“The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harris' unjust enrichment 
claim because Harris did not confer any benefit to Brighton when it sold the Property to 
Brighton.”
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P’ship, 150 Idaho 583, 589, 249 P.3d 382, 388 
(2011)
In our case, Kenworth thought they could purchase and flip the subject tractors at a nice 
profit, so they contacted GE TF Trust and negotiated a sales price which just happened to be the 
Residual Value. Thereafter, the market for these type of semi-tractors fell below what was 
anticipated.
The prima facie case for unjust enrichment is:
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and
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either f these t o theories allo s recovery by a subcontractor ho lacks a 
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" he district court properly granted su ary judg ent on arris' unjust enrich ent 
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(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof.
Independent School District, supra.
1. Kenworth cannot give a value of the alleged benefit to Defendants.
2. As the Defendants have never received a Final Adjustment calculation after turning in 
leased vehicles, there was no benefit to the Defendants and therefore nothing to 
“appreciate”.
3. The Defendants dropped off the leased vehicles and walked away, there is nothing 
inequitable on their part.
“Inequity exists if a transaction is inherently unfair. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905,
910, 42 P.3d 698, 703 (2002). Yet the doctrine "does not operate to rescue a party from 
the consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one."
Since unjust enrichment does not provide compensation simply because one 
suffers the consequences of his own bad bargain, we find that the district court properly 
granted Brighton's motion for summary judgment dismissing Harris' unjust enrichment 
claim.” Emphasis added.
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P’ship, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 P.3d 382, 389 
(2011)
This is exactly what Kenworth is attempting to do, use unjust enrichment to rescue 
themselves from a bad bargain. They didn’t sue GE TF Trust as GE TF Trust has significant 
resources to fight off such a move; whereas the Defendants have limited resources.
For all the reasons listed above, the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be 
denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted.
DATED this day of February, 2017.
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd.
JoirKockstahl
Attorney for Defendants
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(3) acceptance of the benefit under circu stances that ould be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit ithout pay ent to the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
Independent School istrict, supra. 
1. en orth cannot give a value of the alleged benefit to efendants. 
2. s the efendants have never received a Final djust ent calculation after turningin 
leased vehicles, there as no benefit to the efendants and therefore nothing to 
"appreciate". 
3. he efendants dropped off the leased vehicles and alked a ay, there is nothing 
inequitable on their part. 
"Inequity exists if a transaction is inherently unfair. ing v. ang, 136 Idaho 905, 
910, 42 .3d 698, 703 (2002) . et t e doctri e does ot operate to resc e a party fro  
the consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one." 
Since unjust enrich ent does not provide co pensation si ply because one 
suffers the consequences of his own bad bargain, e find that the district comi properly 
granted righton's otion for su ary judg ent dis issing arris' unjust enrich ent 
clai ." phasis added 
Indep. Sch. ist. v. arris Fa ily Ltd. P'ship, 150 Idaho 583 , 590, 249 P.3d 382, 389 
(2011) 
his is exactly hat en orth is atte pting to do, use unjust enrich ent to rescue 
the selves fro  a bad bargain. They didn' t sue E TF Trust as E TF Trust has significant 
resources to fight off such a ove; hereas the efendants have li ited resources. 
For all the reasons listed above, the laintiffs otion for su ary judg ent ust be 
denied and efendant' s otion for su ary judg ent granted. 
TE  this J:)_ day of February, 2017. 
S   I  htd. 
ttorney for efendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ^ 7 day of February, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons, and I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method 




BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 366




[ ] First Class Mail 
[X] iCourt eFile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
| ] electronic
or Legal Assistant
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E TIFI TE F S I  
I E E  E IF  that on d day of ebruary, 2017, a tr e a  c rrect c  f t  
foregoing docu ent as filed ith the ler  f t e mi si  t  i rt fil  st  i  
sent a otice of lectronic iling to the foll i  ers s, a  I s r   tr   rr t  
of the foregoing by delivering the sa e to each of the fo llo ing indivi als  t e et  
indicated belo , addressed as follo s: 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
ichael anielson 
ren ollerup 
E IT, LE , , 
I   LLE P, P  
P. . ox 366 
in Falls, I  83303-0366 
Fax: 208-734-1438 
ollerup benoitla .c  
danielson benoitla .co  
[ ] irst lass ail 
[ ] i ourt eFile 
[ ] and elivery 
[ ] acsi ile 
[ ] electronic 
~.~~ 
or egal ssistant 
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JOE ROCKSTAHL [ISBN #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE Chtd. 
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile (208) 734-8820 
Email: service@ioerocksthl.com
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) CASE NO: CV42-16-2539 
corporation, doing business in the state of 
Idaho,
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES SKINNER 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 








STATE OF IDAHO )
'■§
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS)
JAMES SKINNER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
I am over the age of 18 years and make this Affidavit based upon my own1.
personal knowledge and in support of my Motion for Summary Judgment.
I am the President of Skinner Trucking, Inc. and one of the Plaintiffs in this2.
matter.
Skinner Trucking has leased Kenworth tractors for approximately the last 21o
years.




Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Tami Kirkham, Deputy Clerk
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J  S   [IS  #6576] 
ST L L  FFI E htd. 
510 incoln St. 
T in Falls, Idaho 83301 
Telephone (208) 734-8810 
acsi ile (208) 734-8820 
ail: service ioerocksthl.co  
Attorn.ey for Defendants 
I  T E IST I T T F T E FIFT  J I I L IST I T F T E 
ST TE F I , I   F   T  F T I  F LLS 
E T  S LES P , a tah ) 




S I E  T I , I ., an Idaho 
corporation; J ES E. S I E , an 











________ _e_:fi_e1_1_ _ _ts_. ___ ) 
ST TE F I  ) 
:§ 
C T  F T I  F LLS) 
S  : 42-16-2539 
I I   J  I  
S  J  
J ES S I E , being first duly s orn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I a  over the age of 18 years and ake this ffidavit based upon y o n 
personal kno ledge and in support of y otion for Su ary Judg ent. 
2. I a  the President of Skinner rucking, Inc. and one of the Plaintiffs in this 
matter. 
3. Skinner Trucking has leased en orth tractors for approxi ately the last 21 
years. 
FFI VIT F J ES SK I E  IN SUPP RT F TI  F R S RY 
J E T - Page - I 
4. Attached as Defendant’s Exhibit 1, is a true and accurate copy of the Master
Vehicle Lease Agreement which is the subject of this litigation.
Attached as Defendant’s Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of Schedule A Even5.
Payments (TRAC).
6. Attached as Defendant’s Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of the TRAC
Addendum to Master Vehicle Lease Agreement.
In the Master Lease at page 3, paragraph 8, it sets forth that the Final Adjustment7.
is as set forth in the applicable Addendum; the applicable addendum is Defendant’s Exhibit 3
and in Section 2 of that document it sets forth the Final Adjustment.
In my experience and as set forth in Defendant’s Exhibit 3, Section 2, at the end8.
of the lease the vehicles are turned in where GE TF Trust designates, typically at the Kenworth
dealer in either Boise or Jerome, the vehicles are supposed to be sold and if the net sales amount
is less than the Residual Value, Skinner Trucking would pay the difference, and if the net sales
amount is more than the Residual Value, the difference is supposed be refunded to Skinner
Trucking.
The Residual Value for the subject tractors is set forth in Defendant’s Exhibit 2,9.
Schedule A Even Payments - (TRAC), and in this case was $58,051.20 for each vehicle.
Skinner Trucking considered purchasing one of the three tractors and talked with10.
a sales person about that purchase; the sales person said they would find financing for the sale,
but nothing further happened so we abandoned that idea.
Skinner Trucking had trouble keeping these three tractors on the road as they had11.
multiple sensors to help control emissions which would go bad causing the truck to shut down, it
seemed these tractors spent one week each month in the shop. As a result Skinner Trucking had
trouble keeping drivers employed.
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4. ttached as efendant's i it 1, is a tr e a  r t   f t  t r 
ehicle ease ree e t ic  is t  s j t f t is liti ti . 
5. ttac e  as efe a t's i it  is  tr   r t    l    
Pay ents ( ). 
6. ttached as efendant's i it  is a tr e a  a r t   f t   
ddendu  to aster e icle ease r t. 
7. In the aster ease at page , ara ra  , it sets f01i  t t t  i l j t t 
is as set f rt  i  t  li l  ; t  li l   i  t'    
and in ection 2 f t at c e t it sets f rt  t  i l j st t. 
8. In y experience and as set f rt  i  efe a t's i it , ti  , t t   
f the lease the ve icles are t r e  i  r    r st si t , t i ll  t t  t  
dealer in either ise r Jer e, t e e i l s r  s s  t   l   if t  t l  t 
is less than the esi al al e, i er r i  l   t  iff r ,  i  t  t l  
a ount is re t a  t e esi al l , t  iff r  is s   r f  t  i  
r c i . 
9. he esidual alue for the s ject tract rs is set f rt  i  f t's i it , 
chedule  ve  a e ts - ( ),  i  t is s  s , .  f r  i l . 
10. Skinner rucking considere  rc asi  e f t  t r  tr t rs  t l  it  
a sales person a t t at rc ase; t e s l s rs  s i  t  l  fi  fi i  f  t  l , 
but nothing further happened so e aband e  t at i ea. 
11. i er r c i  a  tr l  i  t s  t r  tr t r   t  r   t   
ultiple sensors t  el  c tr l e issi s i  l    i  t  tr  t  t , it 
see ed these tractors spent one eek eac  t  i  t e s . s  r s lt i r r i   
trouble keepi  ri ers e l e . 
AFFI IT F J S S I  I  S   I    
J E T - Page -2 
Skinner Trucking turned two of the subject tractors in at the end of the lease12.
period and about two months later turned in the third tractor. GE TF Trust had the tractors sent to
Thermo King to have the tri-packs removed and then to Kenworth in Boise.
At turn in, Skinner Trucking had no intention of purchasing any of the tractors13.
and simply walked away to await the eventual sale and Final Adjustment.
Unbeknownst to Skinner Trucking the Plaintiff purchased the three subject14.
tractors from GE TF Trust at full Residual Value.
In their Complaint at paragraph 10., Plaintiff claims: “In October of 2015,15.
erroneously believing that it was somehow obligated under the GE/STI contract, Plaintiff paid
STI’s obligation to GE.”
In the Affidavit of Bill Pahl at paragraph 6, second sentence, Plaintiff claims that16.
because we were long term customers they would help us out by paying off the lease residual
amounts.
Your affiant would point out that these are two completely different positions that17.
Plaintiff claims; which makes any assertions by Plaintiff doubtful at best.
In paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that the contract was18.
between GE TF Trust and Skinner Trucking.
Your affiant became aware that Plaintiff had purchased the subject tractors only19.
when we received the invoice claiming we somehow owed them money due to their purchase of
the tractors.
Your affiant would point out that pursuant to the lease terms, there would be no20.
obligation between Skinner Trucking and GE TF Trust until the tractors were sold and the Final
Adjustment was calculated.
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12. kinner rucking turned t o of the subject tractors in at the end of the lease 
period and about t o onths later turned in the third tractor.  F rust had the tractors sent to 
her o ing to have the tri-packs re oved and then to en orth in oise. 
13. t tum in, Skinner rucking had no intention of purchasing any of the tractors 
and si ply alked a ay to a ait the eventual sale and Final djust ent. 
14. nbekno nst to kinner rucking the laintiff purchased the three subject 
tractors fro  E TF Trust at full esidual alue. 
15. In their o plaint at paragraph 10., laintiff clai s: "In ctober f 2015, 
erroneously believing that it as so eho  obligated under the / I contract, laintiff paid 
STI's obligation to E." 
16. In the ffidavit of ill ahl at paragraph 6, second sentence, laintiff clai s that 
because e ere long ter  custo ers they ould help us out by paying off the lease residual 
amounts. 
17. our affiant ould point out that these are t o co pletely different positions that 
Plaintiff clai s; hich akes any asse1iions by Plaintiff doubtful at best. 
18. I  ara ra   f t e lai t, lai tiff ac le es t at t e c tract as 
bet een  F rust and Skinner rucking. 
19. our affiant beca e a are that Plaintiff had purchased the subject tractors only 
hen e received the invoice clai ing e so eho  o ed the  oney due to their purchase f 
the tractors. 
20. our affiant ould point out that pursuant to the lease ter s, there ould be no 
obligation bet een kinner rucking and   rust until the tractors ere sold and the inal 
djust ent as calculated. 
AFFIDAVIT F J ES S I E  IN S PP T F TI N F R S  
J E T - Page -3 
In all the years we have leased Kenworth’s we have never been advised of a Final21.
Adjustment or similar calculation at the end of a lease.
One of the Kenworth’s leased prior to these three was turned in at Kenworth, I22.
believe it was subsequently sold as we still received GPS data from that truck and it went from
Salinas, California to New York every week for several months after we turned it in.
I did not discuss our business with anyone at Kenworth, it just never came up and23.
when we did talk with Kenworth personnel it was about getting the tractors repaired.
I would discuss our business with GE TF Trust from time to time; because it24.
involved payments on the lease.
We did not discuss Plaintiff purchasing the subject tractors at any time, they did25.
that on their own.
Your affiant’s understanding is that when the subject tractors were dropped off at26.
Plaintiffs yard they were worth $72,000.00 each and Plaintiff stood to make a nice profit if they
purchased for the Residual Value and flipped them. Shortly after Plaintiff purchased the subject
tractors from GE TF Trust, the market was flooded with similar tractors coming off lease, all of
which had similar troubles keeping them on the road as ours had - which then caused the fair
market value of these tractors to fall to $52,000.00.
Your affiant recalls that around the time Plaintiff purchased the subject tractors or27.
shortly after, there was a big change in personnel employed by Plaintiff - employees were fired,
hired, demoted and moved around.
Your affiant was recently in Boise and saw that the subject tractors were still28.
sitting on Plaintiffs lot unsold, the claim of unjust enrichment is unfounded and any claim of
damages is speculative.
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21. In all the years e have leased en orth' s e have never been advised f a inal 
djust ent or si ilar calculation at the end of a lease. 
. ne of the en orth's leased prior to these three as turned in at en orth, I 
believe it as subsequently sold as e still received  data fro  that truck and it ent fro  
alinas, alifornia to e  ork every eek for several onths after e turned it in. 
. I did not discuss our business ith anyone at en orth, it just never ca e up and 
hen e did talk ith en orth personnel it as about getting the tractors repaired. 
. I ould discuss our business ith  F rust fro  ti e to ti e; because it 
involved pay ents on the lease. 
. e did not discuss laintiff purchasing the subject tractors at any ti e, they did 
that on their o n. 
26. our affiant' s understanding is that hen the subject tractors ere dropped off at 
lai tiffs ar  t e  ere rt  , .  eac  a  lai tiff st  t  a e a ice r fit if t e  
purchased for the esidual alue and flipped the . h01ily after laintiff purchased the subject 
tractors fro    rust, the arket as flooded ith si ilar tractors co ing off lease, all of 
hich had si ilar troubles keeping the  on the road as ours had - hich then caused the fair 
ar et al e f t ese tract rs t  fall t  , . . 
 7. our affiant recalls that around the ti e laintiff purchased the subject tractors or 
shortly after, there as a big change in personnel e ployed by laintiff- e ployees ere fired, 
hired, de oted and oved around. 
. r affia t as rece tl  i  ise a  sa  t at t e s ject tract rs ere still 
sitting on laintiff's lot unsold, the clai  of unjust enrich ent is unfounded and any clai  of 
da ages is speculative. 
I I   J S S I  I  S   I   S  
JUD ENT - Page -4 
Your affiant has been in the trucking business for approximately 41 years and I29.
keep myself apprised of the market trends for new and used tractors, new and used trailers and
the going rates for different kinds of freight, among other things; this is how I knew what the
changing values of the subject tractors were.
The Defendants contracted with GE TF Trust and leased the subject tractors, we30.
executed powers of attorney which allowed us to license and register the tractors and GE TG
Trust to remain on the title. The Defendants never had an ownership interest in the tractors.
A third party, outside the GE TF Trust lease contract with Skinner Trucking,31.
came alone and purchased the subject tractors at the Residual Value set forth in Defendant’s
Exhibit 2, which resulted in the subject leases’s Final Adjustment being zero - Defendants
neither gained nor lost from the sale.
There is no purchase option set forth in the Master Lease or Addendums thereto.32.
At the end of the lease period the equipment is required to be turned in so it cano o J)J).
be sold.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this day of February, 2017.
^ James Skinner
President, Skinner Trucking Inc.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me thisj 7 day of February, 2017.
tSfahsfct
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Twin Falls,Idaho 
My Commission Expires: U • (o c>2_0 / 'J
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29. our affiant has been in the trucking business for approxi ately 41 years and I 
keep yself apprised f the arket trends for ne  and used tractors, ne  and used trailers and 
the going rates for different kinds of freight , a ong other things; this is ho  I kne  hat the 
changing values of the subject tractors ere. 
30. he efendants contracted ith  F rust and leased the subject tractors, e 
executed po ers of attorney hich allo ed us to license and register the tractors and   
rust to re ain on the title. he efendants never had an o nership interest in the tractors. 
31.  third pmiy, outside the  F rust lease contract ith Skinner rucking, 
ca e alone and purchased the subject tractors at the esidual alue set forth in efendant's 
Exhibit 2, hich resulted in the subject leases' s Final djust ent being zero - efendants 
neither gained nor lost fro  the sale. 
32. here is no purchase option set fo11h in the aster ease or ddendu s thereto. 
33  t the end of the lease period the equip ent is required to be turned in so it can 
be sold . 
F RT ER R FFI T S  ET  T. 
TE  this a day of February, 2017. 
~~ i skin  
President, Skinner rucking Inc. 
S S I   S  o before e this ~ day of February, 2017. 
~ ~~lo1lli 
esiding at in Falls,ldaho 
r..e · f  ~ ;)..(!) I J 
FFI V IT F J ES S I E  I  SUPP T F TI  F  SU Y 
J E T - Page -5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on@7 ^day of February, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System which 
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons, and I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method 




BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
P.O. Box 366




[ ] First Class Mail 
[X] iCourt eFile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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E TIFI TE F SE I E 
o,) t~
foregoing docu ent as filed ith the lerk of the ourt using the i ourt file Syste  hich 
sent a otice of lectronic Filing to the follo ing persons, and I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by delivering the sa e to each of the fo llo ing individuals by the ethod 
indicated belo , addressed as follo s: 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
ichael anielson 
ren ollerup 
BE IT, LE ER, R , 
I   LLER P, PLLC 
P. . ox 366 
T in Falls, I  83303-0366 
Fax: 208-734-1438 
ollerup benoitla .co  
danielson@benoitla .co  
[ ] First lass ail 
[ ] i ourt eFile 
[ ] and elivery 
[ ] Facsi ile 
[ ] electronic 
~ Qdjk Joe ockstahl 
r galksista t 
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MASTER VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS MASTER VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT is mado as cl 10/07/2010. between General F.leclric Capital Corporation. its 
successors, endorsees and assigns ("Lesson with a place ol business located at 300 E. John Carpenter Freoway, Irving, TX 75062­
2712 and SKINNER TRUCKING. INC. (“Lessee"), a Idaho corporation with its principal place ol business located at P.O. Box 709 
TWIN FALLS. 10 03303.
!
IN CONSIDERATION of Ihe mutual covenants hereinafter contained, Lessor hereby leases lo Lessee, and Lessee hereby 
leases (rom Lessor, one or more voliicles as shall from time to lime bo described in Schedules, Vehicle Purchase Orders or Delivery 
Receipts executed by authorized employees and agems ol Lessee and accepted by Lessor, at ils sole discretion, lor the rental and 
lease term and upon the terms and conditions sol forth below:
LEASE. This Agreement is a contract of leasing only and shall consist ol Ihe general terms and conditions stated heroin which 
shall be applicable lo every Vehicle leased hereunder, any Schedule which may nerealler be allached hereto describing certain 
Vehicles either individually or as a class and the specific terms for each, and Delivery Receipls or olher evidences ol ordering or 
delivery for each Vehicle delivered to Lessee by Lessor. Wilhout limiting the generality of the above, it is agreed lhat Ihe terms hereof 
may be changed lor specilic Vehicles by the Addenda and Schodulos relating thereto. Notwithstanding anylhing lo Ihe conlrary in this 
Agreement, Lessor has no obligation to accepl and vehicle order and Lessee acknowledges and agrees that the lease by Lessor of 
any Vehicle under one Schedule shall nol obligate Lessor to lease any other Vehicle under any additional Schedule. All of said 
Schedules, Delivery Receipls and evidences of ordering or delivery are hereby incorporated by reference and made a part hereol. 
Wherever used herein, the term “Vehicle'1 or ''Vehicles1' shall mean such automobiles, Irucks, and olher vehicles and Irailers as are 
teased hereunder Irom lime lo lime, logelher with all additional equipment and accessories thereon. Unless otherwise specifically 
provided, Vehicles shall at all times remain ihe property of, and shall bo registered in the name of Lessor, but shall be under Ihe lull 
and complete control of Lessee. During the term of this lease, renewal ol registration in the name of Lessor shall be Ihe responsibility 
and expense of Lessee, and Lessor will, upon Lessee's request, (urnish to Lessee a power of attorney lo this end. Lessee recognizes 
that il has acquired no right, title, or interest in or lo any ol the Vehicles and'agrees lhat it shall not assert any claim in or to an interest 
in any Vehicle olher than that ol a lessee. Lessee agrees to accept delivery of all Vehicles ordered by Lessor pursuant to Ihe request 
ol Lessee. Lessee shall at all limes, and al its sole expense and cost, keep Ihe Vehicle(s) free from all levies, attachments, liens and 
encumbrances and olher judicial process olher than those arising solely Irom acts of Lessor. Lessee shall give Lessor immediate 
written notice ol any action lakon by a third parly which may jeopardize Lessor's rights in any Vehicle and shall indemnity and hold 








(a) Lessee agrees to pay Monthly Rental lor each Vehicle in the amounts stated in (he Schedule "A" applicable lo 
such Vehicle, Lessee acknowledges that Schedule “A" Values set forth in Ihe Schedules are based upon Ihe price oslablishod by the 
manulaclurer, dealer or provider in effect on Ihe date the Schedule Is executed. II such price increases or decreases or If additional 
items ol equipment are required on the Vehicle prior to or at the lime ol delivery ol the Vehicle to Lessee, the Schedule “A” Value of 
such Vehicle will bo adjusted by the amount ot such increase or decrease and by the cost lo Lessor ol Ihe additional equipment.
(b) In addition to the Monthly Rental, Lessee shall pay lo Lessor upon demand and as Additional Renl all other 
charges payable by Lessee, which have been paid by Lessor, Lessee also agrees lo pay to Lessor, at the time each Vehicle is 
delivered, the amount ol any Advance Rentals noted in Ihe Schedule applicable to such Vehicle. All Advance Rentals shall be held by 
Lessor and, provided Lessee is not in default, applied lirsi lo the payment ol Ihe initial Monihly Rentals which are due (or the Vehicle 
to which they relate, and then to the payment ot the last Monthly Rentals which are duo, II Lessee is in default Lessor may apply Ihe 
Advance Renials to any of Lessee's obligations hereunder as Lessor in ils solo discretion may determine. No interest shall accrue lo 
Advance Rentals.
(c) Monihly Remal and all olher amounts owing by Lessee shall be paid lo Lessor at its address slated on page one 
hereof or al such other place as Lessor shall hereafter notify Lessee in writing (ihe "Payment Address'). Lessor will render or 
otherwise make available to Lessee monthly statements ol Ihe amounts payable on all Vehicles under this Lease, including Monihly 
Rental and, if applicable, Additional Rani and olher sums, il any, covered by such slatomonts. The Monihly Rental tor each Vehicle 
shall be due on the Payment Date set lorth in Schedule "A", which unless otherwise provided shall be Ihe lirsi day of each calendar 
month and Lessee shall pay Lessor such amount, each monlh in advance, whether or not Lessee received a statement lor such 
amount. It the delivery dale of a Vehicle is olher than the first day of the monlh and unless otherwise provided in Schedule “A", Ihe 
lirsi full Monihly Rental for each such Vehicle will begin as ol the lirsi day ot Ihe next succeeding month and Lessee will pay Lessor 
Ihe Monihly Rental on a daily-prorated basis for the monlh ol delivery. Additional Renl and olher sums, il any, covered by a monihly 
statement shall bo duo, and Lessee shall pay Lessor such amounts, within ten (10) days alter delivery of any such statement. In all 
instances, Lessee shall make payment in immediately available tends without abalemenl, oll-sot or counterclaim arising out ol any 
circumstance whatsoever. Lessee hereby waives any and all existing or future claims of oil-set against the Monthly Rentals, 
Additional Renls and Adjusted Rents due hereunder, and agrees lo make such payments regardless of any off-set or claim which may 
be asserted by Lessee or on its behalf.
(d) For each Monthly Rental or other sum due hereundor which is nol paid when due, Lessee agrees lo pay Lessor 
a delinquency charge calculated thereon at the rate of 1-1/2% per month lor Ihe period, ot delinquency or. al Lessor's option, 5% of 
such Monthly Rental or other sum due hereunder, provided that such a delinquency charge is nol prohibited by law. otherwise al the 
highest rate Lessee can legally obligato itself to pay and/or Lessor can legally collect. All payments made by Lessee to Lessor with
h0CO30 - WVtA 
Rev 1 -IK ft'20) ft 
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THIS MASTER VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT is mado as ol .1.PJQZa_QlQ, bo1wocn General Eloclric CapilµI Corpornlion, its 
successors, en<Jorsees and assigns ("!&§10!") with n place ol bl1Siness localed al 300 E. John Carf)Qnlor Freeway, Irving, TX 75062· 
2712 and SKINNER TRUCKING, INC. ("!&~"), a Idaho corporalion with ils principal place ol business located al f..O . Box 709 
lWIN FALLS, IQ 83303. 
IN CONSIPERATION ol lhe mutual covenants hereinalte1 contained, Lessor hereby leases lo Lessee, nnd Lessee hereby 
leases from Lessor, one or more vollicles as shall from time lo time bo describod in Schedules, Vel1icle Ptirchase Orders or Delivery 
Receipts executed by authorized employees and agents of Lessee and acceptod by LesGor, at its sole discretion, for tho rental and 
lcrnse term and upon 1he terms and conditions sol forth below: 
. LEASE. This Agreement is a contract of leasing only and shall consist of the general terms and conditions staled hemin which 
shnll bo applicable lo every Vehlclo leased hereunder, any Schedule whiclI may hereafter be attached hore10 describing certain 
Vehicles either individually or as a class and t11e specific l<lfms for each, and Delivery Receipts or other -evidences al ordering or 
delivory for each Vcl1lcle delivered to Lessee by Lessor. Without limili11g the goneralily of Iha above. it is agreed that the terms horeof 
may be changed for specific Vehicles by t110 Addenda and Schodulcs relnting thereto. Notwithstnoding anything lo the contrary in this 
Agreement, Lessor has no obligation to accept and vehicle order and Lessee acknowledges and agrees thal tho lease by Lessor of 
any Vol1iclo undor 0110 Schcdulo sl1all not obligate Lessor to loaso any other Vehicle under any additional Schedule. All or said 
Schedt1fes, Delivery Receipts and evidences of ordering or delivery are hereby incorporated by roferonco and made a part hereof. 
Wherever used herein, Iha term "~" or "Vohiclgs" shall 111ean such automobiles, trucks, and other vehicies and trailers as aro 
leased hereunder lrom time lo time, together with all additional equipment and accessories thernon . Unless otherwise specllically 
provided, Vehicfos shall at all times remain the property of, and shall be registered in 1he name of Lessor, bul shall be under the full 
and complete control of Lossee. During the term .of this lease, re11owal of registration in the name of Lessor shall be the responsibility 
and expense of Lessee, and Lessor will, upon Lessee's request. furnish to Lessee a power of attorney 10 t11is end. Lessee recognizes 
lhal it has acquired no riljht, tille, or interest in or to any of the Vehicles and ·agrees thal ii shall not ctssert any claim in or to an interest 
in any Vehicle olhcr than thal ol a lessee. Lessee agrees to accept delivery of all Vehicles ordered by Lessor pursuant 10 the request 
of Lessee. LesseCl shall at all ti mes, and at its sole expense and cost, kcop the Vellicle(s) tree from all lovies, attachments, /lens and 
encumbrances and other judicial process olhcr than those arising solely from acts of Lessor. Lessee shall give Lossor immodialo 
written nolico ol any action takon by a third paIty which may jeopardize Lessor's rights in any Vehicle and shall indemnify and hold 
Lessor harmless from any loss or damages caused thereby. 
2. RENT, 
(a) Lessee agrees to pay Monthly Rental for eacl1 Vehicle in 1he amoun1s stated in tho Schedule "A" applicable lo 
such Vehicle. Lessee acknowledges thal Schedule "A" Values set· forth _in the Schedules are bnsed upon the prico osl(lblishod by the 
1nanulacturor, dealer or provider in effect on tho date lhe Schedule Is ex~uted. II such price increases or decreases or II additional 
items of equipinenl are required on the Vehicle prior 10 or at the time ol dolivery cl lhe Vehicle to Lessee, the Schedule ''A" Value of 
such Vehicle will bo adjusted by the amount of such increase or decrease and by the cost to Lessor of the additional equipment 
(b) 111 addition to the Monthly Renlal, Lessee shall pay to lessor upon demand and as Additional Renl all olher 
charges payable by l.essee, which have be1m paid by Lessor. Lessee also agrees to pay to Lessor, at the time each Vehicle is 
delivered, the amount of any Advance Rentals nolod in lhe Schedule applicablo to such Vehicle. Ail Advance Rontals ttmfl be held by 
Lessor and. provided Lessee is not in default, applied first to the paymenl of tho initial Monthly Ro1itals which are due for the Vehicle 
lo which they relnle, and then to the payment of the last Monthly Rentcils which arc duo. If Lessee is in default Lessor may apply the 
Advance Rentals to any ot Lessee's obligations hereunder os Lessor in ils sole discretion may determine. No interest shall accrue to 
Advance Rentals. 
(c) Monthly Rcn1af and all other amounts owing by Lessee shall be paid lo Lessor at its address slated on page one 
hereof or at such other place as Lessor shall hereatwr notify Lessee in writing (the "Eavmenl Address"\. Lessor will render or 
otherwise mako available to Lessee monthly statomonls of the amounts payablo 011 all Vehicles under t11is Lease, including Monthly 
Rer11al and, if applicable, Additional Rant and olher sums, if any, covered by such slatomonts. The Monthly Ronlal lor oach Vehicle 
shall be due on the Payment Date set forlh in Schedule "A", which unless othe1wise provldod shall be the firs! day of each calendar 
month and Lessee shall pay Lossor such amount, each month in advance, whethor or not Lesseo received a statemenl for such 
amount. If the delivery date of a Vehicle Is olher lhan the first day of !he month and unless ofherwiso provided in Schedule ''A", lhe 
first full Monthly Rental for each nuch Vehicle will begin as of tho first doy of file neX1 succeeding month and Lessee will pay Lessor 
lhe Monthly Rental on a daily-prorated basis for the month of delivery. Additional Rent 1md ofher sums, ii any, covered by II monthly 
statement shall bo duo, ancJ Lessee shall pay Lessor s1Jch amounts, wit11ln ten ( t O) days uller delivery of any such statemcml. In all 
instances, Lessee shall make paymenl in immediately available funds wl\houl abatement, ofl-iict or counterclaim arising ot1l ol nny 
circumstance whalsoover. Lessee hereby waives any and all existing or future claims of off·set (lgainst Ilic Monthly Ronlnfs, 
Additional Renfs and Adjusled Rents due hereunder, and agrees 10 mHke such payments mgurdless of any oil-set or claim which may 
be asserted by Lessee or on ils behalf. 
(d) For each Monthly Rental or olher sum due h0rcundor wl1icl1 is nol paid whnn dus, 1.e,seo ilgrees lo pay Lessor 
a delinqucnc1• charge calculated tliereon al the rate of 1-1/2% per month for the period. ol delinqucnr.y or. at Lessor's option, 5% of 
such Monthly Rental or other sum due l1ereu11d1:Jr. provi(Jccl l11nI such a dolinquency charge is no! prohibited by law. otheiwise al lhe 
highest raw Lessee can legally otlflgato itself 10 pay and/or Lessor car, feg,,lly collect. All paynieots made by Lessoa lo Les81Jr with 
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reference lo this Lease shall be applied first lo late charges, then lo Addilional Renl and any other fees or other amounls payable 
hereunder, and then lo the Monthly Rental payments.
3. TERM. The Term of this Lease in relation to each Vehicle shall extend lor the period not in excess o( the Term noted in the . 
Schedule "A" relating to such Vehicle (the ‘Lease Term'1!. The Lease Term shall commence on the earlier of (i) the date when such 
Vehicle is delivered to Lessee or (li) forty-eight (48) hours after Lessee has been notified, orally or in writing, that the Vehicle is ready 
for delivery (the "Delivery Dale"). Lessor's failure to deliver vehicles at the time and places specified, by reason of labor disorders or 
any other circumstances or events beyond the control ot Lessor, shall not impute liability ol any kind to Lessor.
4. CANCELLATION. This Lease may bo cancelled by either party regarding Vehicles not then ordered or under lease by giving 
written notice thereof lo the other party at least five (5) days in advance of the proposed cancellation date. After the giving of such 
notice no additional or replacement vehicles will be delivered for lease hereunder. Notwithstanding expiration, cancellation or 
termination, all of the provisions of the Lease shall continue in lull force and elfect with respect lo each Vehicle then ordered pursuant 
lo a request ol Lessee or then under lease until the end of the lease term for such Vehicle as provided In Section 3 hereof. Lessee 




Use of Vehicles under this Lease is permitted only in the conduct ot Lessee's business in the United States and 
occasionally In Canada and occasionally in the. designated NAFTA Free Trade Zone in Mexico and only for lawful purposes. No 
Vehicle shall be used lor transportation ol passengers or of material designated as extra-hazardous, radioactive, flammable or 
explosive. Lessee will permit the Vehicles to be operated only by safe and carelul drivers who are qualified and properly licensed in 
accordance with the laws o! the jurisdiction where such Vehicles are used. All operators of the Vehicles will be conclusively presumed 
to be the agents, employees or servants of Lessee and not of Lessor. Upon any complaint from Lessor specifying illegal, negligent, 
reckless, careless or abusive handling ol the Vehicles, Lessee shall promptly take such steps as may be necessary to stop and 
prevent the recurrence of any such practice. Lessee shall in all respects comply, and cause all persons operating the Vehicles lo 
comply, with all applicable requirements of law (including but nol limited to rules, regulations, statutes and ordinances) relating to the 
licensing, maintenance and operation of the Vehicles (including weight limitations, tire requirements, load, axle and spring limits) and 
with all terms and conditions ol policies ol insurance relating lo Ihe Vehicle. Lessee shall immediately notify Lessor of any change of 
place ol permanent garaging of any Vehicle. Lessee agrees that il will nol load any Vehicle in excess ol Ihe losser o( (i) the payload 
capacity noted in the manufacturer's specifications for such Vehicle or (ii) Ihe maximum amount permitted by applicable law, Lessee 
shall comply with all laws, rules and regulations applicable lo Lessee, including without limitation, the USA PATRIOT ACT and all 
laws, rules and regulations relating lo import or export controls, anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.
(a)
i
(b) The maximum number o( miles, as determined by means ol a slandard laclory installed odometer, which Lessee 
may operate any Vehicle each year during Ihe term of this Lease without a mileage charge is set forth in the Schedule “A" applicable 
to such Vehicle. Lessee agrees to pay Lessor, In addition to Monlhly Rental payments, a mileage charge in ihe amount sel forth In 
Ihe Schedule "A” applicable to such Vehicle lor all mileage in excess ol Ihe maximum allowed. Lessor, at its option, may bill Lessee 
either lor the full amount of the mileage charge at the termination or expiration of Ihe Lease Term (as defined in Section 3) lor any 
Vehicle or monthly on the basis ol Ihe average monthly mileage ol ihe Vehicle during ihe proceeding twelve months ol Ihe Lease 
Term in excess of Ihe monlhly apportioned maximum, Lessee agrees not lo, and nol lo allow any other person to, tamper with or 
disconnect the odometer installed on any Vehicle. Lessee further agrees to notify Lessor immediately ol any malfunctioning of any 
such odometer. If it appears that the odometer of any Vehicle was tampored with or disconnected or that any such odometer 
malfunctioned and Lessor was nol promptly notified, then Lessor may, at Lessor's discretion, choose not lo rely upon the mileage 
reading ot such odometer and may instead make a good faith estimate ot the mileage ol the Vehicle, which estimate shall be binding 
upon the parties for the purpose of this Section. ‘ .
6. FEES, TAXES AND CHARGES. Fees, taxes, Governmental Assessments and Charges (including interest and penalties 
thereon) ol whatsoever nature, by whomsoever payable, (other than lederal, state or local taxes levied on the net income of Lessor) 
levied, assessed or incurred during Ihe entire term ol llio Lease in conneclion will) the Vehicles including, but not limited lo, the tilling 
and registration o( the Vehicles in all jurisdictions required by the nature ol Lessee's business and the purchase, sale, ownership, 
rental, use, inspection and operation thereof, shall be paid by Lessee. In tho event any of said fees, taxes, governmental 
assessments and charges (including, without limitation, lines lor or costs related to traffic violations, speeding tickets, or similar 
infractions) have been paid by Lessor, or if Lessor is required to colled or pay any thereof, Lessee shall reimburse Lessor therefore, 
upon demand, as Additional Renl, lo the end that Lessor shall receive the rental as provided in Sections 2 and 8 hereof as a nel relum 
on ihe Vehicles. Together will) such Additional Renl, Lessee shall also pay any applicable administrative fee relating to the payment 
ol such fines, assessments or oiher charges that Lessor may establish (rom lime lo (imo. If agreed by l.essor and Lessee, Lessee 
shall file, on behall ol Lessor in (orm satisfactory to Lessor and before the due date thereof, all required tax returns and reports 
concerning the Vehicles with fill appropriate governmental agencies and to mail a copy thereol, together with evidence ol payment, to 
Lessor concurrently with (lie tiling thereof. Lessee further agrees lo keep or cause to be kepi and made available to l.essor any and 
all necessary records relative lo Ihe use ol Ihe Vehicles and/or pertaining lo ihe aforesaid fees, taxes, governmental assessments and 
charges. Lessee’s obligations under this Section shall survive the expiration, cancellation or termination of this Lease.
7, RETURN. Lessee shall return each Vehicle lo Lessor, at Lessee’s expense, at the expiration, cancellation or termination of this 
Lease in relation to such Vehicle al die location designated by Lessor in the same working order, condition and repair as when 
received by Lessee, excepting only reasonable wear and tear caused by normal usage ol such Vehicle, together with all license 
plates, registration cerfilicates, or other documents relating to such Vehicle. Unless otherwise agreed by Lessor, Lessee shall give 
Lessor al least sixty (60), and not more than one hundred twenty (120), days notice ol die return of any Vehicle. II Lessee does nol
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referonco lo this Lease shall be applied lirsl to 1010 charges, then 10 Additional Rent and any other feGs or other amounts payable 
hereunder, and then lo !he Monthly Rental payments. 
3. TERM. The Term of this Lease in relation to eacl1 Vehicle shall exlend lor the period not in excess or the Term noled in !he . 
Schedule "A" relating to such Vehicle (the 'Leaso Term"\, The Lease Term shall commence o,, the eMier or (i) the dale when such 
Vehicle is delivered lo Lesseo or (Ii) lorty-eighl (48) hours af1er Lessee has been notified, orally or in writing, thal !he Vehiclo is ready 
for delivery (the "Delivery Date"). Lessor's failure to deliver vehicles a1 the time and places specified, by reason of labor disorders or 
any other circumstances or events beyond the control or t.ossor. shall not impute lit1bility 01 any kind to Lessor. 
4. CANCELLATION. This Lease may bo cancelled by either party regarding Vehicles no1 then ordered or under lease by giving 
written no1ice 1hereor 10 1he other party at leas! five (5) days in advance of the proposed cancellation dale. After 1ho giving of such 
no1ice no additional or replacement vchiclos will be delivered for lease hereunder. Notwithstanding expiration, cancellation or 
termination, all of 1he provisions of the Lease shall con1inue in lull force and ellect wilh rospect lo each Vehicle !hen ordored pursuant 
to a requos1 ot Lessee or then under lease until the end of the lease term for such Vehicle as provided In Section 3 hereof. Lessee 
may cancel this Lease as lo any Vehicle effective al any olher 1ime only upon lerms hereafter agreed lo by Lessor. 
5. USE. 
(a) Use of Vehicles undo, !his Lease is permitted only in \he conduct ol Lessee's business in \he Uni1ed States and 
occasionally In Canada and occasionally in lho. designalod NAFTA Free Trade Zone in Mexico and only for law1ul purposes. No 
Vehicle shall be used lor 1ransportalion of passengers or of material dosigmued as exIra-hazardous, radioac11ve, flammable or 
explosive. Lessee will permit 1he Vehicles to be operated only by safe and careful drivers who are qualified and properly liconsed in 
accordance with 1he laws ol 1he iurisdic1ion where such Vehicles are usod. NI operalors of 11\e Vehicles will be conclusively presumed 
to be 1he agen1s, employees or servants of Lessee and no1 of Lessor. Upon any complain! from Lessor specifying illegal, negligen1, 
reckless, careless or abusive handling ol the Vehicles, Lessee shall prompUy take such steps as may be necessary to stop and 
prevent the recurrence or any such practice. Lessee shall in all respecls comply, and cause all persons operating 1he Vehicles 10 
comply, wilh all applicable requirements of law (including bul not limi1ed to rules, regulations, stalutes and ordinances) relating 10 the 
llcensing, maln1enance and operation of 1he Vehicles (including weight limitalions, tire requirements. load, axle and spring limi1s) and 
with all terms nnd conditions ol policies ol insurance relating to Iha Vehicle. Lessee shall immedla\(lly notify Lessor ol any change ol 
place of permanent garaging of any Vehicle. Lessee agrees that ii will no! load any Vehicle in excess of the losser of (i) !he payload 
capRcily notc,d in the manulaclurer's specificalions for such Vehicle or (ii) lhe maximum amount permilled by applicable law, Lessee 
shall comply with all laws, rules and regula\ions applicable to Lessee. incluoing wilhout limi1alion, the USA PATRIOT ACT and all 
laws, rules and regula1ions relating 10 import or export controls, anti-money laundering and lerroris1 financing. 
(bl The maximum number ol miles, as delormined by means of a standard tac1ory ins1alled odometer. which Lessee 
may operate any Vehicle each year during !he term of !his Loase wlihoul a mileage charge is set forth in the Schedule 'A" applicable 
lo such Vehicle. Lessee agrees 10 pay Lessor, In addition to Monthly Rental payments, a mileage charge in the amou111 sel lorth In 
lhe Schedule "A" applicable 10 such Vehicle for all mileage in excess of the maximum allowed. Lessor. at its op1lon, may bill Lessee 
either for the full amount ol 1he mileage charge at 1he 1erminalion or expira1ion of 1he Lease Term (as defined in Section 3) for any 
Vehicle or monthly on the basis of !he average monthly mileage of !ho Vehicle during !he proceeding 1welve months of the Lease 
Term in excess of the monthly apportioned maximum, Lessee agroC;s no1 lo, and not lo ollow any other person 10, tamper wi1h or 
disconnect lht1 odome1er installed on any Vehicle. Lessee lurther agrees 10 nolily Lessor immediately of any malfunctioning of any 
such odometer. II ii appears 1hal the odome1er ol any Vehicle was Iarnporcd with or disconnected or 1ha1 any such odometer 
malfunciloned and Lessor was no1 promptly notified, !hon Lessor may, a1 Lessor's discre1ion. choose no1 to roly upon 1he mileage 
reading 01 such odometer and may inslead make a good faith estimc1\e ot the mileage of tho Vehicle, which estimate shall be binding 
upon !he parties for the purpose of lhis Section. 
6. Ff:ES, TAXES AND CHARGES. Fees, taxes, Govemmcnlal llssossme11ts and Charges (including in1eresl and pcnallies 
!hereon) ol who1soovor natur0, by whomsoever payable. (olhor than federal, s1a1e or local taxes levied on the net income ot Lessor) 
levied, assessed or incurred during lhe entire torm ol !110 Lease in conneclion with !he Vehicles including, but 1101 limited lo, 1he 1illing 
and reglslration of !he Vehicles in all jurisdictions required by 1he na1ure of Lessee's business and the purchase, sale, ownorship, 
rental, use, inspection and operation 1hereot, shall be paid by Lessee. In !ho oven! any of said fees, laxes, govommen1<1I 
assessments and charges (including, without limi1alion, fines for or costs related to lraflic viola1ions, speeding ticke1s, or similar 
infractions) have boon paid by Lessor. or if·Lessor is required to collccl or pay any lhereol, Lessee shall reimburse Lessor 1here1ore, 
upon demand, as Additional Ren I, to Iha end that Lessor shall receive tho rental as provided in Sections 2 and 8 hereof as a no! reIum 
on lhe Vehicles. Togo1hcr wilh such Additional Rent, Lessee shall also pay a11y applicable administrative lee relating 10 the payment 
of such fines, ass~ssmen1s or other cl1arges that L~ssor may establish from time lo time. If agreed by Lessor and Lessee, Lessee 
shall file, on behalf of Lessor in form s111isfac1ory to Lessor a!1d t>efon~ the due dale \hereo!, all required \ax returns and reports 
concerning !he Vehicles with afl approprinle governrnenlal agencies and to mail a r,opy thereof, 1oge111er with evi(1ence of payment, to 
Lessor concurren11y with tho filing lherer.il. Lessee further agrees lo keep or cause to be kepi and mado av11ilablo to l.essor any und 
all necessary reeords relative lo the use of lhc Vehicles and/or pertaining lo !he alorosald lees. taxes, governmental assessments and 
charges. Lessee's obligations under !his Section shall survive the expiraiion. cancellation or lerminalion ol this tease. 
7, RETURN. Lessee shall re111rn each Vehicle lo Lossor. at Lessee's oxponso. al 1he expira1ion, cancellation or 1er111inaIior1 of !his 
Lease in relation 10 such Vehicle al !he location designated by Lessor in the same working order, condi1ion and repair as when 
received by LesstJe, axcep1ing only reasonable wear alld tear caused by normal usage of such Vehicle. together with all license 
plales, regislrolion certilicates, or o1h0r documents relating lo such Vehicle. UI1less otherwise agroed by Lessor, l.e~~ee shall give 
Losser al leas! six1y (60), and not moro lhan one h11nCired twenty (1201, days notice of !he return ot any Vehicle. If Lessee does no1 
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surrender a Vehicle lo Lessor as heroin provided, Lessee will be in delaull ol Ihis Lease as lo such Vehicle, and Lessee shall pay 
Lessor (in addition to any other amounts payable hereunder), as liquidated damages and not as a penally, an amount equal to one 
hundred ten percent (110%) ol the Monthly Rental applicable lo such Vehicle. Such payment shall commence with the month 
immediately following the end ol Ihe Lease Term or Renewal Term, il any, and shall continue thereafler monthly until the Vehicle is 
returned to Lessor. Lessee agrees that such liquidated damages are a reasonable estimate and fair compensation lor the costs, 
expenses, rosidual value exposure and other losses, which are incapable of an exacf determination, incurred by Lessor as a result of 
Lessee's retaining possession ol the Vehicle beyond the end ol the Lease Term or Renewal Term, il any. In addition, Lessee shall 
make all other payments and keep all other obligations and undertakings required ol Lessee under any and all provisions ol ihis lease 
as though such termination or expiration had not occurred, Nolwithstanding the loregoing, Lessor shall have the right to obtain 
Immediate possession ol the Vehicle at any time after the end ol the Lease Term or Renewal Term, if any, for such Vehicle.
8. FINAL ADJUSTMENT. The Final Adjustment for each Vehicle, if so provided ( 'Final Adjustment"), shall be as set forth in the 
applicable Addendum or Schedule “A" relating to such Vehicle.
9. LOSS OR DAMAGE. Loss of or damage to each Vehicle and loss ol use thereof, from whatsoever cause, are risks hereby 
assumed by Lessee from the date hereof until such Vehicle Is returned to and then sold by Lessor. II any Vehicle Is lost, stolen, 
damaged or destroyed, Lessee shall promptly notify Lessor thereof. Lessor shall have no obligation to repair or replace any such 
Vehicle. Additional provisions and requirements regarding loss or damage lo a Vehicle shall be as set forth In the applicable 
Addendum or Schedule “A” relating to such Vehicle.
10. INSURANCE. Liability and physical damage insurance for bodily Injury and property damage to others, and damage lo or loss 
ol Vehicles by collision, fire, theft, or otherwise, Irom the lime each Vehicle is delivered to Lessee until the Vehicle is sold after return 
to Lessor and legal title passes to the purchaser thereof, shall be purchased and maintained by Lessee. Lessor shall not be required 
to order vehicles for Lessee's use until binders disclosing insurance coverage as herein provided have been delivered to Lessor. All 
Insurance policies shall provide primary coverage, shall name Lessor (and any other party that Lessor may designale) as additional 
insured with respect to any liability insurance and as loss-payee with respect to any physical damage insurance, shall be in such 
amounts and with such insurers as shall be approved by Lessor, shall provide for a minimum of filleen (15) days prior written notice to 
Lessor before cancellation or material change lor any reason, and shall provide that no act or default oi any person other than Lessor 
shall altect Lessor's right to recovery under such policies. Minimum requirements shall be S1.000.000.00 lor bodily injury or death to 
any one person; $1,000.000.00 for any one accident; $1,000,000.00 (or property damage; or a combined single limit of $1.000.000,00 
and actual cash value for lire, theft, comprehensive and collision. Doduclible amounts shall not be in excess of $ 2,500.00. Lessor 
may from time lo time by notice to Lessee specify higher minimum requirements or additional risks lo be Insured agalnsi. Lessee shall 
deliver Ihe policies or other satisfactory evidence of insurance required hereunder to Lessor, but Lessor shall be under no duty lo 
examine such evidence of insurance nor to advise Lessee in the event said Insurance Is not in compliance with this Lease. Evidence 
of renewal ol all expiring policies will bo delivered lo Lessor al least sixty (60) days prior to thoir respective expiration dales. Lessor 
does not assume any liability for loss ol or damage to Ihe contents or personal property contained in any Vehicles, and Lessee hereby 
releases and saves Lessor free Irom any and all liability lor loss ol or damage lo any contents or personal property contained in said 
Vehicles regardless of Ihe circumstances under which such loss or damage may occur. Notwithstanding anything else herein to the 
contrary, in the event that Lessee fails to procure or maintain insurance as above provided or falls to perform any other of Lessee's 
duties or obligations as set forth in Ihis Lease, Lessor may, but shall have no obligation to, obtain such insurance al Lessee's expense 
and perform such other duties and obligations of Lessee and any amounts expended therefore shall be due and payable immediately 
as Additional Rent. Lessee shall not use or permit the use of any Vehicle al any time when Ihe insurance described above is nol in 
eflecl.
11. INDEMNITIES. The term "Liabilities" as used herein shall include any and all liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, penalties, 
claims, actions, suits, costs, expenses and disbursements ol whatsoever kind and nature, including legal fees and expenses, (whether 
or not any of the transactions contemplated hereby are consummated), imposed on, incurred by or asserted against Lessor (which 
term as used herein shall include Lessor's successors, assigns, agents, employees and servants) or Ihe Vehicles (whether by way of 
strict or absolute liability or otherwise), and in any way relating to or arising out of ihis Lease or the selection, manulacture, purchase, 
acceptance, ownership, delivery, non-delivery, lease, possession, use, operation, condition, servicing, maintenance, repair, 
improvement, alteration, replacement, storage, relurn or olher disposition of Ihe Vehicles including, bul nol limited to, (i) claims as a
. result of latent, patent or other defects, whether or not discoverable by Lessor or Lessee; (ii) claims for patent, trademark or copyright 
infringement; (iii) tort claims of any kind, (whether based on strict liability, on Lessor's alleged negligence or otherwise), including 
claims for injury or damage lo property or injury or death lo any person (including Lessee's employees); and (iv) claims for any 
interruption of service or loss of business or anticipatory prollts, or consequential damagos, Lessor shall have no responsibility or 
liability lo Lessee, Its successors or assigns, or any other person with respect to any and all Liabilities and, irrespective of any 
insurance coverage and commencing on rhe date each Vehicle Is ready (or delivery lo Lessee, Lessee hereby assumes liability for, 
and hereby agrees, at its sole cost and expense, lo indemnify, dolend, protect, save and keep harmless Lessor from and againsf any 
and all Liabilities, Where a Vehicle is operated by Lessee with a trailer or other equipment not covered by Ihis Lease, then in such 
evenl, Lessee warrants that such trailer or other equipment will be in good operating condilion, compatible in all respects with the 
Vehicles with which such trailer or olher equipment is lo be used, and in all respects in full compliance with all federal, slate and local 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations covering said trailer or other equipment, including but nol limited to all licensing and 
operating roquiremonls. Lessee hereby assumes liability lor, and hereby agrees, at its sole cosl and expense, lo Indemnify, defend, 
proiect. save and keep harmless Lessor Irom and against any and all costs, expensas, damages, (including damages for loss of any 
Vehicles leased hereunder) and Liabilities resulting Irom Lessee's failure to properly connecl, operate or maintain such trailer or other 
equipment or to comply with any ol the foregoing requirements or Irom any other cause. Lessee agrees to give Lessor prompi written 
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surrender a Vehiclo to Lessor as htircin provided, Lessee will be in default of this Lease .s 10 such Vehicle, and Lessee shall pay 
Lessor (in addition to any other amounts payable hereunder), as liquid.ited damages and not as a penally, an amount equal to one 
hundred ten percent (1 t0%) of the Monthly Rental applicable lo such Vehicle. Such payment shall commence with the month 
i111111ediately following the end of (hr, I.ease Term or R<mowal Term, ii any, and shall continue theroaller monthly until the V.:11,icfe is 
returned lo Lessor. Lessee agrees that such liquidaled damages aro a reasonable estimate and fair compensation lor 1he costs, 
expenses, residual vallle exposure and other losses, which are incapable of an oxaci dcterminalion, incurred by Lessor as a resull of 
Lessee's retaining possession of tho Vehicle beyond the end of the Lease Term or Renewal Term, if any. In addition, Lessee shall 
make all other payments and keep all other obligations and undertakings required or Lessee under any and all provisions of this leaso 
as though SLICh termination or expiration had not occurred. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lessor shall have the right to obtain 
Immediate possession of tho Vohicle at any time after the end ol the Lease Tenn or Renewal form, if any, for such Vehicle. 
· 8, FINAL ADJUSTMENT. The Final Adjustment for each Vehicle, i1 so provided (''Final Adjuslrneorl. shall be as set forth in the 
applicable Addendum or Schedule "A" relating to such Vehicle. 
9, LOSS OR DAMAGE. Loss of or damage to ·eactl Vehicle and loss of use thereof, from whatsoever causo, are risks hereby 
assumed by Lessee from the date horoof unlif such Vehicle Is returned to and than sold by Lessor. II any Vehicle Is lost, stolen, 
damaged or destroyed, Lessee shall promptly nolily Lessor !hereof. Lessor shall have no oblignlion to repair or roplace any such 
Vehicle. Additional provisions and requirernenls regarding loss or damage io a Vehicle shall be as sot forth In the applicable 
Addendum or Schedule 'A" relating to such Vehicle. 
10. INSURANCE. Liability and physical damage insurance for bodily Injury and property dnmage to others, and damage to or loss 
of Vehfcles by collision, fire, theft, or otherwise, lrom Iha lime each Vehicle is delivered to Lessee unlil the Vet1icle is sold after return 
to Lessor and legal lltle passes to the purchaser thereof, shall be purchased and maintained by Lessee. Lessor shall not be required 
to ardor v0hic10s for Lessee's use until binders disclosing insurance coverage as herein provided have been dclivorcd to Lessor. All 
Insurance policies shall provide primary coverage, shall name Lessor (and any other party that Lessor may designate) as addllional 
insured ith respecl to any liability Insurance and os loss•payee ith respect to any physicill da age insurance, shall be in such 
amounts and wilh such insurers as shall be approved by Lessor, shall provide for a minimum of filleen (15) days prior wrillen notice to 
Lessor before cancellation or aterial change for any reason, and shall provide that no act or default of any person other than Lessor 
shall affect Lessor's right to recovery under such policies. Minimum requirements shall be $1,000,000,00 lor bodily injury or death to 
any one person; $1,000,000.00 for any one accidenl; $1 1000,000.00 for property damage; or a combined single limit of $1,Q00,000.00 
and actual cash value for lire, theft, comprehensive and collision. Doductible amounts silall not be in excess of $.1Ji.Q.Q,.QQ. Lessor 
may from time to time by notice to Lessee specify higher minimum requirements or additional risks to be Insured against. Lessee shall 
deliver the policies- or other satisfactory evidence or insurance requirod hereunder io Lessor, but Lessor shall be under no duty lo 
examine such evidence of insurance nor to advise Lessee in the event said insurance Is not in compliance with this Lease. Evidence 
of renewal ol all expiring policies will bo delivered lo Lessor al least sixty (60) days prior to thoir respective expiration dales. Lessor 
does not assume any liability for loss of or damage to the contents or personal property contained in any Vehicles, and Lessee hereby 
releases and saves Lessor free from any ,ind all liability for loss of or damage to nny conlents or personal property contained in said 
Vehicles regardless of the circumslances under which sucl1 loss or damage may occur. Nolwithstanding anything else heroin to tho 
conlrary, in the event that Lessee fails to procure or maintain Insurance as above provided or fails to perform any other of Lessee's 
duties or obligations as set forth in lhis Lease, Lessor may, but shall have no obligation to, obtain such insurance al Lessee's expense 
and perform such 01he1 duties and obligations of Lessee and any amounts expanded therefore shall be due and payable immediately 
as Addilional Rnnt. Lessoo shall nol use or pormil the use al any Vohiclo al any time when lhe insurance described obovo is not in 
fl l. 
11. INDEMNITIES. Tho term "~" as used herein shall include any and all liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, penalties, 
claims, actions, suits, costs, expenses and disbursements or whatsoever kind and na1uro, including legal fees and oxpenses, (whether 
or not any ol lhe transactions contomplated hereby are consummated), imposed on, incurred by or ass<lr!ed againsl Lessor (which 
term as used herein shall include Lessor's successors, assigns, agents, employees and servants) or lhc Vehicles (whether by way of 
strict or absolute liability or olherwise), and in any way relaling lo or arising out of this Lease or the selection, manufacture, purchase, 
acceptance, ownership, delivery, non-delivery, lease, possession, use, operntion, condition, servicing, maintenance, repair, 
impmvement, alteration, replacement, storage, relurn or other disposilion or Iha Vehicles incll!ding, bul not limited to, (i) claims as a 
result of latent, patent or other defects, whether or not discoverable by Lessor or Lessee; (ii) claims for patent, trademark or copyright 
infringement; (iii) tort claims or any kind, (whether based on strict liability, on Lessor's alleged nogligence or otherwise), including 
claims for injury or damage to property or injury or death to any person (including l.esseo's employees); and (iv) claims for any 
interruption of service or loss or business or anticipatory profits, or consequential dnmogos. Lessor shall havr, no responsibility or 
liabilfty lo Lessee, Its successors or assigns, or any other person with respecl to any and all Liabilities and, irrespecllve of any 
insurance coverage and cornmonclng on rhe dMe each Vehicle Is rettdy for delivery lo Lessee, Lessee hereby assumes liability for, 
and h<!reby agreos, at ils solo cost and expense, 10 indemnify, defend, prolccl, save and keep harmless Lessor fror11 and againsl any 
and all Liabilities. Whcire a Vehicle is operated by Lessee wilh a trailer or other eqt1ipment not covered by this Lease, then in such 
event, Lessee warrants that such !railer or other equipment will be in good operaling condilion, compatible in all respects with the 
Vehicles with wl_1ich such trailer or olher equipment is lo be used. and in all respects in full compliance with all federal, slate and loca! 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations covering said trailer or orher equipment, including but not limited to all licensing and 
operating roql/iromenis. Lessee horohy assumes liability ior, and hereby agrees, at ifs sole cost and expense, lo indemnify, defen<1. 
protect, save ancl keep harmless Lessor lrom and against any and all cosls, expenses, damages, (including damages for loss of any 
Vehicles leased he1mmoor) and Liabililles resulting lrom Lessee's fniltir0 to properly connecl, operate or mntntain such lrnilor or olhor 
equipment or lo comply with an1• of the foregoh1g requirements or from any othor cause. Lessee agrees to give Lessor prompt written 
notice of any claim or liability 11oreunoer indemnified againsl. 
1J<l(i:;1a.~1.W1.A 
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12. LESSEE'S TAX RELATED INDEMNITIES.
(a) General Indemnity. Lessee agrees lo pay and to indemnify, defend and hold Lessor harmless, on an after-lax 
basis, Irom and against all sales, uso, personal properly, leasing, leasing use, stamp or other taxes, levies, Imposts, duties, charges 
or withholdings of any nature (together witli any penalties, lines or interest thereon) now or hereafter imposed against Lessor, Lessee 
or the Vehicles or any part thoreol or upon the purchase, ownership, delivery, leasing, possession, use, operation, return or other 
disposition thereof, or upon the rentals, receipts or earnings arising therefrom, or upon or with respect to this Lease (excluding, 
however, Federal and Stale taxes on, or measured by, Ihe net income of Lessor).
(b) Income Tax Indemnity, Lessee and Lessor agree that Lessor shall be entitled to accelerated cost recovery (or 
depreciation) deductions wilh respect to ihe Vehicles, and should, under any circumstances whaisoever, except as specifically below 
set forth, either the Untied States government or any state tax authority disallow, eliminate, reduce, recapture, or disqualify, in whole 
or in pan, any benefits consisting of accelerated cost recovery (or depreciation) deduction with respect lo any Vehicle, Lessee shall 
then indemnity Lessor by payment to Lessor, upon demand, of a sum which shall be equal to the amount necessary to permit Lessor 
to receive (on an after-tax basis over the full term of this Lease) Ihe same afler-lax cash flow and after-tax yield assumed by Lessor in 
evaluating the transactions contemplated by this Lease (Ihe "Economic Return"! that Lessor would have realized had there not been a 
loss or disallowance ol such benefits, togelher with, on an after-tax basis, any interest or penalties which may be assessed by the 
governmental aulhority wilh respect to such loss or disallowance. In addition, if Lesseo shall make any addition or improvement lo 
any Vehicle, and as a result thereof, Lessor is required to include an additional amount In iis taxable income, Lessee shall also pay lo 
Lessor, upon demand, an amount which shall be equal lo the amount necessary lo pormil Lessor to receive (on an after-lax basis 
over the full term of this Lease) the same Economic Return that Lessor would have realized had such addition or improvement not 
been made. Lessee shall not be obligated lo pay any sums required in this subsection wilh respect to any Vehicle in the event Ihe 
cause of Ihe loss of the deductions results solely from the failure ol Lessor to timely claim accelerated cost recovery (or depreciation) 
deductions for the Vehicle in Lessor's tax return, other than a failure resulting Irom the Lessor's determination, based upon opinion ol 
counsel or otherwise, that no reasonable basis exists tor claiming accelerated cost recovery (or depreciation) deductions.
(c) Payment and Enforceability, All amounts payable by Lessee pursuant lo clauses (a) and (b) above shall be 
payable directly to Lessor except to the exient paid to a governmental agency or taxing aulhority. All the indemnities contained In 
clauses (a) and (b) above shall conlinue in lull force and effect notwithstanding ihe expiralion, cancellation or other lermination ol this 
Lease In whole or in part and are expressly made lor ihe benefit of, and shall be enforceable by, Lessor. Lessee's obligations under 
clauses (a) and (b) above shall be lhal of primary obligor irrespective of whether Lessor shall also be indemnified wilh respect to Ihe 
same matter under some other agreement by another party.
(d) Duration. The obligations ol Lessee under this Section are expressly made tor the benefit of, and shall be 
enforceable by, Lessor without necessity of declaring this Lease in default and Lessor may initially proceed directly against Lessee 
under this Section without llrst resorting lo any other rights ol indemnilication it may have. II an event occurs during the term or 
continuance ol this Lease that gives rise to a liability of Lessee pursuant to this Section, Lessee's liability shall conlinue, 
nolwilhslanding the expiralion, cancellation or lermination of this Lease, unlil all payments or reimbursements with respect to such 
liability are made.
13. CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS. All of Lessee's obligations, indemnities and liabilities under Sections 10, 11 and 12 shall 
survive the expiration, cancellation or termination of this Lease.
14. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSE. Expense ol operalion and maintenance of Vehicles in accordance wilh 
manufacturer's recommendations and in condition satisfactory to Lessor, including but not limited to, cost ol luel, oil, grease, repairs, 
maintenance, tires, lubes, storage, parking, tolls, lines and penalties shall bo the responsibility and obligation ol Lessee. Lessee Shall 
reimburse Lessor II Lessor shall pay any ot such operating or maintenance expenses. II tires or parts are removed train a Vehicle, 
Lessee shall provide comparable replacements therefore and such replacements shall become part ol the Vehicles by accession. 
Lessee shall not alter any Vehicle without the prior written consent ol Lessor unless such alteration is required by law. Lessee agrees 
to remove all markings from the Vehicles, at Lessee's expense, prior to the return of the Vehicles to Lessor.
15. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY LAW, In the event lhal subsequenl lo ihe Delivery Dale ol a Vehicle any federal, 
state or local law, ordinance, rule or regulation shall require ihe insiallalion ot any additional equipment or accessories, including but 
not limited lo anti-pollution and/or safety devices, ot in the event that any other modifications of ihe Vehicles shall be required by virtue 
of such law, ordinance, rule or regulation, then and In any of ouch events. Lessee shall pay Ihe full cost thereof, including installation 
expenses. Lessor may, al ils option, arrange for Ihe installation of such equipment or fho performance of such modifications, and 
Lessee agrees to pay Ihe full cost thereof as Additional Rent, immediately upon receipt of an invoice for same.
16. NO WARRANTIES; LIMITATION ON LIABILITY. Lessee acknowledges and agrees: (i) lhal the Vehicles are ol a size, design, 
capacity and manufacture selected by t.essee; (ii) that Ihe Lessor Is not the manufacturer or seller of Ihe Vehicles or the 
manufacturer's or seller's agent; (iil) that LESSEE LEASES THE VEHICLES "AS-IS" AND THAT LESSOR HAS NOT MADE, AND 
DOES NOT HEREBY MAKE. ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE VALUE, 
CONDITION, QUALITY, MATERIAL, WORKMANSHIP, DESIGN, CAPACITY, MERCHANTABILITY, DURABILITY, FITNESS 
OR SUITABILITY OF THE VEHICLES FOR ANY USE OR PURPOSE OR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY 
WHATSOEVER. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THE VEHICLES. IN NO EVENT SHALL LESSOR E3E LIABLE FOR 
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12. LESSEE'S TAX RELATED INDEMNITIES. 
(a) General Indemnity. Lessee agrees to pay and to indemnily, defend and hold Lessor harmless, on an after-tax 
baGis, from and againsl all sales, uso, personal property, leasing, leasing use, stamp or olher taxes, levies, imposts, duties, charges 
or withholdings of any nature (together with any penalties, lines or interest thereon) now or hereafter imposed against Lessot, Lessee 
or the Vehicles or any part thoreol or upon the purchuse, ownership, delivery, leasing, possession, use, operation, return or other 
disposition thereof, or upon the rentals, receipts or earnings atising thetelrom, or upon or with respect to this Lease (excluding, 
however, Federal and Stale taxes on, or measured by, lhe net income of Lessor). 
(b) Income Tax Indemnity, Lessee and Lessor agree that Lessor shall be entitled to nccelerated cost recove,y (or 
depreciation) deductions wilh respect to the Vehicles, and should, under any circumstances whatsoever, except as specilically below 
set lorth, either the Unlled States government or any state tax autho1ity disallow, eliminate, reduce, recapture, or disquallly, in whole 
or in part, any benelits consisting ol accelerated cost recovery (or depreciation) deduction with respect lo ,iny Vehicle, Lessee shall 
then lndemnily Lessor by payment to Lessor, upon demand, ol a sum which shall be equal to the amount necessary to permit Lessor 
to receive (on an alter-tax basis over the full term of this Lease) the same afler-lax cash flow and after-tax yield assumed by Lessor in 
evaluating the transactions contemplated by !his Lease (the ''!;conomic Return") that Lessor would t1ave realized had there not been a 
loss or disallowance of such benefits, together with, on an after-tax basis, any interest or penalties which may be assessed by the 
governmental authority with respect to such loss or disallowance. In addition, if Lessoo shall make any addition or improvement lo 
any Vehicle, and as a result thereof, Lessor is required to include an additional amount In its taxable income, Lessee shall also pay 10 
Lessor, upon demamf, an amount which shall be equal to lho amount necessary to permit Lessor to receive (on an afler-lax basis 
over the full term ol this Lease) the same Economic Return that Lessor would have realized had such addition or improvement not 
been made. Lessee shall not be obligated to pay any sums required in this subsection with respect to any Vehicle in the event lhe 
cause of lhe loss of the deductions results solely from the failure of Lessor to timely claim accelerated cost recovery (or deprecialfon) 
deductions for the Vehicle in Lessor's tax return, other than a failure resulting !tom the Lessor's determination, based upon opinion ol 
counsel or otherwise, that no reasonabl<i basis exists for claiming accelerated cost recovery (or depreciation) deductions. 
(c) Payment and Enforoeabillly, All amounts payable by Lessee pursuant 10 clauses (a) and (b) above shall be 
payable directly to Lessor except to the extent paid to a governmenlal agency or taxing authority. All the indemnities contained In 
clauses (a) and (bl above shall continue in full force and elfect notwithstanding lho expiration, cancellation or other termination ol lhis 
Lease In whole or in part and are expressly made lor the benelit of, and shall be enforceable by, Lessor. Lessee's obligations under 
clauses (a) and (b) above shall be thal of primary obliger irrespective of wh0lher Lessor shall also be indemnified with respect to lhe 
same matter under some other agreement by another party. 
{d) Duration, The obligations of Lessee under this Section are expressly made for the benefit of. and shall be 
enforceable by, Lessor without necessity of declaring this Lease in default and Lessor may initially proceed directly against Lessee 
under this Section without first resorting to any other rights of indemnification it may have. II an event occurs during the term or 
continuance ol this Lease that gives rise to a liability of Lessee pursuant to !his Section, Lessee's liability shall continue, 
notwithstanding the expi(alion, cancellation or lermination of this Lease, until all payments or rnimburscmenls with respect to such 
liability are made. 
13. CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS. All ol Lessee's obligations, indemnities and liabilities under Sections 10, 11 and 12 shall 
survive the expiration, cancella!ion or termination of this Le(lsc. 
14. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSE. Expense at operation and maintenance of Vehicles in accotdance with 
manulacturer's recommendations and in condition satisfactory to Lessor, including but not limited to, cos! ol luol, oil, grease, repairs, 
maintenance, tires, tubes, storage, parking, tolls, tines and penalties shall bo the responsibility and obligallon ol Lessee. Lessee shall 
roimburso Lessor ii Lessor shall pay any of such operating or maintenance expenses. II tires or pans are removed lrorn a Vehicle, 
Lessee shall provide comparable replacements therefore and such replacements shall become part of the Vehicles by accession. 
Lessee shnll not niter any Vehicle without the prior written consent ol Lessor unless such ulteration is required by law. Lessee agroes 
to rornovo all markings from the Vehicles, at Lessee's expense, prior to the return ol the Vehicles to Lessor. 
15, ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY I.AW. In the even! lhal subsequent to the Delivery Date ol a Vehicle any federal, 
state or local law, ordinance, rule or regulatlon shall require the installalion of any additional equipment or accessories, including but 
not limited lo anti·pollution andlor safety devices, or in !ho event that any other modilications of t11e Vehicles shall be required by virtue 
of such law, orctinance, rule or regulation, then and In any of such events, Lessee shall pay the full cost thereof, including installation 
expenses. Lessor may, at its option, arrange for the installation ol such equipment or 1110 perlormanco ol sucl1 modificu1ions, ~nd 
Lessee agrees to pay the lull cos! 1f1ereof as Additional Rent. immediately upon receipt of an invoice for same. 
16. NO WARRANTIES; LIMITATION ON LIABILITY. Lessee acknowledges and agrees: (i) that the Vehicles areola size, design, 
cap11city and manulaciure selected by Lessee; (ii) that lhe Lessor Is not the manutacturer or seller of lhe Vehicles or t11e 
n1anl1lacturer's or seller's ,19ent; (iii) that LESSEE LF.ASES THE VEHICLES "AS-IS' AND THAT LESSOR HAS NOT MADE, AND 
DOES NOT HEREBY MAKf., ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE VALUE, 
CONDITION, QUALITY, MATERIAL, WORKMANSHIP, DESIGN, CAPACITY, MERCHANTABILITY. DURABILITY, FITNESS 
OR SUITABILITY or- THE VEHICLES FOR ANY USE OR PURPOSE OR ANY O'THER REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY 
WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WITH RESPECT TO THE VEHICLES. IN NO EVENT SHALL LESSOR BE LIABLE FOR 
LOSS OF OR DAMAG[ TO CARGO, LOSS OF PROFITS OR SUSINF..SS OR FOfl INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL SPECIAL OR 
i1CV':i30 •• IAV~,\ 
fto'/. 1.-tBfrZ(l10 
Cr-.'OI! Ai:-!110: ~ I tfJ25 
Uot.' Rcq11L'lrir {1 ',::J~ 
riginal hattel Paper 
10/08/2010 FRI 10:46 FAX 208 336 806B Utility Boi3e 0005/040
:
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE, HOWSOEVER CAUSED; jiv) THAT LESSOR HAS NOT MADE, AND DOES NOT 
HEREBY MAKE, ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF THIS 
LEASE OR THE TIMING OF THE ACCRUALS OF THE RENTALS HEREUNDER FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT OR TAX 
PURPOSES; and (v) THAT LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN DETERMINATION OF THE PROPER LEASE TERM 
PERIOD FOR PURPOSES OF ITS SFAS 13 OR SIMILAR ANALYSIS. LESSEE ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT LESSOR 
IS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND DOES NOT ACT IN THE CAPACITY OF A FIDUCIARY OF LESSEE, AND THAT 
LESSEE WILL OBTAIN TAX AND ACCOUNTING ADVICE FROM ITS OWN PROFESSIONALS. Provided Lessee Is nol in default 
hereunder, during the lerm ol this Lease as lo any Vehicle, Lessor hereby assigns to Lessee any rights Lessor may have under any 
manufacturer's or seller's warranty, to the exlent that such assignment may be made without impairing Lessor's ability to assert such 
rights in its own name under such warranty. No suit, claim or solllomenl shall bo brought or made by Lessee against or with the 
manufacturer or seller unless Lessee shall have provided Lessor ton (tO) days advanced written notice thereof and any such action 
does not Impair or compromise any claims Lessor may have against any such manufacturer or seller.
17. DEFAULT. Default under this Lease shall occur in Ihe event; (i) Lessee falls lo pay when due any amounl owed by il to Lessor, 
its affiliates (including, without limilaiion, any direct or indirect parent, subsidiary or sister enlily), successors and assigns ol Lessor or 
any other entity that enters into a lease incorporating by reference the terms of this Master Lease (each, an "Other Lessor"! 
(collectively, "Lessor Parties'1! under this Lease Or if Lessee (ails lo pay when duo any amount owed by il lo any Lessor Party under 
any other document, agreement or instrument or Lessee tails to provide or maintain the insurance required hereby; (ii) any of Lessee's 
warranties or represenlations shall be or become untrue or breached; (iii) Lessee shall fail, alter fifteen (15) days nolice thereof, lo 
correct any failure in Ihe duo performance and observance of any other of the covenants and obligations of Lessee hereunder; (iv) 
Lessee shall default under any other agreement with any Lessor Party; (v) Lessee transfers a substantial portion ol ils assets olher 
than in the ordinary course ol business; (vi) a voluntary or involuntary petition under any statute relating lo bankruptcy, reorganization 
or receivership or under any other statute relating to the relief of debtors shall be filed by or against Lessee or any guarantor of 
Lessee’s obligations hereunder; (vii) Lessee or any guarantor ol Lessee's obligations hereunder shall make an assignment for ihe 
benefil of creditors, admil in writing lo being insolvent or, if Lessee or such guarantor is a natural person, if such person shall die; (viii) 
if there shall occur an (a) appropriation, (b) confiscation, (c) retention, or (d) seizure ol conirol, custody or possession ol any Vehicle 
by any governmental authority including without limitation, any municipal, state, federal or other governmental entity or any 
governmental agency or inslrumenlality (all such entities, agencies and instrumentalities shall hereinafter be collectively referred lo as 
''Governmental Authority"): (ix) II anyone in Ihe control, custody or possession of any Vehicle or Ihe Lessee is accused, alleged or 
charged (whether or not subsequently arraigned, indicted or convicted) by any Governmental Authority to have used any Vehicle in 
connection wilh the commission ol any crime (other than a misdemeanor or moving violation); (x) there shall be a material change In 
management, ownership or conirol of Lessee; (xi) there shall be a material adverse change in any ol the: (a) condition (financial or 
otherwise), business, performance, prospects, operaiions or properties of the Lessee, (b) legality, validity or enforceability of this 
Lease: (c) ability ol the Lessee to repay [he indebtedness or perform ils obligations under this Lease, or (d) rights and remedies ol the 
Lessor under (he Lease are impaired; (xli) Ihoro shall bo a death of a majority owner of Lessee or a guarantor of (he obligaiions of 
Lessee under this Lease; or (xiii) there shall be any lien, claim or encumbrance on any ol the Vehicles hereunder.
18. LESSOR'S REMEDIES,
(1) In Ihe event of any default described above, at Ihe option ol Lessor, and without notice to lessee, all rights of 
Lessee hereunder and in and to Ihe Vehicles shall forthwith be cancelled. Upon such cancellation, Lessee agrees that all unpaid 
Monthly Rentals and other sums duo and to become due hereunder ehall be immediately due and payable, and Lessor may, wimoul 
notice to Lessee, either take possession of any or all Vehicles (with or without legal process) or require Lessee to return all Vehicles 
forthwith to Lessor al such location as Lessor shall designate. Lessee authorizes Lessor and Lessor's agenls to enter any premises 
where the Vehicles may be lound (or the purpose of repossessing the same. II Lessor retakes possession of any of Ihe Vehicles and 
al the time ol such retaking rhere shall be in, upon, or attached lo the Vehicles any property, goods, or things ol value belonging to 
Lessee or in the custody or conirol ol Lessee, Lessor is hereby authorized to lake possession ol such property, goods, and things of 
value and hold the same lor Lessee or to place such properly, goods, or things of value in public storage for the account of, and the 
expense of, lessee. (2) Lessor may al ils option; (i) sell any or all ol Ihe Vehicles which are returned or repossessed pursuant to this 
Section and hold Lessee liable (or Adjusted Rent as provided herein; or (ii) lease any or all of the Vehicles to a person olher than 
Lessee for such term and such renlal as Lessor may elect in ils sole discretion, and apply Ihe proceeds of such lease, after first 
deducting all cosis and expenses relating to (he cancellation of (his Lease and (he retaking of the Vehicles, lo Lessee's obligaiions 
hereunder; provided, however, that Lessee shall pay to Lessor immediately upon demand, as liquidated damages lor loss o( bargain 
and not as a penalty, a sum wiih respect lo each such Vehicle which represents Ihe excess ol the present value at Ihe lime of 
cancellation of all Monthly Rentals which would otherwise have accrued hereunder to the end of (ho Maximum Term for such Vehicle 
over Ihe present value of Ihe aggregate ol the rentals to be paid (or such Vehicle by such third party for such period (such present 
values to be computed in each case on the basis of a discount factor equal to Ihe Prime Rate In effect on Ihe dole this Lease is 
cancelled by Lessor, from the respective dates upon which such Monthly Rentals would have been payable hereunder had this Lease 
not been cancelled). In addition to the other remedies set forth herein, if any Vehicle is not returned to Lessor, or if Lessor is 
prevented from taking possession thereof, Lessee shall pay to Lessor immediately upon demand Adjusted Rent as provided herein, 
as if such Vehicle had been sold on the dale this Lease was cancelled, and the amounl of net sale proceeds therefore were zero. (3) 
As used herein, ihe Prime Rate shall mean the Prime Rate as published (rorri time lo lime in Ihe Money Rates section o( The Wall 
St reel Journal as llw base rale on corporate loans. If more than one Prime Rate or a range ol rales is published, ihe Prime Rale will 
be the highest ot (he published rates. In Ihe event the Prime Rate as published in Tiro Wall Street Journal ceases lo exist or The Wall 
Streel Journal ceases publishing a Prime Rate Lessor will substitute a comparable index, which is oulside Ihe conirol of Lessor. In the 
evenl of an error by The Wait Sheet Journal, the Prime Rale will bo based upon the Prime Rate as corrected. Lessor may sell any 
Vehicle without giving any warranties as to the Vehicle. Lessor may disclaim any warranties of title, possession, quiet enjoymom. or
(a)
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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE, HOWSOEVER CAUSED; (iv) THAT LESSOR HAS NOT MADE, AND DOES NOT 
HERESY MAKE, ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF THIS 
LEASE OR THE TIMING OF THE ACCRUALS OF THE RENTALS HEREUNDER FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT OR TAX 
PURPOSES; and (v) THAT LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN DETERMINATION OF THE PROPER LEASE TERM 
PERIOD FOR PURPOSES OF ITS SFAS 13 OR SIMILAR ANALYSIS. LESSEE ACKNOWL.EDGES AND AGREES THAT LESSOR 
IS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND DOES NOT ACT IN THE CAPACITY OF A FIDUCIARY OF LESSEE, AND THAT 
LESSEE WILL OBTAIN TAX AND ACCOUNTING ADVICE FROM ITS OWN PROFESSIONALS. Provided Lessee Is nol in defaull 
hereunder, during lhe terrn of this Leas<:! as lo any Vehicle, Lessor hereby assigns to Lessee any rights Lessor may have under nny 
manufacturer's or setter's warranty, to the extent that such assignment rnay be made without impairing Lessor's abilily to assen such 
rights in its own name under such warranty. No suit, claim or setlloment shall bo brought or mado by Lessee against or with tho 
manufacturer or seller unless Lessee shall have provided Lessor ton (10) days advanced written notice thereof and any such action 
does not Impair or compromise any claims Lessor may have against any such manulacluror or seller. 
17. DEFAULT. Default under this Lease shall occur in the oven!: (i) Lessee falls to pay when due any amount owed by it lo Lessor, 
its affiliates (including, without limitation, any direct or indirect parent, subsidiary or sister entily). successors and assigns al Lessor 01 
any other entity that enters into a lease incorporating by reference the terms of this Master Lease (each, an "Other Losso(") 
(collectively, "l.essor Parties") under this Lease or if Lessee !ails to pay when due any amount owed by it to any Lessor Party under 
any other document, agreement or Instrument or Lossee fails to provide or maintain the h1surance roquired hereby; (ii) any of Lossoe's 
warranties or reprcsenlations shall be or become untrue or breachGd; (Iii) Lessee shall fail, alter liftoon (15) days notice thereof. to 
correct any lailuro in !he due performance and observance of any other of tho covenants and obligations of Lessee hereunder; (iv) 
Lessee shall default under any other agreement wilh any Lessor Party; (v) Lessee transfers a substantial portion of ils assets other 
than in !he ordinary course of business; (vi) a voluntary or involuntary petition under any slatute relating to bankruplcy, reorganization 
or recoivership or under any other statute relating to the relief of debtors shall be filed by or against Lessee or any guarantor ot 
Lessee's obligations hereunder; (vii) Lessee or 1.1ny guarantor of Lessee's obligations hereunder shall make an assignment for !he 
benefit of crediI01s, admit in wriIing to being insolvent or, ii Lessee or such guarantor is a natural person, ii such person shall die; (viii) 
ii !here shall occur an (a) appropriation, (b) confiscation, (c) retention, or (d) seizure of control, custody or possession of any Vehicle 
by any governmental authority including without limitation, any municipal, state, federal or other governmental enlity or any 
governmental agency or instrumentality (all such entities, agencios and lnslrumentallties shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as 
·'Governmental AtJlhority"); (ix) If anyone in lhe con1roI, custody or possession of any Vehicle or the Lessee is accused, alleged or 
charged (whether or not subsequently arraigned, indicted or convicted) by any Governmental Authority to have used any Vehicle in 
connection wilh the commission ol any crime (other than a misdemeanor or moving violation): (x) there shall be a material change In 
management, ownership or conlrol of Lessee: (xi) there shall be a matorlal adverse change in any of the: (a) condition (llnancial or 
otherwise), business, performance, prospects, operations or properties of the Lessee. (b) legality. validity or enforceability of this 
Lease: (c) ability ol the Lessee to repay Ihe indebtedness or perform its obligations under this Lease, or (d) rights and remedies ol the 
Lessor under the Lease are impaired: (xii) !hem shull be a death of n majority owner of Lessee or a guaranfor of the obligations of 
Lessee under this Lease; or (xiii) there shall be any lien, claim or encumbrance on any of the Vehicles he1eunder. 
18, LESSOR'S REMEDIES, 
(a) (1) In lhe event of any default described above, at !he option ol Lessor, and without notice lo lessee, all rights al 
Lessee hereunder and in and to the Vehicles shall forthwith be cancelled. Upon such cancellation, Lessee agrees that all_ unpaid 
Monthly Rentals and olher sums due and to become duo hernunder shall be immediately due and payable, nnd Lessor may, wi111out 
notice to Lessee, either take possession of any or all Vehicles (wllh or without legal procoss) or require Lessee to return all Vehicles 
forthwith lo Lessor al such location as Lessor shall designate. Lossoo authorizes Lessor and Lessor's agents to enter any premises 
whero the Vehicles may be lound lor tho purpose of ropossessing the same. II Lessor retakes possession of any of the Vehicles and 
al lho lime al such rataking there shall be in, upon. or attached to tho Vehicles any properly, goods, or things of value belonging to 
Lessee or in the custody or control of Lessee, Lessor is hereby authorized to lake possession ol such property, goods, and things of 
value and hold lhe same tor Lessee or to place such property, goods, or lhings of value in public storage for th6 account of, and tho 
expense of, Lessee. (2) Lossor may at ils option: (i) sell any or all of the Vel1ictes which are returned or repossessed pursuant to this 
Section and hold Lessee liable for Adjusted Rent as provided herein; or (ii) lease any or all of !he Vehicles to a person other than 
Lessee for such term and such rental as Lessor rnay elect in ils sole discretion, and apply lhe proceeds o! such lease, after first 
doducting all costs and exponsos relating to ·the cancellation of this Lease and the retaking of fhe Vehictes, to Lessee's obligalions 
hereunder; provided, however, that Lessee shall pay to Lessor immediately upon de1rnrnd, as liquidated damages for loss of bargain 
and not as a penalty, n sum with respecl to each such Vehicle which represents !he excess of the present value al the time al 
cancellation of nil Monthly Rentals which would otherwise have accrued hereunder to the end of flio Maximum Term for such Vehicle 
over the present value of tho aggregate ol the rentals 10 be paid for such Vehicle by such third party for such period (such present 
values to be computed in each case on the b1Jsis of a discount factor equal to lhe Prime Rate In effect on lhe dnte this Lease is 
cancolled by Lessor, from the respective dates upon which such Monthly Rentals would have been payable hereunder had !his Lease 
not been cancelled). In addition to the other remedies set forth herein, if any Vehicle is not returned to Lessor, or ii Lessor is 
prevented from taking possession Ih0rcol, Lessoo shall pay to Lessor immediately upon domand Adjusted Rent as provided herein, 
as if such Vehicle had been sold on the dale this L.ease was cancelled, and the amounf of neI sate proceeds therefore were zero. (3) 
As used herein, the Prime Rate shall mean the Prirne Rate us published from lime lo limo in the Money Rates section of The Wall 
Streel Jovrnal as the base rale on corµorare loans. II more than one Prime Rate or a range ol rates is pubtishod, Ille Prime Rate will 
be 11,e highesl of the published rates. tn the event the Prime RaIe as published in Tile Wall Street Journal ceases lo exist or The Wall 
Street ,Journal ceases publishing a Prime Rate Lessor will substitute a comparable index, which i~ outside !he conlrot of L.essor. In the 
even! ol an error by The Wall Street Journ,!11. t11e Prime rlnle will bo based upon the Prime Rate as corrected. Lessor may sell any 
VeI1iclo withoul giving any warranties as to 1110 Vehicle. Lessor may disclaim any warranties ol lille, possession, quiet enjoy111on1. or 
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Ihe like. This procedure will not bo considered lo adversely allect (ho commercial reasonableness ol any sale of the Vehicle.
Whether or noi Ihe Vehicles are relumed lo, sold or leased by Lessor, Lessor shall also recover from Lessee all 
unpaid Monthly Rentals, Additional Rents and Ad|usted Rents then due or owing together with all costs and expenses, including 
attorneys' fees, incurred by Lessor in the enforcement of ils rights and remedies under this Lease. In addition. Lessor may retain as 
liquidated damages all Monthly Rentals and Additional Rents and sale proceeds received, including any relunds and other sums 
which otherwise would be payable to Lessee, and a sum equal to the aggregate ot all Monthly Rentals and other amounts, including 
but not limited to any applicable early termination (eo charged by Lessor in accordance with a particular Lease (the due dales of which 
Rentals and other amounts Lessor may accelerate at its option) which would have been due during the period ending, for each 




■ (c) In addition to the foregoing remedies, in the event of a default hereunder, Lessor may also declare all other debts
then owing by Lessee to Lessor or any affiliate (including, wilhout limitation, any direct or indirect paronl, subsidiary or sister entity), 
successor or assignee of Lessor to be immediately due and payable.
(d) The remedies in this Lease provided in favor of Lessor shall not be deemed exclusive or alternative, but shall be 
cumulative and shall be In addition to all other remedies in Ils lavor existing at law or in equity. LESSEE HEREBY WAIVES ANY 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION RELATING TO THIS LEASE, AS WELL AS ANY REQUIREMENTS OF LAW, NOW OR 
HEREAFTER IN EFFECT, WHICH MIGHT LIMIT OR MODIFY ANY OF THE REMEDIES HEREIN PROVIDED, TO THE EXTENT 
THAT SUCH WAIVER IS PERMITTED BY LAW. THE FAILURE OF LESSOR TO EXERCISE ANY OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED IT 




19. ASSIGNMENT. Neither this Lease, any rights or obligations hereunder, nor any rights in or lo the Vehicles may b8 assigned or 
subleased by Lessee withoul the prior writlen consent of Lessor and no such assignment or sublease shall be valid or binding on 
Lessor. Lessor or any assignee or successor ol Lessor shall have the right to transfer, sell or assign all or any portion of this Lease or 
any interest In the Vehicles and/or obligations hereunder, including servicing rights, whether as part ol a securitization or by 
participation, assignment, sale or other transfer (in each case, a "Lessor Transfer^ without notice, acknowledgment or consent from 
Lessee, LESSEE WAIVES, RELINQUISHES, DISCLAIMS AND AGREES THAT IT WILL NOT ASSERT AGAINST ANY ASSIGNEE 
OR LESSOR ANY CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, CLAIMS IN RECOUPMENT, ABATEMENT, REDUCTION, DEFENSES, OR SET­
OFFS FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO WITHHOLD PAYMENT OF 
ANY MONIES WHICH MAY BECOME DUE UNDER THIS LEASE EXCEPT DEFENSES THAT CANNOT BE WAIVED UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. Upon a Lessor Transfer ol Lessor's entire interest with respect to a Vehicle, Lessor shall be 
automatically relieved, from and alter Ihe date ol such Lessor Transfer, ol liability for the pertormance or obligation ol Lessor, whether 
contained In this Agreement or otherwise imposed by law, with respect to such Vehicle.
20. FURTHER ASSURANCES; REPORTING; INSPECTIONS, Lessee agrees that at any time and Irom time lo lime, after the 
execution and delivery of this Lease, it shall, upon request at Lessor, execute and deliver such further documents and do such further 
ads and things as Lessor may reasonably request In order fully to effect Ihe purposes ot this Lease and to protect Lessor's interest in 
the Vehicles, including, but not limited to, furnishing any and all information necessary to enable Lessor or its Insurer to defend itselt in 
any litigation arising in connection herewith. Lessee hereby authorizes Lessor to insert serial numbers, delivery and Monthly Rental 
due dates, and other data on tho Schedules, Delivery Receipts and other documents relating hereto when such numbers, dates and 
data become known lo Lessor. Lessee shall promptly provide all information relating to registration, titling, licensing (including license 
plate numbers) or otherwise relating to the Vehicle or tho use or operation thereol as Lessor may trom time to time request. Lessee 
will deliver or make available to Lessor, Lessee's and any Guarantor's, il applicable, complete (inancial statements prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, certified by a recognized firm of certified public 
accountants, or it acceptable to Lessor, certified by Ihe chiel linancial officer of Lessee wilhin ninety (90) days of Ihe close of each 
fiscal year of Lessee, together with a certificate ol an authorized officer ot Lessee stating that such officer has reviewed the activities 
ol Lessee and that lo the best of such officer's knowledge, there exists no Event of Default or event which with notice or lapse of lime 
(or both) would become an Event ol Default. In addition, Lessee will, upon Lessor’s request, deliver to Lessor copies of Lessee's and 
any Guarantor's, if applicable, quarterly financial report or such other reports as may be reasonably requested by Lessor, in each case 
certified by the chief financial officer of Lessee. Lessor may inspect the Vehicles and Lessee's books and records relating thereto at 
any time during Lessor's usual business hours.
21. NOTICES. Notices required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be given in writing either personally or by registered or 
certified mail addressed (o Ihe respective party at Its address listed on page one hereof or, il such party lias previously given notice of 
a change ot address, lo the address specified in the last such notice ol change of address. Notices shall be deemed received when 
delivered if personally delivered or, If mailed, two (2) business days after deposit postage prepaid in ihe United Stales mails.
22. MISCELLANEOUS,
This Lease will become effective only upon acceptance by Lessor. This (orm is intended for general use 
Ihroughoul the United States. Any provision of this Lease that is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall be ineffective in 
such jurisdiclion lo the extent oi such prohibition or unentorcoability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, any such 
prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall noi invalidate or render unenforceable such provision in any oilier jurisdiction. 
Unless otherwise provided In an applicable Schedule "A", it is the intention ol Ihe parties hereto that this contract constitutes a lease 
for tax and other purposes and Lessor and Lessee agree to report at! Vehicles subjeef hereto as leases for US. income lax purposes.
(a)
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lhe like. This procedure will 1101 be considered 10 adversely alfect lho commercial reasonableness of any sale of the Vehicle. 
 Whether or not lhe Vehicles aro returned lo, sold or leased by Lessor, Lessor shall also recover from Lessee all 
unpaid Monthly Rentals, Additional Aenls and Ad)usled Rents then duo or owing logether wilh all costs and expenses, including 
altorneys' fees, incurred by Lessor in lhe enforcemenl of ils rights and remedies under !his Lease. In addition, Lessor may retain os 
liquidated damages oil Monthly Rentals and Additional Rents and sah;i proceeds received, including any refunds and other sums 
which olherwise would be payable to Lessee, and a sum equal to the aggrogate of all Monlhly Rentals and olher amounls, including 
bul no! limited to any applicable early lermination feo charged by Lessor in accordance wllh a particular Loase (the due dales of which 
Rentals and Olher amounls Lessor may accelerale al its option) which would have been due during 1he period ending. for each 
Vehicle, on the earliost date on which Lessee could, ii applicable, have effectively cancelled this Lease as lo such Vehiclo if Lessee 
had not defaulted. 
(c) In addilion to the foregoing remedies, in the event of a dofauu· hereunder, Lessor may also declare all 01her debls 
then owing by Lessee to Lessor or any affiliale (including, wilhout limilatlon, any direct or indirect parcml, subsidiary or sislor entity), 
successor or assignee _of Lessor to be Immediately due and payable. 
(d) The remedies in this Lease provided in favor of Lessor shall nol be deemed exclusive or alternative, bul shall be 
cumula1ive and shall be In addillon to all other remedies in lls favor existing at law or in equity. LESSEE HEREBY WAIVES ANY 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION RELATING TO THIS LEASE, AS WELL AS ANY REQUIREMENTS OF LAW, NOW OR 
HEREAFTER IN EFFECT, WHICH MIGHT LIMIT OR MODIFY ANY OF THE REMEDIES HEREIN PAOVIDl:D, TO THE EXTENT 
THAT SUCH WAIVER IS PERMITTED BY LAW. THE FAILURE OF LESSOR TO EXERCISE ANY OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED IT 
HEREUNDER SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF ANY SUCH RIGHT OR ESTABLISH A CUSTOM OR COURSE OF 
I . 
19. ASSIGNMENT. Neilher !his Lease, any rights or obligations horeunder, nor any righls in or lo lhe Vehicles may be assigned or 
subleased by Lessee wilhout lhe prior writlen consent of Lessor and no such assignmenl or sublease shall be valid or binding on 
Lessor. Lessor or any assignee or successor ol Lessor shall have the right 10 transfer, sell or assign all or any portion of this Lease or 
any Interest In Iha Vehicles and/or obligalions hereunder, including servicing righls, whether as part ol a sccuritizallon or by 
participalion, assignmenl, sale or other lransfer (in each case. a "Lessor Transfer·) withoul notico, acknowlodgmont or consenl trom 
Lessee. LESSEE WAIVES, RELINQUISHES, DISCLAIMS AND AGREES THAT IT WILL NOT ASSERT AGAINST ANY ASSIGNEE 
OR LESSOR ANY CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, CLAIMS IN AECOUPMENT, ABATEMENT, REDUCTION, DEFENSES, OR SET· 
OFFS FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO WITHHOLD PAYMENT OF 
ANY MONIES WHICH MAY BECOME DUE UNDER THIS LEASE EXCEPT DEFENSES THAT CANNOT BE WAIVED UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. Upon a Lessor Transfer ol Lessor's entire interest with respect to a Vehicle, Lessor shall be 
automatically relieved, from and alter lhe date of such Lessor Transfer, ol liability for the performance or obligalion of Lessor, whether 
conlained in this Agreemenl or otherwise imposed by law, with respect 10 such Vehicle. 
20. FURTHER ASSURANCES; REPORTING; INSPECTIONS. Lessee agrees lhal a1 any limo and from lime to lime, after the 
execution and delivery or this Lease, ii shall, upon requosl of Lessor, execute and deliver such further documents and do such further 
acls and things as Lossor may reasonably request In order lully 10 effect Iha purposes of lhis Lease and to prolecl Lasso~s inleresl in 
(he Vehicles, including, bul nol limiled 10, furnishing any and all information necessary lo enabll3 Lessor or its Insurer 10 defend itselt in 
any litigalion arising in conneclion herewith. Lessee hereby null101izes Lossor lo inserl serial numbers. delivery and Monlhly Ronlal 
due dales, and olher data on tho Schedules, Delivery Receipts and other documents relaling hereto when such numbers, dales and 
ctala become known lo Lessor. Lessee shall promptly provide all information relating to registration. tilling. licensing (including license 
plate numbers) or otherwise relaling lo lhe Vehicle or 1ho use or opcralion 1he1eof as Lessor may from lime to time request. Lessee 
will deliver or make available lo Lessor, Lessee's and any Guaranlor's, ii applicable, complelo financial stalements prepared in 
accordance wilh generally accopted accounting principles, consistenlly applied, certified by a recognized firm of cerlified public 
accountants, or if acceptable lo Lessor, certified by the chiol linancial officer of Lessee wilhin ninety (90) days of the close of each 
fiscal year or Lessee, togelher with a cortlficale of an authorized officer ot Lessee slating lhat such officer has reviewed the aclivilies 
of Lossee and that to lhe besl of such officer's knowledge, there exists no Event of Default or even! which with nolice or lapse of lime 
(or bolh) would become an Event of Default. In addilion, Lessee will, upon Lessor's request, deliver 10 Lessor copies of l.essee's and 
any Guarantor's, ii applicable, quarterly financial report or such other reports as may be reasonably requesled by Lessor, in each case 
cerlified by the chief financial officer of Lessee. Lessor may inspecl the Vehicles and Lessee's books and records relating lherelo at 
any time during Lessors usual business hours. 
21. NOTICES. Nolices required or permitted lo be given hereunder shall bo given in writing eilher personally or by regis1ered or 
certified mail addressed lo the respeclive party al fts address listed on page one hereof or, ii such pa,ty has previously given notice of 
a change ol address, to lhe address specilied in lhe lasl such notice of change of address. Notices shall be deemed ,eceived when 
delivered i! personally delivered or, If mniled, two (2) busil1ess days aiter deposit postage prepaid in lhe Uniled Stales mails. 
22. MISCELLAN£:OUS. 
(a) This I.ease will become effeclivc only upon acceptance by l.ossor. This lorm is intended for general use 
lhroughoul the Uniled States. Any provision of !his Lease lllat is prohibited or unenforceable in any ju,isdiction shall be ineffeclive in 
such jurisdiction to 1he extent oi sucl1 prohibttion or unenlorcoabilily witl1out invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, any such 
prohibition or une➔otorceability in any jurlsdlclion shall not invalidate or render unenforceable suc11 provision in any other jurisdiclion. 
Unless olherwise provided In an applicable Sche.<Jvle "A", ii is !he inien1ion of the parties hore10 !hat !his conlracl constitutes a lea$1l 
ior lax and other purposes and lessor and Lessee agree lo repc11 al! Vehicles subj8ct hemto as leases for U.S. income tax purposes. 
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If and to tho exient this Lease or any Addendum or Schedule is interpreled by any court as a lease intended as security, Lessee 
hereby grants to Lessor and eacti other Lessor Parly a security Interesl in the Vehicles and all additions, attachments, accessories 
and accessions thereto whether or not lurnished by Ihe supplier ol the Vehicles and any and all substitutions, upgrades, replacements 
or exchanges therefore, and any and all insurance and/or other proceeds of Ihe property in and against which a security interest is 
granted hereunder. This security interest is granted lo secure tho payment and performance of all debts and all liabilities of Lessee lo 
Lessor or any other Lessor Party ol every hind and character, whether now existing or hereafter arising under this Lease, any Other 
Lease (as defined below) or any Addenda or Schedules horeto or thereto, and whether direct, Indirect, absolute, contingent, primary, 
secondary, or otherwise, now existing or hereafter arising, and whether due directly or by assignment, and any renewals, extensions 
and modifications of such debts, obligations and liabilities. Lessee authorizes Lessor lo file a financing statement describing the 
Vehicles and the security Interest granted herein. Lessor Parties may set off any amounts owned lo Lessee and its alfiliates under 
this Agreement, any Other Lease or any Schedule hereto or thereto against any amounts owed to Lessor Parlies by Lessee or any ol 
its alfiliates. If and lo the extern any amounf paid or payable by Lessee to Lessor under a Lease or any Addendum or Schedule is 
interpreled by any court as inlerest, it is Ihe intention of Ihe parties hereto to comply with any applicable usury laws; accordingly, it is 
agreed fhal, any provisions in this Agreement to (he contrary notwiihslanding. in no event shall this Agreement require the payment or 
permit the collection of interest or any amount In the naiure of interesl or fees in excess of Ihe maximum amount permitted by 
applicable law as now or hereafter construed by a court ol competent jurisdiction. II any such excess inlorest is coniracied lor, 
charged or received pursuant to this Agreement, or in ihe event that all ol the principal balance under this Agreement shall be prepaid, 
so that under any ol such circumstances Ihe amount ol Inlerest coniracied lor, charged or received shall exceed the maximum 
amount of interesl permitted by applicable law as so construed, then in such event any such excess which may have been collected 
shall, al Lessor’s option, either be credited lo Monthly Rentals or olher sums owed by Lessee under this Agreement (to Ihe extent 
such application represent a prepayment of such obligations, without any prepayment fee) or refunded to Lessee, and the effective 
rate of interest shall automatically be reduced lo the maximum lawful rale allowed under applicable law as now or hereafter construed 
by a court ol competent jurisdiction. Without limiting (he foregoing, all calculations ol Ihe rale of interesl contracted lor, charged or 
received with respect lo this Agreement which are made for ihe purpose of determining whether such rate exceeds tho maximum 
lawful contract rale, shall be made, lo Ihe fullest exient permitted by applicable law, by amortizing, prorating, allocating and spreading 
in equal parts during the period of the tuft staled term of Ihe indebtedness, all interesl al any time contracted for, charged to or 
received from Lessee in connection with such indebtedness.
THIS LEASE AND ANY ADDENDA AND SCHEDULES REFERRED TO HEREIN REPRESENTS THE FINAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS, 
OR SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES, THERE ARE NO UNWRITTEN ORAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES, No oral agreement, guaranty, promise, condition, representation or warranty shall be binding. All prior conversations, 
agreements or representations related hereto and/or the Vehicles are superseded hereby, and no modification hereof shall bo binding 
on Lessor unless in writing and signed by an authorized representative ol Lessor. Lessee authorizes Lessor lo correct palem errors 
herein and to make changes to this Agreement or to any related Addendum or Schedule that benelil Lessee, such as decreasing the 
Monthly Rental or other amount payable under this Agreement. In addition, if there are changes in calculation ol taxes, configuration 
of the Vehicle(s) or other cost factors affecting the cost ol the Vehicle(s), and if such an increase is within the dollar limits and lime 
limits of Lessor's credit approval, Lessee authorizes Lessor,, upon written notice lo Lessoe, to increase the Monthly Rental or other 
amount payable under this Agreement or any related Addendum or Schedule by not more than fifteen percent accordingly. No vehicle 
dealer nor any employee or agent of any dealer or of any other person has authority to make any representations to Lessee on 
Lessor's behall as to Ihe performance ol Ihe Vehicles, or as lo any provision ol this Lease or as lo any oilier mailer whatsoever. 
Lessee has no authority lo, and shall not, make any warranty or representation concerning the Vehicles to any person on Lessor's 
behalf. Lessor may pay tees to or receive lees Irom Ihe seller or manufacturer of the Vehicles, a broker, or olher third parly in 
connection wilh this Lease. Such tees may affect the rate, terms and Lessee's total cost hereunder.
23. ORGANIZATION. If Lessee is a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or other registered organization, ils 
state of organization is In tho slate set forth immediately below its signature on the Iasi page of this Lease. II Lessee is an individual, 
his/her principal place of residence is at the address set forth immediately below its signature on ihe last page of this Lease. II Lessee 
is an organization, Its place of business or if It has more than one place of business, its chlel executive office is located at the address 
set forth immediately below its signature on Ihe last page o( this Lease. Lessee agrees that il will not, withoul the prior written consent 
ol Lessor, change ils state ol organization if it is a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or olher registered 
organization or tho location ol its chief executive oflice or ils place ol business it it is a non-regislered organization. If Lessee is an 
individual, Lessee must notify Lessor in writing of a change in his/her principal place ol residence thirty (30) days prior lo such change.
24. PRIVACY WAIVER, Lessor may receive from and disclose to any individual, corporation, business trust, association, 
company, partnership, joint venture, or olher entity (collectively, the "Entity"!. including, without limiting the generality ol the loregoing. 
Lessor's parent or any affiliate or any subsidiary of Lessor and any credit reporting agency or olher entity whether or nol related lo 
Lessor lor any purpose, information about Lessee's accounts, credit application and credil experience wilh Lessor and Lessee 
authorizes any Entity (o release lo Lessor any information related to Lessee's accounts, credil experience and account information 
regarding Ihe Lessee. This shall be continuing authorization for all present and future disclosures of Lessee's account 
information, credit application and credil experience on Lessee made by Lessor, or any Entity requested to release such 
information to Lessor.
25. DEBIT TRANSACTIONS. Lessor may but shall not be required lo otter Lessee the option of paying any of Lessee's obligations 
lo Lessor through printed checks ("Debit Transactions"! drawn pursuant to litis authorization upon Lessee's checking account, using 
Lessee's checking account number' bank touting code and olher information which Lessee provides lo Lessor prior lo the first Debit 
Transaction. Lessee authorizes Lessor lo Initiate Debit Transactions from Lessee's checking account in the amount necessary lo pay 
the rental payments, delinquency charges, or such olher amounts as may now or hereafter be due hereunder or under any other
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If and 10 1110 ex1ent this Lease or any Addendum or Schedule is interpreted by any court as a lease inlended as securily, Lessee 
hereby grants lo Lessor and e11ch other lessor Parly a socurily lnteresl iri lhe Vehicles and all additions, attachments, accessories 
and accessions lhoreto whethor or not turnislmd by the supplier o1 the Vehicles and any and all substitutions, upgrades, replacements 
or exchanges therefore, and any and all insurance and/or 01hcr proceeds of the property in and against which a security intorost is 
granted hereunder. This security interest is granted lo secure lho payment and performance of all debls and all liabilities of Lessee to 
Lessor or any other Losser Party of every kind and character, whether now oxisli11g or hereafter arising under this Lease, any Othor 
Lease (as defined below) or any Addenda or Schedules hereto or lhoroto, and whether direct, indirect, absolute, contingent, primary, 
secondary, or otherwise. now existing or hereafter arising, and whether due directly or by assignment, aod any renewals, extensions 
and modifications of such dobls, obligations and liabilities. Lessee nuthorizes Lessor to file a financing slotemenl describing Iha 
Vehicles and the socurily Interest granted herein. Lessor Parties may set off any amounts owned to Lessee and its af/iliates under 
lhis Agreement, any Other Lease or any Schedule hereto or thereto against any amounls owed lo Lessor Parlies by Lessee or any of 
ils affiliates. If and 10 the extent any amoun1 paid or payable by Lessee to Lessor under a Lease or any Addendum or Schedule is 
interpreted by any court as interest, ii is the intention of lhe panies hereto to comply with any applicable usury laws; accordingly, It is 
agreed that. any provisions [n this Agreement to the contrary nolwitnstanding, in no event shall tl1is Agreement require the payment or 
permit 1l1e collection of interest or any amount In Iha nature of interest or toes in Clxcess of the maximum amount permitted by 
applicable law as now or hereafter construed by a court of competent jurisdiction. If a,1y such excess intorest Is contracted for, 
charged or received pursuant to this Agreement, or in the event that all of tho principal balance under this Agreement shall be prepaid, 
so that under any ol such circumstances tho amount ol Interest contracted for, charged or received shall excoed the maximum 
amount of interest permilled by applicable low as so construed, then in such event any such excess which may have been collected 
shall, al Lessor's option, either be credited to Monthly Rentals or other sums owed by Lessee under this Agreement (to the extent 
such application represents a prepayme,11 of such obligations. without any prepayment fee) or refunded to Lessee, and the elfective 
rate of interest shall automatically be reduced lo the maximum lawful rate allowed under applicable law as now or hereatter cons1rued 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Without limiting the foregoing, all calculations of the rate ol interest ccntracted for, charged or 
received with respect to this Agreement which are made for the purpose of determining whether such rate exceeds the maximum 
lawful contract ral(), shall be made, lo the tulles! extent permilted by applicable law, by amortizing, prorating, allocating and spreading 
in equal parts during the period of the fufl slated term of the indebtedness, an lnlerest at any time contracted for, charged to or 
received from Lessee in connection with such indebtedness. 
( ) THIS LEASE AND ANY ADDENDA AND SCHEDULES REFERRED TO HEREIN REPRESENTS THE FINAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS, 
OR SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES. THERE ARE NO UNWRITTEN ORAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. No oral agreement, guaranty, promise, condition, ropresentalion or warranty shall be binding. All prior conversations, 
agreements or representations rolaled herelo and/or the Vehicles are superseded hereby, and no modification hereof shall be binding 
on Lessor unless in writing and signed by an authoriied representative of Lessor. Lessee authorizes Lessor to correct patent errors 
herein and to make changes lo this Agreement or lo any related Addendum or Schedule that benefit Lessee, such as decreasing ll1e 
Monthly Rental or other amount payable under this Agroomenl. In addition, if there are changes in calculation of taxes, configuration 
of the Vehicle(s) or other cost factors affecting the cost of the Vehicle(s), and if such an increase is wilhin the dollar limits and litM 
limits of Lessor's credit approval, Lossee aulhorl?.es Lessor,. upon wriuon notice lo Lessee, to increase the Monthly Rental or other 
amount payable under this Agreement or any related Addendum or Schedule by nol more than fifteen percent accordingly. No vehicle 
dealer nor any employee or agent of any dealer or of any other person has authority 10 make any represen1a1ions lo Lessee on 
Lessor's behall as lo the performance of the Vehicles, or as to any provision of this Lease or as to any other mailer whatsoever. 
Lessee has no authority 10, and shall not, make any warranty or representation concerning the Vehicles lo any person on Lessor's 
behalf. Lessor may pay fees to or receive fees from the seller or manulacturer of the Vehicles, a broker, or other third parly in 
connection with this lease. Such fees may affect the rate, terms and Lessee's total cost hornunder. 
23. ORGANIZATION. If Lessee is a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or other registered organization, ils 
stale of organization is In tho stato set forth immediately below its signmuro on tho las! page of this Lease. II Lossee is an individual, 
histhor princif)<II place ot residonce is at the address set forth immediately below its signature on lhe last page of this Leaso. If Lessee 
is an organization, Its place of business or if It has more than one place of business, its chlel executive office is located at the address 
sel forth immediately below its signature on lhe fast page of this Lease. Lessee agrees that II will oot, withoul l11e prior.written consent 
of Lessor, change its slate of organlzalion if ii is a corporation, limiled liability company, limited partnership or other registered 
organl2ation or the tocalion of its chief executive office or its place of business if ii is a non,registered organizalion. If Lessee is an 
individual, Lessee must notify Lessor in writing of a change in his/her principal place of residence thirty (30) days prior to such change. 
24. PRIVACY WAIVER, Lessor may receive from and disclose to any individual, corporation. business trust, association, 
company, partnership, joint venture, or other entity (collectlvely, the "Entity"), including, without llrniting the generalilY ol the foregoing, 
Lessor'$ parent or any afliliala or any subsidiary of Lessor and any credit reporfing agency or other enlity wllether or not rola!ed to 
Lessor for any purpose, inform~llon aboul Lessee's accounts, credit application and credit experience with Le~sor and Lessee 
aulhoriz.es any Entity to release lo Lessor any informulion rel~lod lo l.tiasee'.s accounls, credit expcriencn and account information 
regnrding the Lessee. This shalt be continuing authorlza11on for afl present and future disclosures of Lessee's account 
information, credit application and credit experience on Lessee made by Lessor, or any Enllty requested to release such 
Information to t.essor. 
25. DEBIT TRANSACTIONS. l.essor may bul shall nol be required to otter Lessee the oplion of paying any of Lessee's obligations 
to Lessor 1hrou9h printed checks ("Deb\ Trl!JW.ac1io1f) drawn pursuant lo 1111s authorization upon Les$oe's checking account, usin~ 
Lessee's checking account number, ban routing co e and olhor information which LessGe provides to Lessor prior 10 the first Dobtt 
Trans3clion. Lessee aulhoril.es Lessor lo initiate Debi! Transactions from Lessee's checking account in lho i1mount necossary to pay 
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; present or future agreement with or which is held by Lessor, plus a lee of ten dollars ($10.00) for each Debit Transaction initialed by 
Lessor, In the event applicable law prohibits or restricts the amount ol such lee, the fee chargeable under this provision shall be 
limited and/or restricted in accordance with applicable law. Lessor may Irom time to time increase or decrease the Debit Transaction 
lee upon prior written notice addressed to Lessee's last known address as shown on the records of Lessor and such increase or 
decrease shall be effective as stated in the written notice. Unless prohibited by applicable law, Lessee's continued use of Debit 
Transactions alter the effective date specified in such notice shall conclusively establish Lessee's agreement to pay the new Debit 
Transaction tee stated therein. Lessee authorizes Lessor or any officer, employee, or designee to endorse Lessee s name as drawer 
on any printed check drawn in accordance with this authorization, Until cancelled by Lessee, this authorization shall be valid lor all 
Debit Transactions Lessor initiates In payment of Lessee's obligations hereunder or under any other present or future agreement with 
or which is held by Lessor, This authorization may be cancelled at any time by Lessee giving at least three (3) business days prior 
written notice lo Lessee's bank and Lessor. Payment by Debit Transactions is nol required by Lessor nor is its use a laclor in the 
approval of credil.
CHATTEL PAPER. The only copy of this Lease that will constitute “chattel paper" lor purposes of the Uniform Commercial 
Code is the original ot this Lease marked “Original lor GE Capital Americas".
26.
27. PAYMENT PROCESSING. Credil to your account may be delayed il payment Is (a) not received at the Payment Address or 
(b) nol accompanied by your invoice number. Preferred forms ol payment include Direct Debit, Wires, Company Checks and Cerlilied 
Checks, Payment in any other form may delay processing or be returned lo you, Delayed credit may cause you lo incur a late 
payment foe. All credil lor payments of your account are subject to linal payment by the institution on which the item of payment was 
drawn. All written communication concerning disputed amounts, including any check or other payment instrument that (i) indicates 
that the written payment constitutes ''payment in full" or is tendered as full satisfaction of a disputed amount or (ii) Is tendered with 
other conditions or limitations I'DIsputed Payments'1) must bo mailed or delivered to Lessor at the address for billing inquiries shown 
on the invoice or statement and not to the Payment Address.
28. CAPITAL MARKETS. LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT ANY ENTITY THAT IS AN AFFILIATE, OR 
SUBSIDIARY OF GECC OR ANY OTHER LESSOR MAY FROM TIME TO TIME DIRECTLY ENTER INTO ANO EXECUTE (AS THE 
NAMED LESSOR): (I) ANY SCHEDULE OR OTHER LEASE AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT 
BY REFERENCE (AN “OTHER LEASE"); AND (II) ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUCH OTHER LEASE. IN EACH 
SUCH SITUATION, THE LESSOR UNDER THE SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF LEASE RESULTING FROM SUCH OTHER LEASE 
SHALL BE THE OTHER LESSOR DIRECTLY ENTERING INTO AND EXECUTING SUCH OTHER LEASE OR (AS THE CASE MAY 
BE) ANY SUCCESSOR OR ASSIGN OF SUCH ENTITY, AND SUCH OTHER LESSOR SHALL HAVE ALL OF THE RIGHTS OF 
THE LESSOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT. ANY SUCCESSOR OR ASSIGN OF SUCH ENTITY MAY APPOINT AGENTS 
(INCLUDING GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION (“GECCD TO ACT ON ITS BEHALF.
29. GOVERNING LAW. THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS GOVERN THIS AGREEMENT (WITHOUT REGARD TO THE 
CONFLICTS OF LAW PRINCIPLES OF SUCH STATE), BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT SUCH LAW IS NOT PREEMPTED BY 
FEDERAL LAW OR REGULATION. Any legal action or proceeding wilh respeel or relating lo this Lease or uny Other Lease shall be 
brought exclusively in the federal or stale courts located in the State ol Texas, and Lessee accepts lor itself and in respect of its 
property, generally and unconditionally, the jurisdiction ol the aforesaid courts; provided, however, that nothing in this Lease shall limit 
or restrict the right ot Lessor to commence any proceeding in the federal or stale courts located in the state In which ihe collateral is 
localed lo Ihe extent Lessor deems such proceeding necessary or advisable to exercise remedies available under this Lease, any 
Other Lease or any document related hereto or thereto or to commence legal proceedings or otherwise proceed against Lessee in 
any other jurisdiction. Lessor and Lessee hereby Irrevocably waive any objection, including any objection to Ihe laying oi venue or 
based on Hie grounds ol forum non conveniens Ilia! any ol Ihem may now or hereafter have to Ihe bringing ot any such action or 
proceeding in such jurisdictions.
I
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present or Mure agreement with or which is 11ctd by Lessor. plus a lee ol ten dollars ($10.00/ for each Dc1bit Transaclion initiated by 
Lessor. In the event applicable law prohibits or restricts the amount of such lea, the fee c 1argeable under this provision shall be 
limited and/or restricted in accordllf'lce with applicable law. Lessor may from time to time increase or decrease the Debit Transaction 
foe upon prior written notice addressed to Lessee's last known address as shown on tl1e records of Lessor and such incroaso or 
decrease shall be effective as stated in the written notice. Unless prohibited by applicable law, Lessee's conlinucd use of Debit 
Transactions alter the oflcctivo data spccifiod in such nolico shall conclusively establish Lessee's agreemonl to pay the new Debit 
iransaction lee staled therein. Lessee authorizes L0ssor or any officer, ernploye0, or designeo to endorse Ll;lssec s namo as drnwcr 
on any printed check drawn in accordance with this authorization. Untfl cancelled by Lessee, this authorization shall be valid tor alt 
Debit Transactions Lessor initiates In paymonl of Lessee's obligations hereunder or under any other present or future agreement with 
or which is held by Lessor. This autlionzation may be cancelled al any time by Lessee 9lvlng al least three {3) business days prior 
written notice to Lessee's bank and Lessor. Payment by Debit Transactions is not required by Lessor nor is its use a lactor in the 
approval of credit. 
26. CHATTEL PAPER. The only copy of this Lease that will conslitule "chattel paper" for purposes of the Unifom1 Commercial 
Code is the original ol this Lease marked "Original for GE Capita I Americas". 
27. PAYMENT PROCESSING. Credit to your account may be delayed if payment Is (a) not received al the Payment Address or 
(b) nol accompanied by your invoice number. Pmterred forms ol payment include Direct Debit, Wires, Company Checks and Certified 
Checks. Payment in any other form may delay processing or be returned to you. Delayed credit may cause you to incur a late 
payment foe. All credit lor payments of your account arc subject to final payment by the institution on which the item ol payment was 
drawn. All written communication concerning disputed amounls, including any check or other payment instrument that (i) indicates 
that the written payment constitutes "payment in full" or is tendered as full satisfaction of a disputed amount or (ii) Is tendered with 
other conditions or limllations ("DIBRIJ!~d Pa'iments") musf bo mailed or dolivered to Lessor at the address for billing inquiries shown 
on the invoice or statement and not to the Payment Address. 
28. CAPITAL MARKETS. LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES ANO AGREES THAT ANY ENTITY THAT IS AN AFFILIATE, OR 
SUBSIDIARY OF GECC OR ANY OTHER LESSOR MAY FROM TIME TO TIME DIRECTLY ENTER INTO ANO EXECUTE (AS THE 
NAMED LESSOR): {I) ANY SCHEDULE OR OTHER LEASE AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT 
BY REFERENCE (AN "OTHER LEASE"); AND (II) ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUCH OTHER LEASE. IN EACH 
SUCH SITUATION, THE LESSOR UNDER THE SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF LEASE RESULTING FROM SUCH OTHER LEASE 
SHALL BE THE OTHER LESSOR DIRECTLY ENTERING INTO AND EXECUTING SUCH OTHER LEASE OR (AS THE CASE MAY 
BE) ANY SUCCESSOR OR ASSIGN OF SUCH ENTITY, AND SUCH OTHER LESSOR SHALL HAVE ALL OF THE RIGHTS OF 
THE LESSOR UNDl:R THIS AGREEMENT. ANY SUCCESSOR OR ASSIGN OF SUCH ENTITY MAY APPOINT AGENTS 
(INCLUDING GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION{"~")) TO ACT ON ITS BEHALF. 
29. GOVERNING LAW. THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS GOVERN THIS AGREEMENT (WITHOUT REGARD TO THE 
CONFLICTS OF LAW PRINCIPLES OF SUCH STATE), BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT SUCH LAW IS NOT PREEMPTED BY 
FEDERAL LAW OR REGULATION. Any legal action or proceeding with rospecl or relating lo this Lease or uny Other Lease shall be 
brought exclusively in the lodcrral or state courts located in the Sta le ol Texas, and Lessee accepts for itself and in respect of its 
property, generally and unconditionally, the jurlsdiclion of the aforesaid courts; provided, however, that nothing In this Lease shall limit 
or restrict the right ol Lessor to commence any proceeding in the lederal or state courts locatod In the stale in which the collateral is 
located 10 Iha extent Lessor deems such proceeding necessary or advisable to exercise remedies available under this Lease, any 
Other Lease or any document related hereto or thereto or lo commence legal proceedings or otherwise procoed against Lessee in 
any other jurisdiction. Lessor and Lessee hereby Irrevocably waive any objection, including any objection to the laying of venue or 
based on tile grounds of forum non conveniens that any ol them may now or hereafler have to Ille bringing of any such action or 
proceeding in such jurisdictions. 
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IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT ESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP WITH GE CAPITAL
To help the government flghl Ihe funding of terrorism and money laundering actlvilles, Federal law requires all financial 
institutions to obtain, verify and record Information that identifies each person who opens an account, What this means tor 
you: When you open an account, we will ask for your name, address, and other Information that will allow us to Identify you. 
We may also ask to see Identifying documents. You shall comply with all laws, rules and regulations applicable to you, 
Including without limitation, the USA PATRIOT ACT and all laws, rules and regulations relating to Import or export controls, 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing,




Date ol Birth:Witness (or Attest): ..
(Individual / Soto Proprietor)
Slate of Organization: Idaho
Principal Residence/Chief Executive Ollice/Place 
ol Business:
P.O, Box 709 TWIN FALLS, ID 83303
Billing/Invoice Address
(II dillarent (rom above, please compleie):
(Address)
(City, Slate and Zip Code)
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IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT ESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP WITH GE CAPITAL 
To help the govern ent llghl lhe funding of terrorism and money laundering activities, Federal law requires all llnanclal 
inslllullons to obtain, verify and record·lnformatlon that identifies each person who opens an account. What this means for 
you: When you open an account, we wlll ask !or your name, address, and other Information that will allow us to Identify you. 
We may also ask to see Identifying documents. You shall comply with all laws, rules and regulations applicable to you, 
Including ithout li itation, the USA PATRIOT ACT and all laws, rules and regulallons relating to Import or export controls, 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing. 
-------------------------·--·-·-·----·---
Witn<lSS (Or Attest): 
Accepted on: _1~O/~O_7/_2O'"'1'-"O _______ _ 
~ C·3fi .. · l.l\ 
F.~v 1.,:?U :1;ui10 c,ct!il ApplO: •11 ll:2!i 
~<.It. H1.•q1:u:1: 1)..1~';1 
  
~ ,) / 
~_.?.,#.L?"~ c:---··· ·~ -&',~ 
~-ille: President 
LESSOR: 
ate of Birth: -~c-:--=-c--::,---:-----c-------
(lndiviuva1 I Solo Propria\or} 
State of Organizalion: ""ld"'a"-'h-=-o _______ _ 
Princlpa1 Residence/Chiof Executive omce/Placo 
or Business: 
P.O, Box 709 TWIN F~JJ.~§,"'3-"-30""3;....... ____ _ 
Billing/Invoice Address 
(if different from above, plea so complete): 
(Address) 
{Clty,-Slato and Zip Codo) 
r\g\nal hattel Paper 
SCHEDULE A EVEN PAYMENTS - (TRAC)
Schedule # 800050
El
This Schedule A Even Payments - (TRAC) constitutes a separate lease agreement and instrument of lease between GE TF TRUST (’Lesser") and SKINNER TRUCKING, INC. (“Lessee") and is executed 
pursuant to. and incorporates by reference the terms and conditions of the Master Vehicle Lease Agreement dated as of 08/18/2011, between General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC") and Lessee (the 
“Master Lease”) and a TRAC Addendum to Master Lease (collectively, the “Lease1). LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES THAT THE ORIGINATING LESSOR UNDER THIS LEASE IS GE 
TF TRUST, A DELAWARE STATUTORY TRUST. LESSOR SHALL HAVE ALL RIGHTS OF GECC UNDER THE MASTER LEASE. LESSOR MAY APPOINT AGENTS (INCLUDING GECC) TO ACT ON ITS 
BEHALF. If and to the extent that this Schedule is deemed a security agreement, Lessee hereby grants to Lessor a first priority security Interest in the collateral described below, together with all additions, 
attachments, accessories and accessions thereto whether or not furnished by the supplier of the collateral and any and all substitutions, upgrades, replacements or exchanges therefore, and any arid'all 
insurance and/or other proceeds of the property in and against which a security interest Is granted hereunder. This security Interest Is given to secure the payment and performance of all debts, obligations and 
liabilities of any kind whatsoever of Lessee to Lessor, GECC, or any of their respective affiliates (including, without limitation, any direct or indirect parent, subsidiary or sister entity), successors and assignees 
(collectively “Lessor Parties"), now existing or arising In the future under this Schedule, the Lease, any Other Lease or any Schedules hereto or thereto, and any renewals, extensions and modifications of such 
debts, obligations and liabilities. Lessor may set off any amounts owed to Lessee and its affiliates under this Schedule, the Lease or any Schedule hereto or thereto against any amounts owed to Lessor 
Parties by Lessee or any of its affiliates.
This Schedule will be created and evidenced as follows: (I) we, Lessor, will deliver to you, Lessee (at the e-mail, facsimile or business address you provide to us) an electronic (e-mail or facsimile) or paper 
version of each document to be signed by you, Including this Schedule and any exhibits or related documents (each, a “Document"); (fi) you will print (if applicable) and manually sign the signature page and 
initial the provisions (if the Document Includes provisions requiring your initials) of each such Document and deliver to us by facsimile or other means the signed Documents; (Hi) we will manually sign each 
signature page of the Documents so delivered by you (if the Document requires our signature); and (iv) we will attach each fully signed signature page to a printed paper copy of the applicable Document By 
so signing and transmitting a Document to us, you confirm your intent to sign such Document and accept its terms. You acknowledge that we are relying upon your promise that you have not modified the 
Document sent to you for signature. We both intend that each Document produced by this process which contains Lessor’s original manual signature shall be for all purposes (including perfection of security 
interests and admissibility of evidence) the sole original authenticated Document. We will retain each original authenticated Document (as described in the preceding sentence), which will be conclusively 
presumed to be identical to the version signed by you.















YEAR MANUFACTURER MODEL DESCRIPTION
SERIAL NUMBER !
Korr«rth2012 T660 Tractor 1XKADP9X8CJ316247 80000 $145,128X0 $2457.72 $58,051X0 0.01524582 3X4%
2012 Kenworth T660 Tractor 1XXADP9XBCJ316248 80000 $145,128.00 $2457.72 $58,051X0 0.01624582 344%
2012 Kenworth TB80 Tracer 1XXADP9XXCJ316249 $145,128.00 $2457.7380C00 $58,051X0 0.01624582 3X4%
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SCHEDULE A EVEN PAYMENTS- (TRAC) 
Schedule # 800050 
This Schedule A Even Payments - (TRAC) constiMes a separate lease agreement and instrument of lease between GE TF TRUST ('Lesser") and SKINNER TRUCKING, INC. ("Lessee1 and Is executed 
pursuant to, and incorporates by reference the tenns and conditlons of the Master Vehicle Lease Agteemenl da!ed as of 08/18/2011, between General 8ectric Capital Corporation ("GECC") ar:d Lessee (the 
"Master Lease1 and a TRAC Addendum to Master Lease (collec1ively, the 'lease1. LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES TliAT THE ORIGINATING LESSOR UNDER lli!S LEASE IS GE 
TF TRUST, A DELAWARE STATIJTORY TRLIST. LESSOR SHALL HAVE ALL RIGHTS OF GECC UNDER lliE MASTER LEASE. LESSOR MAY APPOINT AGENTS ONCLUDING GECC) TO ACTON ITS 
BEHAU:. If and to the extent that this Schedule is deemed a security agreement, Lessee hereby grants to Lessor a first priority security Interest in the collateral described betow, together with all addit.lcns, 
attachments, accessories and accessions thereto whether or not furnished by the supplier of the collateraJ and any and all substitutions, upgrades, replacements or exchanges therefore, and any·a,it''alt 
insurance and'or other proceeds of the property in and agalnst which a security interest ts granted hereunder. This security Interest Is given to secure the payment and per1ormance of all debts, obOga,tions and 
llabllltfes of any kind whatsoever of Lessee to Lessor, GECC, or any of their respective affiliates {lnduding, without llmitatlon, any direct or indirect parent, subsidiary or sister entity), successors and assignees 
(collectively "lessor Partiesj, now existing or arising In the future ur.der this Sc.~edule, the lease, any Other Lease or any schedules hereto or thereto, and any renewals, extensions and modifications of such 
debts, obfigations and liabilities. Lessor may set off any amounts owed to Lessee and fts affiliates under th!s Schedule, the Lease or any Schedule hereto or thereto against any amounts owed to Lessor 
Parties by Lessee or any of Its affiUates. 
Tots Schedule will be created and evider.ced as foUOYIS: (I) we, Lessor, Ylill derrver to you, Lessee (at the e--man, facsimile or business address you provide to us) an electronic (e-mail or facsimile) or paper 
version of each document lo be signed by you, lnciudlng this Schedule and any exhibits or related documents (each, a "'Documenr); (ii) you will print [If applicable) and manually sign the signature page and 
inttial the provisions [rf the Document Includes provisions requiring your Initials) of each such Document and deliver to us by facsimile or other means the signed Documents; {Iii) we will manually sign each 
signature page of the Documents so delivered by you [rf the Document requires our stgnature) ; and [rv) we VJill sttach each h.:lly signed signature page to a printed paper copy of the applicable Document. By 
so signing and transmitting a Document to us, you confinn your intent lo sign such Document and accept its terms. You acknowledge that we are relying upon your promise that you have not mocflfled the 
Document sent to you for signature. We both intend that each Document ptoduced by this process which contains Lessor's original manual signature shall be tor all purposes ~ncluding perfection of security 
Interests and admisslbility of evidence) the sole original authenticated Document We will retain each original authenticated Document (as described in the preceding sentence), which will be conclusively 
presumed to be identicaJ to the version signed by you. 
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Advance Payment Amount: $14,146.34 
Interim Rent $0.00 
Admin Fees: $0.00 
Taxes: $0.00
Total Amount: $14,146.34 
LEASE INFORMATION PER UNn
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Section 2 of the Master Lease, Monthly Rentals for the Vehicles described on this Schedule A shall be paid as provided herein. 
In Service Date:
First Payment Date:
Subsequent Payment Dates: 18th day of each month after the First Payment Date
Term (# of Months):
B Payments are In Advance: Lessee agrees to pay 2 ADVANCE RENTAL payments) per unit at time of delivery.




The domicile location noted below will determine the calculation of sales/use tax and personal property tax. If domicile location changes, please notify Lessor immediately.
VEHICLE DOMICILE ADDRESS
STREET: 528 Washington Street CITY: TWIN FALLS STATE: ID ZIP: 83303
COUNTY: TWIN FALLS
SKJNNERJByCKJNG, INC. //M? >LESSEE:
fffLE: President
LESSOR: GETF TRUST
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Advance Payment Amount: $14,146.34 
Interim Rent $0.00 
Admin Fees: $0.00 
Taxes: $0.00 
:,,, Total Amount: $14,146.34 
LEASE INFORMATION PER UNIT 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Section 2 of \he Master Lease, Monthly Rentals for \he Vehicles described on this Schedule A shall be paid as provided herein. 
In Service Dale: August 18, 2011 
First Payment Date: 
Subsequent Payment Dates: 
Term(# of Months): 
August 18, 2011 
18th day of each month after the First Payment Date 
 
181 Payments are In Advance: Lessee agrees to pay 2 ADVANCE RENTAL payrnent{s} per unit at time of delivery. 
D Payments are in Arrears 
The domicile location noted below wilt determine the calculation of sales/use tax and personal property tax. If domicile location changes, please notify Lessor immediately. 
STREET: 528 Washington Street 
COUNTY: TWIN FALLS 




CITY: TWIN FALLS 
VEHICLE DOMICILE ADDRESS 




LESSOR: GE TF TRUST 
Pa;o2of2 
::: Jr:ttC:::n 
TITl.E: Au1hor1zed Representative 
DATE: 08/18121)11 
JAN/09/2014/THU 01:22 PM Kenworth Jerome FAX No, 208 324-4055 P, 009
: *
' •[ ::; ••: . : • r :;
.;
:
■■ i : TRAC ADDENDUM
TO RASTER VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT
: 1 ■
• This TRAC Addendum la Master Vehicle Lease Agreement (ifite "AddsMufly}, dated as of Is mqda and entered Info by
. BrtdfetwHnnfSararal Electric Capita) Comoraifon f'Lasatf). and SKIX'NERTRUGKIMSJNC.fUscea"). ' “ ' '
WHEREAS, Lessor and Lessee entered Into Cist certain Master Vehicle Lease Agreement dated 69 of 05/36/3011 (as amended and 
.' ' siiFmfBmanta d. tha'-MastarL&esa').' and nowdssfreto aucfllemantlhe Master Lease as hereafter sat forth. "
NOW, THEREFORE, for go«f end vataabte cnnsMeratfon, ffta receipt and sufficiency of which bjb  hereby actas^orlgsd, Lessor srtd 
Lessee hereby agree as foltarc:
SecUon i. AnnUnabiffiy, This Addendum, and the srnandmente to the Master Lease desorbed herein, shall only apply io (hose 
Vahidas described to each SphedulftA.BimaPavmants - fTftAQI that to attached and makes scerffc reference hereto, '
Section 2, Moater Lease Amendments. The Master Lease te hereby amended as follows. ■ . ■ ■ : ■.
(a) (Final Adjustment) - The renewing shall be added to the and of Section fc
Alter I te return of a Vstifcte to accordance wi|h Section 7, Lessor shall ceusa such Vahids to he sold a! publfe or private sate, 
at wholesale, for fits highest cash offer received end stiff Open at toe lima of sale, The taaieate Broca oris* for said Vehicle 
shall bo tho not amount received and paid to Lessor alter deducting the cos! of safe, fe cost of steering, repairing, equipping 
or transporting eakl Vehtate and anycthar expense o( Lessor In connection inerewiih. ‘ '
Final A^uetment ter each Vehicle vrtlt be made upon ratals of the net sate proceeds iterators and, unless any default shall 
have occurred and except as provided below, Lessor shat) pay to Lessee (he artiOUn), If any, by which toe sum o( (a) the net 
sate proceeds., plus (b) surplus Insurance recoveries, If any, on such Vehicle, exceeds toe sum of the (c) Termination Value 
(as defined below), calculated as of the (tele of receipt of the last MonlWy Rental reoetesd by ihe Lsssorwim reaped to such
delWonoy to Lessor as Adjusted Rental without abasement, off-sat or counterclaim arising out of any circumstance 
whatsoever. Lessor shall promptly determine toe aforesaid amounts and ebaS render statatnsntefherefbm to Lessee, Lessor 
may apph/any sums received S3 proceeds tan any Vehicle whrch would cffrerwfeB be due io Lessee hereunder egslnat any 
other obligation of Lessee and Lessor msy off-sat to® amount of any such ratify adjustment against arty ofalm fl may have 
against Lasses.
■Termination Value1*, aa used to this Lease, shalf mean:
(l) on any date os or after toe scheduled expiration of ihe Lease Term, the Residual Value; and
(S) on any date before toe scheduled dxptatort of Ihe lease Term, the amount equal to toe tbennetpresenc value of alf
' upaccrusd Months Rentals phis the net present valua of to© Residual Value specified In toe schedule ‘A’relating to
such Vehicle (determined by dfeeounlEng such McnthSy Rentals from Usstr respective due dates at fhe Tarmlnatfon 
Value Rate specified h> the Sshsckrla “As rotating to such Vahfcte, and by dteecuntlng such Residual VaJua from the 
Aral day of the month foSowtag the month In which the Fret Monthly Rental Is dire at the Temitaaiion Value Rate), 
compounded at toe earns Intervals as such Monthly Rentals era payable. '
jb) (Loss or Damage) - The foltawfng shall be added to the srtd of Section 8:
There shall be no abatement of rent« other payments otherwise due hereunder during the period a Vehicle is stolen or 
mtssfng or (luting toe tone r^uhedfar anyrapata earvlctaa or^epfeeoment of a Vehfcla and MonthfyRenteta will
made aa provided In Section 6, promptly alter sale of fhe salvage sndtar receipt of insurance proceeds, as applicable or within 
tarty-five (45) days after auch loss, theft or destruction; whichever is earlier, For purposes of Final Adjustment, lost or stolen 
Veh Sites shall be seamed to have been sold as of the date of eueh fuse or theft, end the amount of net sale proceeds therefore 
shalf be deemed to ha zero. In no event shall Lessor be liable to Losses, (to employe® or agents for buslnssa or other losses 
by reason of loss, ihsff, desimollcn, repair, servicing or replacement of any Vehicle,
Sections. Mteeeilanaous. (a) The amendment set forth herein Is limited precisely as written and shall not bs deemed Io; (!) bo a 
consent to, or waive? or rrtcdWcaton of, any other term o' condition of the Master Lease; (S) amend Ihe Master Lease generally, or 
apply to any Vahfdea oStsr lhan fhosre reteranccd in Sscllon. I above; or (0) prejudice anyrlgh! or rights wh'wh Lessor may now have or 
may hare !n the future under or In connection with the Master Leas© or any of the -other documents referred to therein, Breepl as 
expressly modified hereby or by tsprasa yrritten amendment® thereof, She terms and provisions ol to© Master Lease or any other 
documenta or Instnunerte executed Its cmnaGlIon wflh the foregoing are and shall remain In toll farce and effect, (b) fn the event of a 
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:· · ws lA   to sl r ehtct11 Le!!S6 r llllt Ohra 'MJ\1, da'!lld t\S of 0008/201 L Ju 111~ and 91)1sl'&d !nr, by 
 ~d~IWBIII! ~ner t §I~. Qq )f,81 Q9FAA@lfM{'~• d.$.=-- _JIJJ.QKIN?~~Q.(~ . ·· · 
·w RW, eSSM a  eesoo Gnto.red lnw fltal eerta!n asr.r eblcl& Lease crae oot dated as of ()8/-Jfl/ga11 (as a ended and 
: ~~ppra ~ , t e Westccf.AAsa'}; M  vai'al@ 611pt.1lement 1h11 at!~r w aa h&re8'1er 6eHorth: .. · · 
. : 
·, , lHEAl:F FI~ for gocd and vQ!u~ conslde~lfon. the r11e.tJpl ~  sulllclCf!tt,Y of whlcl'I mg ~r~y ~el!ged, ~or 81)!1 .. 
Lsss1111 et~Y !-91'8& a.. follows: 
&c~ 1, &alJlr,abllll):. lils hklend'u , arid lhe amend enla to lhe aatef Lease d,!Otihfld h&rern. shall only ~ly ro lhos& 
lclss descdb&d Tn each §Wii<(tJla,  mn ~ents -a&PJ tha! f!1 attaclJed and akas s,Pedfro rarerence horeto, · :. : · 
cll . 
~
. -·- .. . \ ''•: .. ••, ' 
~IQtl -- fil{!ncf ents.. Th& aster LWG It: hen,by 1.1merided l!S 1olloVIII, 
(fli:iaf Adjtlsf enl)- "J11o fo!IO\lllna shall be added I~ 1118 llnd Of Secl/9n &. 
lter lh&-fl3!tlrn of a Vbhlcla In 8CCQI&nca W!lh 8mlon 7, i.eSGor mall osuta sum Ve Mele to be fiOld al publ!c or prnrale sal9, 
I'll vmoleaa!o, for the h1ghim cash Dfrer ~d ancl 1111!1 open at lh$ ti e of sele. Tfl~ 'Del u)q PTOGftW" ror said Vahlc!'e 
s ll ha t e et 11JT1llUl1t racel<ledand purd to lessor aftar ded\lC!lng lhs Ms! or aal0, 1M cosl ofdeenhlg. rapalrl~. equipping 
 ff lV.lportl  s id lcf  $Cl e  !lter a ai, a l l. wlr I  ~nlh w.vil . 
Fina! Adj11et111ont kit each Vehfole \\ill be ad a upon recel)lt of loo net sale J)l'oaiacla lharefore and, unless any def11ult shaU 
ti11.i.ra occu11ed and exaOjlt s p!OOdad bel'o , 1.essor .mall pay lo lesooa lilt lll'ITOllnl. If tlllY, by \'lhlch lh& sum of (a} the net 
s kl procGeos, lus (b) surpltts lrl$unmce mcoverlee. II a111. en s1.1a1 Vehli;le, ~a Ute su  ol lhl) (c) Te 'llnallon Value 
(as dG!lned heki ). csleufa~ as (If !he (lajl) tif tfflllpt of the la~ onthly Reola! 16<Xlfwd bf Iha tessontilh 1'8S1)41cl lo suco 
Vehlde, pl111t(d) -!Ill~ tmd unpllld Mmthly Aenlalund 1111 O!Mramounl'fi t'hen doe end remEllnki9 unp.i!d, If tfu, wm of 
{ttrmr (a} and (b) above Js .lflS than the Tem,fnal~n Valt!e, Lessee shal/1 'lllllm t!lfl (10) dll'ftl effir nu~ thereof, pay the 
dollclanoy lo bas:or as d}Ustad ental Ylllhout sbale mt. olt~t Qf ~untero!ai  2/l'sl~ our of Mr/ cln:um.stsntfl 
ls ver. l.8ssor e:Jtall J)fD!JlJ)!!y deler loo lhe 1!1Jo<a$atd a cunt8 and 8hftll rel!der ~llffl'illnlBtneN1fore to Leese&. LGaaor 
ay SllW any w s recefved aB pr~e&;1r0rfl any el'I~ whreh wwtd olJrtJIY,fjftj be ll'l!e 10 L.8868$ hefeundar agah\st any 
other obffgaUon ol l.esaea and ~or s.y o/f.set Ute alllO!lnl of rmY auoh remal adJ11!!lrnant sgat any ~aim fl mll,Y have 
~rml.ll$s1i&. 




on any dlile on or afl81' trre:ichedl.llad expfralron of Ilia 1.eaee-Tl3<m, the Flesldual Valu~ and 
on any da!!il be~ Iha .sdieduled l!xpltallott of Ille l.sa!le Tero,, lhc 8lll0Unt equal b> tit& lhen nat ):lfflsent Vl1Itl6 of-all 
utia crued MonUlly Rel'l!21s phis lhe nal pmlllll Y!IWB Ill ll18 ~8aldual Vclue !fl~ffBd In tho ~edtlle "A" fillatlng to 
 fd& (cl'el r l   (l{scounl~ wo  cn!hly oola!s fro  llle!t respective due lfatG!i at Ille Ter ination 
l a &t& apecik  l t  altadul  ~ felatm.Q t  o  e~o,   i.'!co!.!riU g  Assf tt l slu11 frc  Uw 
flrirt a"'1 ~ l s m J flt l t W 13 u \  rmln tl  l  t ). 
c und~ at !fie same Intervals as 1,ucfl onthfy entals are ~able. 
(Loss or oa age)- ha /ollo fng shell be added to th& end of Sl'.!Q!Jon S: 
r  :Sl'l8ll  rw t t ! ro t N t r l)ay snfi1 lheNlise due hereunder doling the perlod a Vehicle 18 s\Olen or 
l6sl~ r dulfog lhe tuna rotiulred fot !lflY repair, ~BTit, !lilrv~119 or tepl~ment of a Veh!plc, and anlh1Y Renlala wlR 
ccnllnue lO ~oorne unm FJasl Adjustment Is mad&. Flmil hlJusrmen1 In nlf!lllori lo lost, .stolen or dea1royso Vehicles sha!J oo 
e.eta as prG!ided In Secllon 8, pro plfy al(er mite ol lits salvage ~ndlot ~calpt o1 lJllluranca procesd&, es appl[cable or withtn 
l rt ,fl  ( ) a e; n r  10&8, theR r d8$lrt!Clloni hlcllaver ts earHer. or w~es of Final Ad.luiltrn&nl, last or alolen 
icles sn ll oo dea ed l  flava been sold ae 01 toe date of .sueh toss or theft. ~nd the runmmtof net 8Sla proceeds therefore 
'81ll  l e :zer , f   G l ll less  & ll lll  t  a11 ml, 11s f es r i, ts f r slneSG r l er t sses 
by reasoo of loss, lheft, dasl!Vollor,, 1epa!r1 se:rvlcln9 or replacement of any Veh/da, 
ecUon 3, ~@llaneous, (a) he a end ant set forth herein ls llrnlted ~sel  asWlfflen and :shalf ®t be dee ed 10; (I) .bee; 
¢t:11l9ent 101 r a{'lel' r nto illcall  tif, a  t,1ha/ wr  r condnlon cl the aster azee; (ll) arnel\d Ille ll.$lar Lease ~omirally, or 
a l  t  a  ahrclst1 ttien mthos& referenced In Section. J above: <Jt !Ill) proJUdlCG any ~hi cir rig his hldl Lemr ay now have or 
ay have In tl!e fll!ur1 under t)[ In connsotlon vllth the aster l.e8S8 or any of tile illher dor.uments rafer~d to !herein. l:xeepl ~
;c r ssl  lll  r  r  wipre~ Wl'itlen a andtrientc thereof, lhe ter s wid ptovlstons ol lh$ ~!&ter t.easE> or s1ny olhat 
<locu'!Mnte r l1'161rulfl8nls a~111 COllr$cllon ,'l!Ih !he Fllreaolog are and 5hall re alll In tull force and eftilct (b) rn th$ event of a 
u nr t tiat  l l!i Mtlendi.r   ~  r Ille foregcTng croev enlS.., lf\  iei s of thl6 Addonc!u  shalt be contl'Qllll\g. (e; apllal~ed 
~•loll! 
DEFENDANT'S I EX~ IT 
i r r i   






' '■■■ terms used herein ttftltsfi era Jflejfirted In the Master Uass shall haw ths sane meanings when used herein. (d) This Amendment end me document referred lo herein represent me enSre smderatandlrg of tha parties hereto regarding die eutjjrwt matter hereof end 
supersede af prior and eentemporenfloife oral and written agreements of tbs parties hereto With respect to the subject mailer hereof.
(e) This Amendment may ba executed In any number ct counterparts end tjjr dffiereM parfe an separate counterparts and at! of arch :
counterparts sha5 togethercorrettlute one and (he same frwlmmsnt :
:;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, lira parties hereto have caused this Addendum to be duly axaputed and delivered by their respective duly 
. authcrtred officers as otthedate first above written. ’ • ...... •'
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Electronically Filed
7/6/2017 2:30:44 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Tami Kirkham, Deputy Clerk
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Bren E. Mollerup, ISB No. 7959 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLER.UP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: 111ollerup@benoitlaw.co111 
Email: clanielson@.benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
STIPULATION F'OR 
SCHEDULING AND PLANNING 
The above parties hereby stipulate to the following scheduling deadlines: 
A. EXPERT WITNltSSES 
(Plaintiffs experts) 
1. 75 clays before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as an 
expert witness at trial and state the su~ject matter on which the witness is expected to testify. 
STIPULATION FOR SCHEDULING AND PLANNING- I 
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2. 75 days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all infonnation required by Rule 26(b)(4) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 
3. 60 days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the plaintiff's initial 
expert witnesses. 
(Defendant's experts) 
4. 60 days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person defendant intends to call as an 
expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify. 
5. 60 days before trial, defendant shall disclose all infonnation required by Rule 26(b)(4) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses. 
6. 45 days before trial, plaintiff shall complete any depositions of the defendants' expert 
witnesses. 
(Plaintiff's rebuttal experts) 
7. 45 days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as an 
expert witness at trial to rebut new infonnation or issues disclosed or raised by the defendant. 
8. 45 days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose all infonnation required by Rule 26(b)(4) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the rebuttal expert witnesses. 
9. 30 days before trial, defendant shall complete any depositions of the plaintiff's rebuttal 
expert witnesses. 
B. LAY WITNESSES 
I. 60 days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each person plaintiff intends to call as a Jay 
witness at trial ( excluding impeachment witnesses). 
2. 60 days before trial, defendant shall disclose each person defendant intends to call as a 
lay witness at trial (excluding impeachment witnesses). 
3. 45 days before trial, plaintiff shall disclose each lay witness (excluding impeachment 
witnesses) plaintiff intends to call at trial to rebut new infonnation or issues disclosed or raised by the 
defendant. 
4. 30 days before trial, all parties shall complete any depositions oflay witnesses. 
C. DEADLINES FOR INITIATING DISCOVERY 
I. 60 days before trial is the last day for serving interrogatories, requests for production, 
requests to permit entry upon land or other property, and requests for admission. 
STIPULATION FOR SCHEDULING AND PLANNING - 2 
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2. 60 days before trial is the last day for filing motions for a physical or mental examination. 
D. DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENT AL RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY 
I. 30 days before trial, all parties must serve any supplemental response to discovery 
required by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
E. DEADLINE FOR DISCLOSURE OF EXHIBITS 
I. IO days before trial all parties must disclose all proposed trial exhibits. 
F. PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
I. 90 days before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional parties to the lawsuit. 
2. 90 days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the claims between existing 
parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim for punitive damages. 
G. TRIAL SETTING 
I. This case can be set for a trial to commence on or after October I, 2017. Note that, 
absent extremely compelling circumstances, no case will be set for trial more than 510 days from 
the date of r.Iing the complaint. 
2. It is estimated that the trial will take 2 days. 
3. This case is to be tried as a: 
~ court trial 
0 jury trial 
4. Parties preference for trial dates: (Please confer and complete. Do not attach 
"unavailable dates"). 
(a) Week of Tuesday, October 17-20, 2017. 
(b) Week of Tuesday, October24-27, 2017 
(c) Week of Tuesday,-----~ 20_. 
H. MEDIATION 
I. The patties agree to mediation: Yes No.JL 
2. If yes: 
a. The parties agree to submit to mediation with a mediator mutually agreed 
upon. 
STIPULATION FOR SCHEDULING AND PLANNING· 3 
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b. Mediation shall begin 30 clays prior to trial. 
c. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, the costs of 
mediation shall be equally divided between the parties. 
The parties reserve the right to amend this stipnlation by agreement of all parties, subject 
to Court approval; each party reserves the right to seek amendment hereof by Court orclcr, nncl 
to request farther status conferences for such purpose, in accorcfancc with I.R.C.P. 16(a) ancl 
16(h). 
Appearances: 
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DISTRICT COURT 
Fifth Judicial District 
County of Twin Falla • State of Idaho 
AUG 21 2017 
11:00,4-A-] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 




This matter came before the Court on 08/21/2017 for a pretrial conference. 
Michael Danielson represented the plaintiff and Joe Rockstahl, represented the 
defendants. During the conference the following matters were discussed and decided: 
1. The trial is scheduled to commence on 10/24/2017. 
2. The issue to be decided at trial is the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim 
between the parties. 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 1 
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3. Discovery is complete except for a deposition and any supplemental 
discovery. 
4. The following affirmative defenses are deemed to have been abandoned: 
Failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted; and failure to join an 
indispensable party. 
5. The parties shall have until Tuesday 10/10/2017 at 5:00 PM to exchange 
final trial documents. The parties shall have until Tuesday 10/17/2017 to object in 
writing to the exhibits offered by the other party. Unless such objection is made, the 
exhibits offered will be deemed admitted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,:;,f I day of August 2017, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michael Danielson 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Joe Rockstahl 
Counsel for Defendants 
PRETRIAL ORDER - 3 
Clerk 
() U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
() Faxed 
~Email 
() U.S. Mail 




Bren E. Mollerup, !SB No. 7959 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd A venue North 
P.O.Box366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: mollerup@benoitlaw.com 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Electronically Filed 
10/10/201711:31 AM 
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County 
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court 
By: Elisha Raney, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTHSALESCO~IPANY,aUtah 




SKINNERTRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. 8::<INNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
STIPULATION RE TRIAL 
EXHIBITS 
COME NOW, that above entitled parties, by and through their respective counsel of record, 
and hereby enter into this Stipulation Regarding the Admissibility of Exhibits at Trial. 
The following Exhibits are stipulated as admitted and offered in the form attached hereto: 
Exhibit 1 (18 pages): Lease and various addenda 
Exhibit 2 (4 pages): Appraisal paperwork 
Exhibit 3 (5 pages): Payoff paperwork from October, 2015 
Exhibit 4 (5 pages): Payoff paperwork from December, 2015 
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Exhibit 5 (20 pages): Affidavit of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Exhibit 6 (19 pages): Affidavit of Jam.es Skinner in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Exhibit 7 (35 pages): All three Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Intenogatories 
Exhibit 8 (12 pages): All three Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's First Set 
of Requests for Admissions 
Exhibit 9 (42 pages): 2015 Income Tax Return for Defendant Skinner 
Trucking 
Exhibit 10 (5 pages): Email and invoices re trucks at issue 
Exhibit 11 (4 pages) Lease payment schedule 
f\,\__ 
DATED this /'O day of October, 2017. 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
By~ oe Rockstahl 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DATED this IIJ,tt,. day of October, 2017. 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLER UP, PLLC 
By ~ ~ 
Michael D. Danielson --.......:::: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the /1JfA.. day of October, 2017, he caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing STIPULATION RE TRIAL EXHIBITS to be served upon the following 
attorney in the following manner: 
Joe Rockstahl 
ROCK.STAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
(Attorney for Defendants) 
STIPULATION RE TRIAL EXHIBITSq3 
Hand Delivered 
U.S. Mail 









Michael D. Danielson -.::::::::: 
Electronically Filed
11/29/2017 3:45 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Pam Schulz, Deputy Clerk
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Bren E. Mollernp, ISB No. 7959 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box 366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Telephone: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Email: mollernp@benoitlaw.com 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DA YID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the above entitled plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company, by and through its 
attorneys or record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollernp, PLLC, and submits this Trial 
Brief for the Court's consideration. 
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF-I 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter is set for a court trial, to begin on December 6, 2017, on the issue of unjust 
enrichment. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as (1) Plaintiff conferred a 
benefit on the Defendants, (2) the Defendants appreciated that benefit, and (3) the Defendants have 
accepted that benefit under circumstances wherein it is inequitable for them to retain the benefit 
without compensating Plaintiff for the value thereof. 
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
(1) Plaintiff sold three Kenworth T660 trucks (the "Trucks") to GE TF Trust ("GE") for lease 
to the Defendant Skim1er Trucking, Inc. ("STI") on 08/18/2011. Complaint, ,r 6; Answer, ,r II. 
(2) The lease agreement (the "Lease") between GE and STI, also signed on 08/18/2011, 
included personal guarantees signed by Defendants James and David Skilliler (together, the 
"Skinners"). Complaint, ,r 7; Answer, ,r IV; Response to Interrogatory No. 3 (all three defendants). 
(3) The Lease was for a term of four years. Response to Requests for Admission No. 2 
(all three defendants). 
( 4) The Lease included a residual/payoff payment that was due at the termination of the Lease. 
Response to Requests for Admission No. 3 (STI). 1 
(5) The total residual/payoff payment contemplated by the Lease was for $174,153.60 
($58,051.20 for each of the three tractors). Response to Requests for Admission No. 4 (all three 
defendants). 
( 6) Prior to the creation of the Lease, Plaintiff and STI had prior business dealings. Response 
to Requests for Admission No. 5 (all three defendants). 
(7) On prior leases of Ken worth trucks, STI would turn the trucks in to Keith McKenzie at 
1 The Sldnners admitted this too, but limited their admissions to "only ifit was exercised." 
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Kenworth at the end of the lease. Response to Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 21 (STI). 
(8) Kenworth would then sell the trucks. Response to Interrogatory No. 21 (STI); Response 
to Interrogatory No. 17 (James and David Skinner). 
(9) After such sales, if the net sales amount was less than the residual value, Skinner Trucking 
would pay the difference. If the net sales amount was more than the residual value, the difference 
was to be refunded to Skinner Trucking. Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 1 8. 
(10) STI fell behind on its lease obligations under the Lease to GE. Complaint, 18; Answer, 
(11) At the end of the Lease, STI was undergoing financial difficulties. Response 
to Requests for Admission No. 7 (all three defendants). 
(12) STI turned two of the trucks in at the end of the Lease and tumed in the third truck 
roughly two (2) months later. Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 112. 
(13) The trucks at issue were turned in to Kenworth. Response to Requests for Admission 
No. 7 (all three defendants); Response to Interrogatory No. 12 (STI). 
(14) After tuming the trucks in, STI walked away to await an eventual sale and final 
adjustment. Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 113. 
(15) On 10/30/15, Plaintiff paid off the outstanding residual/payoff payments owed by STI 
on the two of the three tractors to GE. The amount of that payment was $116,102.40 ($58,051.20 per 
truck). Trial Exhibit 3. 
(16) Additionally, on 12/02/15, Plaintiff paid off the outstanding residual/payoff payment 
owed by STI on the third tractor to GE. The amount of that payment was $58,051.20. On that same 
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date, Plaintiff paid GE $7,073.17, the amount of STI's unpaid rent/lease payments. Trial Exhibit 4; 
Trial Exhibit 5, ,r 9. 
(I 7) In January of 2016, Plaintiff billed ST! for $55,226.77. That amount consists of 
$16,051.20 per tractor (lease residual of$58,051.20 minus dealer resale allowance of $42,000.00), 
plus a late lease payment charge of $7,073.17. Complaint, ,r 12; Answer, ,r VII; Trial Exhibit 5, ,r 11; 
Exhibit B to Trial Exhibit 5. 
(18) Plaintiff also requested payment from STI through the Defendant James Skinner. 
Complaint, ,r 13; Answer, ,r II; Response to Requests for Admission No. 13 (STI) and 12 (Skinners). 
( 19) STI has never reimbursed Plaintiff for the payments that Plaintiff made to GE on STI' s 
behalf. Response to Requests for Admission No. 12 (STI) and 11 (Skinners). 
III, LEGAL STANDARD/ELEMENTS 
To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, Plaintiff must establish three elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Those elements are (1) that Plaintiff conferred a benefit on the 
Defendants, (2) that the Defendants appreciated that benefit, and (3) that the Defendants accepted 
that benefit under circumstances wherein it would be inequitable for them to retain the benefit without 
payment to Plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558, 165 
P Jd 261, 272 (2007). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff will Establish at Trial all Three Requisite Elements of Unjust Enrichment. 
As will be shown below, as well as at trial, Plaintiff will establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Plaintiff conferred a benefit on STI by paying offSTI's obligation to GE on the Lease. 
Ending STI's obligation to GE also conferred a benefit on James and David Skinner (together, the 
"Skinners"), as it tenninated their personal liability for the Lease. Plaintiff will also establish that 
STI and the Skinners appreciated that benefit, as they were notified by Plaintiff that Plaintiff would 
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be satisfying their obligation to GE under the Lease, and that STI and the Skinners accepted that 
benefit under circumstances wherein it is inequitable for them to continue in their refusal to pay 
Plaintiff therefore. 
A. Plaintiff conferred a benefit on all three defendants. 
It is undisputed that STI entered into a four ( 4) year Lease with GE on 8/18/11 regarding three 
Trucks, that the Lease included a residual/payoff payment that was due at the termination of the 
Lease, and that the total residual/payoff payment under the Lease was $174,153.60 ($58,051.20 for 
each of the three Trucks). As will be explained at trial, STI was obligated for this amount at the end 
of the Lease regardless of whether or not it chose to purchase the Trucks or to turn them in to Plaintiff 
for sale and a final adjustment.2 It is also undisputed that the Skim1ers were personally liable for 
STI's obligations under the Lease and that as the Lease term neared its end, STI was undergoing 
financial difficulties and had fallen behind on its Lease obligations. 
As will be established at trial through the testimony of Pahl, Keith McKenzie ("McKenzie"), 
and Kassidy Harness ("Harness"), employees of Plaintiff both now and at all times at issue in this 
case, STI was a long-term customer of Plaintiff. These employees were aware that STI was 
undergoing financial difficulties, was struggling to keep its payments under the Lease current, and 
was having difficulty keeping the Trucks on the road, Therefore, when STI turned the Trucks over 
to Plaintiff, McKenzie made it clear to STI that Plaintiff would do it a favor and satisfy STI' s 
obligations under the Lease in order to stop STI's financial bleeding. McKenzie will testify that ST! 
2 Bill Pahl ("Pahl"), District Manager for Plaintiff, will testify at trial that under a TRAC lease such as the Lease at issue 
in this case, ST! had the option to purchase the Trucks at 1he end of the Lease for the residual/payoff value of 
$174,153.60 and 1hat had it done so, along wi1h satisfying any lease payments still outstanding at the time, STI's 
obligation under the Lease would have ended. STI's second option under the Lease was to tum them in for sale and a 
final adjustment. If the Trucks were to sell for less than their residual/payoff value, STI-and the Skinners pursuant to 
their personal guarantee-would still owe the difference, as well as any outstanding unpaid lease payments. The 
Defendants have admitted that this was standard operating procedure at the end of these leases, See 11117, 8, 9, and 14 
under "Undisputed Facts" above. 
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was never told that it would not be liable for any deficiency should the trucks be valued or sold for 
less than the residual/payoff value or for any unpaid Lease payments. 
Once they were turned in, Pahl will testify that Plaintiff paid off STI' s outstanding obligations 
under the Lease (both the residual and unpaid lease payments) as promised. Plaintiff then inspected 
and valued the Trucks at $42,000.00 each based on their condition at the time and market trends.3 
Finally, Plaintiff sent STI an invoice for $55,226.77 ($16,051.20 per tractor-the Lease residual of 
$58,051.20 minus dealer resale allowance of $42,000.00-plus a late lease payment charge of 
$7,073.17), 
When Plaintiff satisfied the Defendants' obligations under the Lease, an act that Plaintiff was 
under no compulsion to undertake, a direct financial benefit was conferred on each of the Defendants. 
STI was no longer liable under the Lease, for either the residual amount or the outstanding unpaid 
lease payments. The same is true of the Skinners, whose personal liability under the Lease was 
terminated as well. 
The Defendants intend to argue at trial that they were only liable for the residual/payoff 
amount if the Trucks sold for less than that amount after turn in. They also intend on arguing at trial 
that Plaintiff, instead of paying off STI' s obligations under the Lease, merely purchased the Trucks 
from GE at their residual amounts plus $7,073.17. However, such an interpretation of Plaintiff's 
actions is unsupported by any evidence and will be directly contradicted by the testimony of Pahl, 
McKenzie, and Harness. Furthennore, such an interpretation simply makes no sense. If Plaintiff 
wished to purchase the Trucks from GE mid resell them for a profit, why would they have paid not 
3 One of the reasons for the value placed on the Tmcks at the time was the fact that before turning the Trncks over to 
Plaintiff, ST! had removed Tri-Pac units from each of the Trncks and sold them for $4,000.00. Pahl will testify that the 
Trucks were equipped with those units at the beginning of the Lease, that the Lease payments and residual/payoff were 
calculated based partially on the presence and value of those units, and that the removal thereof lowered the value of the 
Trncks. ST!, in removing those units and selling them for $12,000.00 benefitted financially while lowering the value of 
the Trncks at turn in. 
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only the residual amounts, but STI's obligation for unpaid lease payments as well? Unlike the 
Defendants' unsupported assertion, the evidence that will be produced at trial supports only one 
explanation for Plaintiffs decision to pay $181,226.77 to GE in late 2015, and that was to do a favor 
for a long-time customer.4 
The Defendants may also attempt to argue that the Trucks were worth more than the 
residual/payoff amount at the time that they were turned over to Plaintiff. This argument makes little 
sense given the fact that the Defendants had the option to purchase the Trucks at the end of the Lease 
and sell them at a profit-an option which they declined to exercise. In fact, James Skiuner admitted 
during his deposition that he tried to sell the Trucks himself before turning them in, but that nobody 
would purchase them for even $20,000.00. Plaintiffs witnesses will testify that at the time that they 
were turned in and in the condition that they were turned in, the Trucks were worth $42,000.00 each, 
and the Defendants will not be able to present credible evidence to the contrary. 
In sum, Plaintiff will establish at trial that it paid GE the exact amount of STI's obligation 
under the Lease as a favor to a long-time client, under the clear expectation that the Defendants would 
repay Plaintiff for any deficiency between the value of the Trucks and the amount Plaintiff paid. 5 As 
such, Plaintiff conferred a benefit on the Defendants in the amount of $55,226.77 by erasing the 
Defendants' obligations to GE. 
4 The Defendants are likely to argue at trial that Plaintiff valued the three Trucks at more than $181,226.77 and simply 
wished to flip them for a profit. However, besides the fact that this argument too lacks any supporting evidence, such 
reasoning is flawed. First, if Plaintiff believed that the Trucks were worth some amount more than $181,226.77, why 
would they have paid the full $181,226.77 to GE, an amount which included STl's unpaid lease payments. Plaintiff 
was under no obligation to pay that amount for the Trucks and GE was under no obligation under the terms of the Lease 
to sell them for that amount. Furthermore, such an argument requires one to believe that Plaintiff, which is in the 
business of buying and selling trucks, overvalued each of the three Trucks in question by well over $18,000.00 apiece. 
In fact, Plaintiff was unable to sell any of the three Trucks at $42,000 and only finally sold them within the last few 
months for considerably less than that amount. However, Plaintiff is not seeking the full extent of its loss. 
5 If the Defendants disputed this expectation, they could have done so at any time after receiving Plaintiff's invoice, but 
they failed to make any response until this lawsuit was filed, 
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B. Each of the defendants appreciated that benefit. 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term "appreciate" as "to be aware of." 
Appreciate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016). Based on this definition, each of the Defendants 
appreciated the benefit discussed above. 
It is undisputed that the Defendants were aware of their respective obligations under the 
STI/GE Lease. Plaintiffs employees will testify at trial that Plaintiff satisfied those obligations in 
full and then notified the Defendants via an invoice and multiple communication attempts that it 
had done so and expected to be compensated therefore. Neither ST! nor the Skinners will testify at 
trial that after Plaintiff satisfied their obligations to GE, they somehow believed that their obligation 
remained. Thus, once Plaintiff paid GE and once an invoice was sent to ST! seeking payment, the 
Defendants were aware of the benefit conferred thereby. 
The Defendants appear to believe that "appreciate" somehow requires an admission on their 
part, and that if they simply refuse to admit to having received any benefit, this element cannot be 
met. However, such a definition is unsupportable. Plaintiff informed the Defendants that their 
obligations under the Lease had been satisfied, and at that point the Defendants appreciated the 
benefit conferred by Plaintiffs actions. 
C, Each of the defendants accepted the benefit under circumstances whereby it is 
inequitable to retain the benefit without repaying plaintiff for its value. 
When the Trucks were surrendered to Plaintiff, Plaintiffs employees will testify that ST! 
was informed that Plaintiff would be satisfying STI's obligations to GE under the Lease as a favor 
to STI as a long-time client. STI didn't object or request that Plaintiff refrain from doing so. 
Afterward, STI was aware that Plaintiff had paid off said obligation, as evidenced by the fact that 
STI received an invoice and never made an attempt from that point forward to pay on its obligation 
to GE. Never once did either STI or the Skinners contact GE and attempt to dispute or undo 
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Plaintiffs actions. Never once did STI or the Skinners contact Plaintiff and attempt to undo the 
transaction, even after receiving an invoice. Instead, the Defendants were aware of the benefit 
conferred by Plaintiff, accepted it, and only after Plaintiff brought this suit did they decide to 
dispute it. Therefore, the evidence presented at trial will establish that the Defendants accepted the 
benefit conferred by Plaintiff under circumstances wherein it is inequitable to allow them to retain 
that benefit without compensating Plaintiff for the value thereof. 
V. CONCLUSION 
ST! and, pursuant to a personal guarantee, the Skinners, were obligated under the terms of the 
Lease to pay the residual/payoff amount at the end of the Lease, as well as any unpaid back lease 
payments. STI was undergoing financial difficulties toward the end of the Lease term and as a favor, 
Plaintiff paid off those obligations. As will be proven at trial, Plaintiffs actions conferred a benefit 
on the Defendants, the Defendants appreciated that benefit, and the Defendants accepted that benefit 
under circumstances wherein it is inequitable for them to continue in their refusal to pay Plaintiff 
therefore. As such, Plaintiff asks this Court for a verdict against the Defendants in the amount of 
$55,226.77. 
DATED this }AJ'h day of November, 2017. 
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BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
By________:_~~±_,,_,V-2-::_('.0~:::::::::::====-~ 
Michael D. Danielson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, doing business in the state of 
Idaho, 
 
   Plaintiff 
vs 
 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual;  
 














CASE NO: CV42-16-2539 
 
DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF 
 
   
 
 COMES NOW the above named Defendants, Skinner Trucking, Inc., James Skinner and 
David Skinner, by and through their attorney of record, Joe Rockstahl of Rockstahl Law Office, 
Chtd., and submits their Trial Brief. 
 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiff sold three Kenworth tractors to GE TF Trust who then leased the tractors to 
Defendants on or about 08/18/2011. Complaint paragraph 6, Answer paragraph II. 
2. At the end of the lease Defendants turned in two of the subject tractors and about two 
months later turned in the third tractor. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 12, Affidavit 
of Bill Pahl paragraphs 8 and 9. 
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3. The Master Lease provides that at the end of the lease term the Lessee shall return the 
vehicle to the Lessor; if the Lessee does not surrender the vehicle he shall be in default of 
the lease and will pay as liquidated damages 110% of the monthly rental applicable to the 
subject vehicle. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 4 and Defendant’s Exhibit 1, 
paragraph 7. 
4. The Master Lease provides for a Final Adjustment at the end of the lease term, which is 
defined in the TRAC Addendum to Master Vehicle Lease Agreement. After the vehicles 
are returned, as per paragraph 7 of the Master Lease, the Lessor shall sell the vehicles and 
if the net sales amount is less than the Residual Value set out in Schedule A Even Payments 
– (TRAC) then the lessee owes the difference to Lessor, or if the net sale proceeds are more 
than the Residual Value the Lessor owes that amount to the Lessee. Affidavit of James 
Skinner paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, attached to the Affidavit: Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 
2 and 3. 
5. At the end of the subject lease, the Defendants contacted a salesperson at Kenworth to 
discuss purchasing one of the tractors, the sales person said they would find financing for 
the deal and then never called back, thereafter the Defendants gave up any thought of 
purchasing one of the tractors. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 10. 
6. The Defendants turned in the three subject tractors and walked away to wait for the 
eventual sale and Final Adjustment. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 13. 
7. Unbeknownst to Defendants, the Plaintiff had purchased the three subject tractors from GE 
TF Trust at full Residual Value. Affidavit of James Skinner paragraph 14, Affidavit of Bill 
Pahl paragraphs 8 and 9. 
8. The Defendants only learned Plaintiff had purchased the subject tractors when Defendants 
received an invoice from Plaintiff, claiming they somehow owed money to Plaintiff due to 
the purchase of the subject tractors. Affidavit of Jim Skinner, paragraph 19. 
9. In their Complaint at paragraph 10., Plaintiff claims: “In October of 2015, erroneously 
believing that it was somehow obligated under the GE/STI contract, Plaintiff paid STI’s 
obligation to GE.” 
10. In the Affidavit of Bill Pahl at paragraph 6, second sentence, Plaintiff claims that because 
the Defendants were long term customers they would help out Skinner Trucking by paying 
off the lease residual amounts. 
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11. In paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that the contract was between 
GE TF Trust and Skinner Trucking. 
12. When the subject tractors were dropped off at Plaintiff’s yard they were worth $72,000.00 
each and Plaintiff stood to make a nice profit if they purchased for the Residual Value and 
flipped them. Shortly after Plaintiff purchased the subject tractors from GE TF Trust, the 
market was flooded with similar tractors coming off lease, all of which had similar troubles 
keeping them on the road as the subject tractors had – which then caused the fair market 
value of these tractors to fall to $52,000.00. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 26. 
13. Defendant James Skinner has been in the trucking business for approximately 41 years and 
kept himself apprised of the market trends for new and used tractors, new and used trailers 
and the going rates for different kinds of freight, among other things; this is how he knew 
about the changing values of the subject tractors. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 
29. 
14. The Defendants never obtained an ownership interest in the subject tractors. Affidavit of 
James Skinner, paragraph 30. 
15. There is no purchase option set forth in the Master Lease or Addendums thereto. Affidavit 
of James Skinner, paragraph 32, Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. 
16. At the end of the subject lease period the equipment is required to be turned in to it can be 
sold. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 33, Defendant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. 
17. Plaintiff, a third party outside of the lease contract between GE TF Trust and Defendants, 
purchased the subject tractors at the Residual Value set forth in Defendant’s Exhibit 2, 
which resulted in the subject leases’ Final Adjustment being zero – Defendants neither 
gained nor lost from the sale. Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 31, Defendant’s 
Exhibit 2. 
18. In all the years, approximately 21, that the Defendants have leased Kenworth tractors they 
have never been advised of a Final Adjustment or similar calculation at the end of a lease. 
Affidavit of James Skinner, paragraph 21. 
19. After a lease turn in prior to the subject tractors lease, the GPS until remained working on 
one of the tractors and Defendants saw that it went from Salinas, California to New York 
every week until the GPS subscription expired several weeks later. There was no Final 
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Adjustment on that vehicle and it had obviously been sold after turn in. Affidavit of James 
Skinner, paragraph 22. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 Plaintiff argues that they have unjustly enriched the Defendants by purchasing the 
three tractors at the Residual Value set forth in the Master Lease and Schedule A thereto. 
 Defendants would point out that their contract was with GE TF Trust; the only 
contact Defendants had with the Plaintiffs was for maintenance and repair of the subject 
tractors. Defendants never had an ownership interest in the subject tractors and after 
Plaintiff’s salesperson failed to follow through on financing – no intention of purchasing 
the subject tractors. 
 In the Complaint at paragraph 10, the Plaintiff claims they erroneously thought they 
were obligated under Skinner Trucking’s lease with GE TF Trust and purchased the trucks, 
two in October and the third in December of 2015. If that were true, Plaintiff should have 
explained that to GE TF Trust and if something could not be worked out, Plaintiff should 
have filed suit against GE TF Trust for return of the monies erroneously paid. 
 In their affidavit in support of summary judgment, Plaintiff claims they purchased 
the tractors to basically help Defendants out of a bind; Defendants deny this outright and 
state they never discussed Plaintiff purchasing the vehicles on their behalf. The Defendants 
story is true as evidenced by the problems they had trying to keep these three tractors on 
the road – why would they want to purchase these troublesome vehicles?  
 Furthermore, no phone records, notes, memos, or any tangible proof of the alleged 
discussion between the parties regarding Plaintiff’s purchase of the subject tractors has 
been divulged, nor can they be divulged as they don’t exist. 
 Defendants owed no obligation to GE TF Trust until the subject vehicles were sold 
and the Final Adjustment was calculated. As set forth in the Master Lease, Schedules and 
Addendums, the sale of the leased vehicles is the triggering event for the Final Adjustment 
and determination if the Defendants owed GE TF Trust anything. Over the years, 
Defendants never received a Final Adjustment, they just turned the tractors in at the end of 
the lease and walked away. 
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 The Plaintiff is an outside third party not in privity of contract with Defendants who 
purchased the subject vehicles of their own accord. 
 
 “The district court held that existing Idaho law "fails to recognize a cause of 
action under either the theory of fraud or unjust enrichment where the alleged injured 
party has no relationship with the alleged injuring party." Therefore, the district court 
concluded that Bannock Paving was entitled to summary judgment.” 
Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 465-66, 797 P.2d 863, 865-66 
(1990) 
 
 As set forth above and in the Affidavit of James Skinner, there was no vehicle 
ownership interest between the parties and no purchase/sales relationship. 
 
 “If reasonable certainty is not attained and if it is speculative or doubtful whether 
a benefit would have been derived, then a complaining party must fail, because adequate 
proof is lacking. Hoskins v. Scott, 52 Or. 271, 96 P. 1112; Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 
185, 259 P.2d 810; McNichols v. J. R. Simplot Co., 74 Idaho 321, 262 P.2d 1012; 
O'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348, 194 P.2d 608.” 
Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 200, 279 P.2d 1064, 1065 (1955) 
 
 “Damages need be proved only with a reasonable certainty and taken out of the 
realm of speculation. Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-
83, 595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979).” 
Hake v. DeLane, 117 Idaho 1058, 1063, 793 P.2d 1230, 1235 (1990) 
 
In this matter, damages are speculative at best, the Plaintiff claims estimated damages, the 
subject vehicles are still on the Plaintiff’s lot waiting to be sold; and therefore any guess at a value 
for the subject vehicles is speculative and doubtful and should not be allowed. 
 
“Appellant also advances the proposition that the damages are remote and 
speculative. These terms are defined in 25 C.J.S. Damages § 2, pp. 459 and 460 as 
follows:  
"Remote damages. Remote damages are such as are the result of accident or an 
unusual combination of circumstances which could not reasonably be anticipated, and 
over which the party sought to be charged had no control." 
"Speculative damages. The term 'speculative damages' is sometimes used as 
synonymous with 'exemplary damages'; but ordinarily damages are said to be speculative 
when the probability that a circumstance will exist as an element for compensation 
becomes conjectural." 
From all of the evidence it must be concluded that the damages were remote and 
speculative. 
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Having concluded the damages were remote and speculative, and therefore not 
recoverable by the respondents, the judgment on the cross-complaint is reversed and the 
cross-complaint ordered dismissed.”  
Lockwood Graders v. Neibaur, 80 Idaho 123, 128-29, 326 P.2d 675, 677-78 (1958) 
 
 In the instant matter, re: remote damages: in all their years of leasing Kenworth’s 
the Defendants never received the results from a Final Adjustment, making the claimed 
damages not reasonably foreseeable and over which the Defendants’ had no control. 
 Re: speculative damages: the subject vehicles have not been sold and any attempt 
to estimate value is speculative and should not be allowed.  
 
 “Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable where the plaintiff 
in an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the benefit 
conferred upon the defendant. 
Id. at 667, 619 P.2d at 1120. See also Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d' Alene 
Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062 (Ct.App.1986).” 
Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990) 
 
 As set forth above, Kenworth cannot establish a value for any alleged benefit 
conferred upon the defendants and therefore the doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable. 
 
“The two theories, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, are simply different 
measures of recovery as equitable remedies. 
... 
Neither of these two theories allows recovery by a subcontractor who lacks a 
contractual relationship directly with a property owner. 
... 
Thus it is said that a landowner will not be held liable for work or material furnished by a 
subcontractor to a contractor, pursuant to a contractual arrangement between the 
contractor and subcontractor, where the landowner is not a party to this contractual 
arrangement. 
... 
It is true that there is an exception to this general rule under the mechanic's lien 
laws, where if a subcontractor is not paid, he may enforce his claim for compensation 
directly against the landowner.” 
Great Plains Equip. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 768, 979 P.2d 627, 641 (1999) 
 
Great Plains, supra., makes it clear that unjust enrichment as between a subcontractor and 
a property owner requires a contract between the parties; and notes that the mechanic’s lien laws 
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are an exception to this general rule. There was no contract, real or imagined, between Kenworth 
and the Defendants.  
 
Somewhat similar to the instant case is the Independent School District, infra., case, where 
a purchaser bought a parcel of land from a developer, which parcel included restrictive covenants; 
the purchaser then sold the property at fair market value to a university, the university used its 
condemnation powers to do away with the restrictive covenants. The developer sought to sue the 
buyer claiming he was unjustly enriched in this transaction; the court disagreed. 
 
“The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harris' unjust enrichment 
claim because Harris did not confer any benefit to Brighton when it sold the Property to 
Brighton.” 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P’ship, 150 Idaho 583, 589, 249 P.3d 382, 388 
(2011) 
  
In our case, Kenworth thought they could purchase and flip the subject tractors at a nice 
profit, so they contacted GE TF Trust and negotiated a sales price which just happened to be the 
Residual Value. Thereafter, the market for these type of semi-tractors fell below what was 
anticipated.  
The prima facie case for unjust enrichment is: 
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;  
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and  
(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. 
Independent School District, supra. 
1. Kenworth cannot give a value of the alleged benefit to Defendants. 
2. As the Defendants have never received a Final Adjustment calculation after turning in 
leased vehicles, there was no benefit to the Defendants and therefore nothing to 
“appreciate”. 
3. The Defendants dropped off the leased vehicles and walked away, there is nothing 
inequitable on their part. 
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“Inequity exists if a transaction is inherently unfair. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 
910, 42 P.3d 698, 703 (2002). Yet the doctrine "does not operate to rescue a party from 
the consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one."  
... 
Since unjust enrichment does not provide compensation simply because one 
suffers the consequences of his own bad bargain, we find that the district court properly 
granted Brighton's motion for summary judgment dismissing Harris' unjust enrichment 
claim.” Emphasis added. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P’ship, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 P.3d 382, 389 
(2011)  
 
 This is exactly what Kenworth is attempting to do, use unjust enrichment to rescue 
themselves from a bad bargain. They didn’t sue GE TF Trust as GE TF Trust has significant 
resources to fight off such a move; whereas the Defendants have limited resources. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Plaintiff’s complaint must fail; they are attempting to use the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment to save themselves from a bad bargain.  
 In 20+ years the Defendants have never received a Final Adjustment after turning in leased 
vehicles. After the advent of GPS and computer tracking, the Defendants witnessed a tractor they 
had turned in at the end of a lease – traveling coast to coast; which means the Plaintiff sold the 
tractor to a new customer, with no Final Adjustment having been provided to Defendants. 
 No documentation has been produced evidencing Kenworth had agreed to help Defendants 
out of a jam. The Defendants had no involvement with the sale of the three tractors. 
 There has been no documentation of a Final Adjustment ever being done after Defendants 
turned in tractors at the end of a lease. 
 Making reasonable assumptions and conclusions and applying Idaho law, the Plaintiff’s 
complaint must fail. 
 DATED: November 30, 2017. 
     
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
 
 
     ___________________________________ 
     Joe Rockstahl 
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COMES NOW, the above entitled plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company, by and through its 
attorneys or record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC, and submits this Closing 
Brief for the Court's consideration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter was heard at a one-day court trial on December 6, 2017, on the issue of unjust 
enrichment. Plaintiff maintains that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as it has shown, both through 
evidence previously submitted to the Court and through evidence presented at trial, that (1) Plaintiff 
conferred a benefit on the Defendants, (2) the Defendants appreciated that benefit, and (3) the 
Defendants have accepted that benefit under circumstances wherein it is inequitable for them to retain 
the benefit without compensating Plaintiff for the value thereof. 
II. FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL1 
(1) Plaintiff and the Defendant, Skinner Trucking Company ("STI") had a long-term 
business relationship, spanning decades. Trial Testimony of Kassidy Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill 
Pahl, Jim Skinner, and David Skinner. 
(2) At the end of the lease in question (the "Lease"), STI was in default and owed back 
rent/late fees totaling at least $7,073.17.2 STI was also without cash and unable to either purchase or 
finance the trucks for the outstanding residual amount on the lease. Trial Testimony of Kassidy 
Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill Pahl, and Jim Skinner. 
(3) STI was facing the potential ofrepossession, further late fees/penalties, legal fees, and 
an auction/fire sale of the trucks for an amount far below their value. Trial Testimony of Kassidy 
Harness, Keith McKenzie, and Bill Pahl. 
(4) Under the terms of the Lease, STI was under no obligation to tum the trucks in to 
Plaintiff and Plaintiff was under no obligation to accept the trucks from STI. Trial Testimony of 
1 These are in addition to facts previously admitted by the Defendants through the discovery process and highlighted in 
Plaintiffs Trial Brief. 
2 Jim Skinner claimed at trial that he cannot remember if STI was in default or how much was owed in back rent/late 
fees. However, the only affirmative evidence before the Court is that STI was in default and owed at least $7,073.17 in 
back rent/late fees, despite tbe Defendants' memory problems. 
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Kassidy Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill Pahl. 
(5) Plaintiff had no desire to purchase and market the trucks, knowing that they were likely 
to be appraised below the outstanding residual amount. However, Plaintiff was also aware of STI's 
financial straits and, as STI was a valued, long time customer, decided to satisfy STI's obligation to 
the lessor, GE TF Trust ("GE"). Trial Testimony of Kassidy Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill Pahl. 
(6) Plaintiff informed Jim Skinner that it would be doing so, as a favor to STI, at the time 
that STI surrendered the trucks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff never led the Defendants to believe that Plaintiff 
was purchasing the trucks with the intent of making a profit, that the trucks were valued either at or 
above the residual amount under the lease, that STI would be under no obligation to Plaintiff for a 
deficiency, should the trucks be valued at less than the residual amount, or that they could simply 
walk away from a lease under which they were in default and owed back rent/late payments, owing 
nothing.3 Trial Testimony of Kassidy Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill Pahl. 
(7) STI surrendered the trucks to Plaintiff and walked away, after which Plaintiff paid off 
the Defendants' obligations under the lease, in the amount of $181,226.77. From that moment on, 
the Defendants' obligations to GE under the lease ceased. Trial Testimony ofKassidy Harness, Keith 
McKenzie, Bill Pahl, and Jim Sldnner; Trial Exhibits 3 and 4. 
(8) Plaintiff then appraised the trucks at $42,000.00 each.4 This amount was due, in part 
to the condition of the trucks, including the absence of auxiliary power units, tire issues, and the fact 
that one of the trucks had been wrecked. Trial Testimony of Kassidy Harness, Keith McKenzie, and 
Bill Pahl. 
3 Again, despite testimony by Plaintiff's employees that Jim Skinner was aware that Plaintiff was doing ST! a favor and 
that Plaintiff expected payment from ST! should the trucks be valued at less than the amotmt paid by Plaintiff to GE, 
Jim Skinner couldn't recall whether or not such conversations took place. An inability to recall does not negate 
affirmative testimony. 
4 Jim Skinner admitted at trial(!) that he had tried to sell the trucks prior to surrendering them to Plaintiff, but couldn't 
get $20,000.00 for them and (2) that based on market conditions at the time, he could see why they were valued at 
$42,000.00. 
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(9) After appraising the trucks, Plaintiff invoiced STI for $55,226.77, the difference 
between the residual amount on each truck and the appraised value of $42,000.00, plus the back 
rent/late fee of$7,073.17. STI received these invoices, but refused to pay. Trial Testimony of Kassidy 
Harness, Keith McKenzie, Bill Pahl, Jim Skinner, and David Skinner; Trial Exhibit 10. 
(I 0) The trucks finally sold two years later for $34,500.00 each. Trial Testimony of Bill 
Pahl. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD/ELEMENTS 
To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, Plaintiff must establish three elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Those elements are (I) that Plaintiff conferred a benefit on the 
Defendants, (2) that the Defendants appreciated that benefit, and (3) that the Defendants accepted 
that benefit under circumstances wherein it would be inequitable for them to retain the benefit without 
payment to Plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558, 165 
P.3d 261,272 (2007).5 
IV.ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has established, both at trial and by admissions made through the discovery process, 
that in October of 2015, STI was in default on the Lease and faced a number of potential penalties 
therefrom. STI was short on cash and lacked the ability to purchase or finance the trucks any further 
or to satisfy its obligations to GE. 
Plaintiff has also established that it was aware of STI' s plight through communications with 
both STI (through Jim Skinner) and GE. Plaintiff made the decision to pay offSTI's entire obligation 
to GE in order to stop STI's financial bleeding, in the hopes that STI could recover financially and 
make good on a deficiency, if any, to Plaintiff moving forward. Plaintiff did so, and at the time that 
5 The Defendants have argued in their trial brief that privity of contract is also required. However, such is simply not 
the case. 
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STI surrendered the trucks, informed Jim Skinner of its intentions. Jim didn't disagree or take the 
trucks elsewhere, as he had a right to do. Instead, he simply left the trucks with Plaintiff and walked 
away. 
Finally, Plaintiff established that it appraised the trucks at $42,000.00 a piece, a fair appraisal 
given the condition of the trucks and the market at the time, and placed them on the market. STI was 
then invoiced for $55,226.77, the amount that it had been saved by Plaintiffs actions,6 which STI 
and the Skinners then ignored until this lawsuit was filed. 
Plaintiff conferred a direct benefit on all three Defendants when it paid off their obligation to 
GE under the Lease without any duty to do so. This benefitted the Defendants by (I) avoiding 
repossession, an auction/fire sale, further late penalties, and possible legal fees, and (2) satisfying 
their financial obligation to GE. That benefit, despite the Defendants' argument to the contrary, is 
definite and easily ascertainable. It was either $55,226.17 (the difference between the residual 
amounts under the lease and the appraised value of$42,000.00, plus a back rent/late fee of$7,073. l 7) 
or $77,726.77 (the difference between the residual amounts under the Lease and the amount that the 
trucks were actually sold for, plus the sale back rent/late fee). Whichever calculation is the better 
measurement of damages here is for the Court to decide. 
The Defendants appreciated that benefit when they were infonned that their obligations to GE 
were satisfied in full and understood that GE could no longer come after them for any further penalties 
under the Lease. Finally, after Plaintiff explained to Jim what it intended to do, the Defendants were 
under no obligation to surrender the trucks to Plaintiff and walk away, knowing what Plaintiff was 
going to do. However, they did so anyway and when Plaintiffs invoice finally arrived, and when 
6 It should also be pointed out that because ST! had zero cash on hand at the time and was unable to procure any 
alternate financing, Plaintiffs actions saved Jim and David Skinner from these obligations was well, as they were both 
personally liable under the lease. 
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Plaintiffs employees made multiple attempts to work things out with the Defendants, all of which 
were ignored, the Defendants chose to accept that benefit under circumstances wherein it would be 
inequitable for them to retain the benefit without payment to Plaintiff for the value thereof. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor, 
for either $55,226.17 or $77,726.77, as the Court in equity sees fit. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 2017. 
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CASE NO.  CV42-16-2539  
 
DEFENDANTS’ CLOSING ARGUMENT    
 
 COMES NOW the Defendants by and through their attorney of record and submit their 
Closing Argument. 
FACTS 
 Skinner Trucking entered a lease with GE TF Financial (GE) for the three subject 
Kenworth tractors on August 18, 2011, the lease was for four years. (Exhibit 1) 
 Skinner Trucking turned in two of the subject Kenworth’s on October 30, 2015 and the 
third on December 22, 2015. Skinner Trucking attempted to purchase the third truck but could 
not obtain financing between October and December, 2015. 
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 Skinners owed no obligation to GE until the subject vehicles were sold and the Final 
Adjustment was calculated.  
 On October 30, 2015, Kenworth Sales Company (Kenworth), the Plaintiff, purchased the 
two subject Kenworth tractors by paying GE the full residual value of the Skinner lease. (Exhibit 
3). 
 On December 2, 2015, Kenworth purchased the third subject Kenworth tractor by paying 
GE the full residual value plus an additional $7,073.17. 
 Kenworth claims that they purchased the three tractors to help out Skinner Trucking a 
long time and valued client; and by doing so the Defendants were unjustly enriched. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 There was no agreement 
The Defendants deny that there was an agreement for Kenworth to help them out by 
paying off the lease. 
 Throughout their testimony, the Plaintiffs referred to purchasing or buying the trucks. 
 The Skinners were close friends with Kenworth’s prior owner, but the new owner(s) are a 
bigger company and it was more business with no personal friendship. 
 The Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that there was no writing evidencing their claimed 
agreement with the Skinners. 
 No email; 
 No letter; 
 No sticky note with any terms; 
 No memo; 
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 No doodling on a desk calendar; 
 No writing of any kind. 
The Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that Keith MacKenzie was the guy who recommended 
Kenworth buy the three subject tractors. However, Keith’s testimony was vague in places: 
 When asked if he was aware that Skinner Trucking was struggling financially, he said “I 
sensed that.” (Rough Transcript, page 60, lines 1-3). 
 When asked if Jim Skinner was aware that Kenworth was going to buy the trucks at the 
time he turned them in – Keith said: “I believe so.” (Rough Transcript, page 61, lines 16-23). 
 When asked: “Did you tell Jim why Kenworth was willing to pay off these obligations?” 
he replied: “It was quite some time ago. I don’t know if I said it in so many words, but I think he 
knew that I didn’t want to see his company fail. We had a long history with him.” (Rough 
Transcript, pages 61-62, lines 24-4). 
 When asked if he told Jim Skinner that Kenworth was trying to stop the bleeding; he 
replied: “Don’t know if it was in those type of words, but yes. I paid them off for him because he 
was not in the position to pay them off at that point.” (Rough Transcript, page 62, lines 11-15). 
 When asked, what would have happened if Kenworth had not purchased the subject 
tractors, he said they probably would have added late charges, and it probably would have ended 
in a legal situation. (Rough Transcript, page 63, lines 17-23). Emphasis added. 
 Also, see Rough Transcript page 67, lines 5-7, Keith says: “I made the decision to pay 
them off, so I just bought them some time, basically, in hopes that they could come out better.  
Note that it doesn’t say we, or after discussion with Skinners, just “I”. 
 I sensed it. 
 I believe so. 
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 I think he knew 
 Probably 
Also, missing throughout this lawsuit – the terms of the alleged agreement, there have 
never been any specific terms or conditions mentioned; just, we had an agreement... 
James Skinner did not talk to anyone at Kenworth when he turned the trucks in at the end 
of the lease. (September 11, 2017 Deposition of James Skinner, pages 29-30). 
Plaintiff’s other witnesses all said they learned of the alleged deal from Keith; and as set 
forth above, Keith’s testimony was not very specific about Skinner actually knowing they 
intended to buy the trucks. 
“The principle of unjust enrichment, however, is applicable only if the person conferring 
the benefit is not an "officious intermeddler." The officious intermeddler rule essentially 
provides that a mere volunteer who, without request therefor, confers a benefit upon another is 
not entitled to restitution. This rule exists to protect persons who have had unsolicited "benefits" 
thrust upon them. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 
372, 374 (Ct. App. 1989) (adopting Restatement (First) of Restitution Section 2 (1937)). A 
person is not an intermeddler if such person has a valid reason for conferring the benefit, such as 
protecting an interest. See comments to Section 2 of Restatement (First) of Restitution, supra. 
Cf. Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147, 650 P.2d 449, 456 (Ariz. 1982).” Emphasis 
added. 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
“The district court held that existing Idaho law "fails to recognize a cause of action under 
either the theory of fraud or unjust enrichment where the alleged injured party has no 
relationship with the alleged injuring party." Therefore, the district court concluded that 
Bannock Paving was entitled to summary judgment.” 
Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 465-66, 797 P.2d 863, 865-66 
(1990) 
 




 It is clear from the facts and testimony that Kenworth was an officious intermeddler in 
purchasing the subject trucks with no agreement real or imagined with the Skinners and cannot 




 There was no evidence that Skinners ever received a Final Adjustment after turning in 
tractors at the end of a lease. 
 There was testimony that when three tractors were turned in around June 27, 2014 that 
Kenworth purchased them for $60,000 each and that each had a residual value of $53,251. 
(Rough Transcript, page 96-97, lines 24-6). (Deposition of Bill Pahl, exhibit 3).  
Cassidy Harness testified that if Kenworth bought the subject trucks for $58,000 each and 
listed them for $65,000 each, they stood to make a decent profit. (Rough Transcript, pages 48-49, 
lines 24-2). 
 The Defendants’ and their witnesses testified that they never received a check from 
Kenworth or GE for funds in excess of the Residual Value.  
 Every leased truck prior to these subject trucks were worth more than the residual when 
Skinner Trucking turned them in at the end, and was never asked to pay a deficiency, except for 
the three subject trucks. (March 23, 2017 Deposition of James Skinner, page 21, lines 8-22). 
 Making reasonable inferences, all of the Skinner lease trucks purchased by Kenworth 
prior to the subject trucks were sold at a profit and there was no accounting or Final Adjustment 
to Skinner – this makes sense only if Kenworth was buying these trucks as an independent third 




James Skinner valued the subject trucks at $72,000 each when he turned them in at the 
end of the lease, 10/30/2015. (September 11, 2017 Deposition of James Skinner, pages 26-27). 
 Plaintiffs Black Book valuation as of 01/01/2016 was $65,975 for Average Retail. 
 Bill Pahl testified that the market for these trucks had been going down 2% a month 
before October (2015). (Rough Transcript, Page 85, lines 11-13). 
 If we assume the subject trucks were worth $72,000 each on October 30, 2015 and we 
subtract 2% each month: 
November: 72,000 – 1,440 = 70,560 
December: 70,560 – 1440 = 69,120 
January: 69,120 – 1440 = 67,680 
 The Plaintiffs stood to make a nice profit, by their own assessment, if they purchased 
trucks worth $72,000 for $58, 051.20 each; someone at Kenworth screwed up on this deal and 
they are trying to make the Skinners pay for it. 
“Inequity exists if a transaction is inherently unfair. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 
910, 42 P.3d 698, 703 (2002). Yet the doctrine "does not operate to rescue a party from 
the consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one."  
... 
Since unjust enrichment does not provide compensation simply because one suffers the 
consequences of his own bad bargain, we find that the district court properly granted Brighton's 
motion for summary judgment dismissing Harris' unjust enrichment claim.” Emphasis added. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P’ship, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 P.3d 382, 389 (2011) 
 
“Recovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if the benefits to the Sybrandys were created 
incidentally by Mr. Hettinga in pursuit of his own financial advantage. Brown v. Yacht Club of 
Coeur d' Alene Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 199, 722 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ct. App. 1986).” 
Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 471, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994) 
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 The prior course of conduct, the filings and testimony make it clear Kenworth was 
pursuing their own financial advantage when the purchased the subject trucks. They should not 
be able to recovery for unjust enrichment for making a bad business deal. 
 
Common Sense 
 Skinner Trucking turned in three trucks in 2014 and the subject three trucks in 2015 and 
did not replace them. Kenworth received these 6 trucks and knew Skinner Trucking was winding 
down. 
 Skinner Trucking had been C.O.D. with Kenworth for parts and repairs for most of 2015. 
 Skinner Trucking had four drivers and four trucks at the end of 2015. (Deposition of 
Nicole Steward, pages 11-12, lines 22-14). 
Plaintiffs testified that they knew Skinner Trucking was behind on their lease payments 
and that they were unable to get Skinner Trucking financing on one of the subject trucks. 
Defendants testified that all of their dealings with Kenworth were in writing, whether 
contract or work order. 
Kenworth’s ownership had changed to Salt Lake City and were described as bigger 
business and the relationship was all business not personal after the change. 
In spite of all of the above, Kenworth claims they bought the trucks to help Skinners 
because of a long friendship and being a valuable customer. A customer so valuable that 
Kenworth put them on C.O.D. for parts and repairs – at most a few thousand dollars; but we are 
to believe they fronted Skinners $181,226.77 with no contract or written agreement of any kind, 
with the hopes that the Skinners could somehow pull things out. 
Kenworth’s inconsistencies: 
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First, as set forth in paragraph 10 of their complaint, Kenworth claimed they erroneously 
believed they were somehow obligated under Skinner’s lease with GE and so paid off the lease. 
Later, Kenworth claims they were helping out an old friend and valued client. 
Also, Kenworth knew Skinner Trucking was winding things down and was in financial 
difficulty and decided to spend $181,226.77 to help Skinners with the hope the Skinners would 
pull out of their financial difficulties while winding things down. 
The subject trucks sold: Keith MacKenzie - $45,000 each. (Rough Transcript, page 72, 
lines 21-22); Bill Pahl - $34,500 each. (Rough Transcript, page 88, lines 5-6). 
Bill Pahl agreed that money had been wired to GE for the first two subject trucks turned 
in October 30, 2015 and then later that Kenworth borrowed the money from GE. (Rough 
Transcript, pages 94-95, lines 18-21). 
Bill Pahl describing the last page of Exhibit 3, that Kenworth has an agreement with GE 
that the trucks are what they say they are – 2012 Kenworth T660, overall condition Good and 
worth $58,051.20 each; which is contrasted by this lawsuit and the Plaintiff’s testimony. 
The most logical and obvious scenario is that Kenworth thought they could flip these 
trucks and make a nice profit; they miscalculated somewhere along the way and realized they 
had made a bad business deal. Instead of just moving on, they decide to try to recoup their losses 
from the Skinners. 
 There was no benefit to Skinners. If Kenworth truly wanted to help their old friends, they 
would have immediately sold two of the trucks and financed the third for Skinner Trucking. 
 As set forth in Exhibit 2, wholesale value in January of 2016 was between $35,000 and 
$57,709; but everyone knew the value was falling – they should have sent these trucks to auction 
right away to get the highest value possible in the falling market. Although, there was testimony 
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that these subject trucks sold a few weeks ago, for $45,000 each (Rough Transcript, page 72, 
lines 21-22), or sold the trucks for $34,500 (Rough Transcript, page 88, lines 5-6), this brings 
Kenworth’s veracity and estimations of value into question. 
Trial Exhibits 
Exhibit 1: 
 The lease is between GE and Skinner, no mention of Kenworth. 
 (Page: Skinner Trucking 31) Section 2. Master Lease Amendments – The Master Lease 
is hereby amended as follows: 
(a) (Final Adjustment) – The following shall be added to the end of Section 8: 
After return of a Vehicle in accordance with Section 7, Lessor shall cause such 
Vehicle to be sold at public or private sale ... 
Kenworth was an independent third party to the lease and the subject tractors were sold at 
private sale pursuant to the lease provisions. 
Exhibit 2: 
 These alleged assessments were done in January on vehicles turned in in October and in a 
market “everyone” knew was falling. 
Exhibit 3: 
 (first page, first full paragraph) Payment by Buyer pursuant to this Invoice and Bill of 
Sale shall be conclusive evidence of Buyer’s agreement to be bound by this Invoice and 
Bill of Sale and Buyer’s receipt; and acceptance of the property pursuant to the terms of 
this Invoice and Bill of Sale, whether or not Buyer countersigns this Invoice and Bill of 
Sale. 




 Kenworth buys the third truck in December. 
Exhibit 5: 
 Affidavit of Bill Pahl – we now know that the alleged knowledge set forth actually 
allegedly came from Keith MacKenzie and is contradicted by trial testimony. 
 
Exhibit 6: 
 Affidavit of Jim Skinner 
 Is not contradicted by trial testimony. 
 
Exhibit 7: 
 David Skinner’s Response to Interrogatories 
 James Skinner’s Response to Interrogatories 
 Skinner Trucking Inc. Response to Interrogatories 
 Was not contradicted by trial testimony 
 
Exhibit 8: 
 Defendants’ Response to Request for Admissions 
 Was not contradicted by trial testimony 
 
Exhibit 9: 
 2015 Tax Records 
 $1.5 million in gross receipts 
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 $42,390 compensation of officers 
Exhibit 10: 
 Email, dated January 11, 2016 in which Bill Pahl decides to invoice the Skinner’s for 
Kenworth’s bad business deals from October 30, 2015 and December 22, 2015. 
Exhibit 11: 
 Pay History Report Skinner Trucking to GE 
 08/18/2011 – first payment is double 
 09/18/2011 – first Late Charge 
 10/18/2015 – payment made 
 11/18/2015 – payment made 
 12/18/2015 – payment made 
 If October, November and December 2015 payments were made – what is the final 
$7,073.17 for? 
There is no proof that Kenworth actually paid GE for the subject trucks. We learned that GE 
is Kenworth’s flooring financer and also finances Kenworth’s customers – there is the possibility 
of cahooting1 by GE and Kenworth. 
Cassidy testified that Jim Skinner took the APU units off because they were his. 
Conclusion 
 Considering all of the evidence and using common sense to draw reasonable conclusions, 
the Defendants were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs and Kenworth was in fact an officious 
1 Definition of CAHOOT 
: PARTNERSHIP, LEAGUE —usually used in plural  
 they're in cahoots 
 He was robbed by a man who was in cahoots with the bartender. 
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intermeddler and cannot avail itself of the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment to try to fix its 
bad bargain. The Plaintiff’s claim must fail in its entirety. 





     JOE ROCKSTAHL 
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Couray of r .-.in Falls - State of Idaho 
DEC 1ij 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Court for trial sitting without a jury on December 6, 
2017. Plaintiff Kenworth was represented by Michael Danielson. Defendants Skinner 
(collectively) were represented by Joe Rockstahl. Post-trial briefing was received 
December 11 , 2017 and this matter is deemed under advisement as of that date. This 
document constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FACTS 
Kenworth is a licensed dealer engaged in the business of selling and buying 
commercial trucks. Skinner Trucking, Inc. is a local business engaged in the commodity 
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transportation business. The company has done business with Kenworth for more than 
forty years and is considered a good customer of Kenworth. GE TF Trust is a 
subdivision of General Electric Capital Corporation which is a financing entity. Among 
other things the Trust (hereinafter GE) acts as a Lessor of Kenworth products that have 
been selected by Kenworth's customers such as Skinner. 
The Lease transaction in this case was structured as follows. Skinner selected 
three new Kenworth trucks on 08/18/2011. Kenworth arranged lease financing with GE. 
Upon approval Kenworth sold the three trucks to GE who in turn leased those trucks to 
Skinner pursuant to a TRAC lease. The provisions of the TRAC lease established a 
residual payoff at the end of the lease and in the absence of Skinner purchasing each 
truck required Skinner to return the trucks to GE at the end of the lease term. Upon 
return of the trucks, GE is required to sell each vehicle at either private of public sale for 
the highest cash offer received. If the sales amount is larger than the lease residual, 
the surplus is given to defendants; if the sales amount is less than the lease residual, 
the deficiency must be paid to GE by Skinner. James and David personally guaranteed 
the lease obligations. 
At the end of the lease period of four years in October of 2015 Skinner was 
unable to either sell the trucks, payoff the residual and thus purchase them or obtain 
financing to pay off the residual balance. By this time Skinner also owned 
approximately $7,000 for two missed lease payments on one truck. Kenworth was 
aware of Skinner's financial problems and attempted to help Skinner work out of this 
financial problem. Kenworth was sympathetic to Skinner's position and did not wish to 
see get Skinner get into a worse financial position by having the trucks sold at auction. 
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GE would not refinance any of the trucks; nor would any other lender. Neither Kenworth 
nor Skinner were able to find an acceptable purchaser for any truck. 
Ultimately Skinner voluntarily surrendered two of the trucks in the late fall of 
2015. The residual value on each of these trucks before sale as required by the TRAC 
lease was $58,051.20 each. Skinner held on to the third truck for a period of time but 
also voluntarily returned it. The residual value on this truck was likewise $58,051.20. 
The amount of the delinquent two lease payments on this vehicle was $7,073.17. 
Kenworth and James had some discussions about what to do with the trucks. 
The trial record is not clear precisely what those discussions were. The Court can, and 
does, however make a finding that there was no agreement between the two entities of 
what would be done. Nor, more importantly, did Skinner ever request that Kenworth 
pay off its debt. Kenworth did in fact pay off the residual amounts and delinquent 
payments. The most substantial evidence supporting the reason for this decision was 
that Skinner was a good customer and they wanted to help them. There was no 
agreement between Kenworth and Skinner what would happen if the trucks could not be 
sold for sufficient monies to repay those monies expended by Kenworth. 
During this time Kenworth valued each vehicle at $42,000. Credible evidence 
from the Kenworth representatives convinces the Court that this is a reasonable value. 
The market for used trucks had significantly declined and these particular models had a 
history of engine problems. One truck had been wrecked, but repaired. Tires had to be 
replaced. In January, 2016, Kenworth sent Skinner a bill for the difference between 
their appraised value of the vehicles and their respective residual values, as well as the 
lease payments Kenworth made for Skinner, which totals $55,226.77. Skinner had 
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never received a "delinquency notice" from Kenworth in their previous dealings. At the 
time these invoices were generated the trucks remained unsold. The trucks have now 
been sold in the spring of 2017 for $34,500 each. Kenworth knew at the time of payoff 
to GE that there would be a deficiency. 
KENWORTH'S CLAIM 
Kenworth's claim in this case is for $55,226.77 based upon a theory of unjust 
enrichment. None of the Affirmative Defenses pied in Skinner's Answer appear to have 
any relevance to this issue. However, Skinner is entitled to argue that the elements of 
unjust enrichment have not been met. 
GOVERNING AUTHORITY 
There are three elements to an unjust enrichment claim, which include: "1) a 
benefit conferred upon a defendant by a plaintiff; 2) appreciation of that benefit by the 
defendant; and 3) acceptance of that benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Med. Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 
157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). A benefit is conferred when "he or she 
gives the other some interest in money, land, or possessions, performs services 
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or in any 
other way adds to the other's advantage." Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395, 
quoting 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 9 (2013) (emphasis added). 
As explained in Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co .• 95 
Idaho 739. 518 P.2d 1201 (1974): 
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Basically the courts have recognized three types of contractual 
arrangements. Restatement of Contracts, s 5, comment a, at p. 7 (1932); 
3 Corbin on Contracts, s 562 at p. 283 (1960). First is the express 
contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. 
Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 316, 267 P.2d 730 (1954). Secondly, there is 
the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but the 
conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 408 P.2d 810 (1965). 
The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract. 
However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an 
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and 
equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, 
in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. Hixon v. 
Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); McShane v. Quillin, 47 
Idaho 542, 277 P 554 (1929); 3 Corbin on Contracts, s 561, at p. 276 
(1960). It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally 
as if it were a contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust 
enrichment, implied in law contract or restitution. In discussing a quasi 
contract or an action founded on unjust enrichment, the California 
Supreme Court stated in Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 
(1959): 
'The promise is purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to 
circumvent rigid common-law pleading. It was invoked not to deny a 
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remedy, but to create one 'for the purpose of bringing about justice 
without reference to the intention of the parties.' 1 Williston, Contracts 
(rev. ed.) p. 9; ... ' 336 P.2d at 538. 
Whether a benefit has been conferred is generally dispositive in unjust 
enrichment cases, and several cases look to whether there was a third party that 
actually conferred a benefit to the defendant. See Beco Const. Co. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 467, 797 P.2d 863, 867 (1990) (holding that Beco did not 
confer a benefit on Bannock Paving since a third party awarded a contract that both 
companies bid on to Bannock); Stevenson v. Windemere Real Estate/Capital Group 
Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 829, 275 P.3d 839, 844 (2012) (holding that plaintiff's payment to a 
"middleman" who then paid defendant did not constitute a benefit conferred to 
defendant by plaintiff); Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 399 (holding that a plaintiff 
did not confer a benefit to a defendant when defendant mistakenly received money from 
a third party that was subject to a garnishment order filed by plaintiff); Independent 
School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 
P.3d 382, 389 (2011) (holding that there is no benefit conferred when a plaintiff sells 
land to a defendant who then sells the land for profit to a state agency that can 
condemn restrictive covenants via eminent domain that the original land sale was 
subject to). 
The "officious intermeddler" doctrine operates to prevent a claim of unjust 
enrichment where a "mere volunteer who, without request therefor, confers a benefit 
upon another[.]" Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 354, 941 P.2d 350, 382 (Ct. App. 
1997). However, an individual is not "an intermeddler if such a person has a valid 
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reason for conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
In this case, Kenworth has alleged that it paid two debts belonging to defendants, 
specifically, the residual lease values on all three vehicles, and the past due lease 
payments on one vehicle. For these two unjust enrichment claims, the court needs to 
determine: 1) Whether Kenworth's purchase of the vehicles at residual value, or 
payment of the past-due lease amount conferred a benefit to Skinner; 2) whether 
Skinner accepted the benefit; 3) whether it is inequitable for the Skinner to retain the 
benefit without paying the value thereof to Kenworth. However, if Kenworth is an 
officious intermeddler, it cannot bring an unjust enrichment claim. 
The terms of the lease show what obligations defendant had to the lessor 
regarding both the residual value of the vehicles, and whatever amount was owed as 
lease payments. A final adjustment paragraph in the lease refers to an "Addendum 
Schedule 'A"' of the lease. Defendant's Exhibit 1, ,r 8. Schedule A establishes the lease 
residual amount at $58,051.20, and establishes the monthly payment amount at 
$2,357.72. Defendant's Exhibit 2. A third document, the "TRAC Addendum" establishes 
that if the vehicle is sold for less than the "termination value" the deficiency is to be paid 
to the lessor by the lessee within ten days of receiving notice of the deficiency from the 
lessor. Defendant's Exhibit 3, § 2(a). The "termination value" is defined as the residual 
value for dates after the termination of the lease. Id. at § 2(a)(i). Thus, under the lease, 
defendants would not owe anything to GE TF Trust until after being informed that GE 
TF Trust sold the vehicles for less than the termination value, or the residual amount. In 
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this case, the vehicles sold for exactly the residual amount. Joint Exhibit 3, p. 2. Since 
Kenworth paid GE TF Trust, they cannot be said to have given defendants any interest 
in money, land, or possessions. Since the vehicles sold for the residual amount there 
was no debt owed by defendants to GE TF Trust in regards to the residual value of the 
vehicles, Kenworth did not satisfy Skinner's debt. Without a debt to satisfy there is no 
benefit conferred upon Skinner by Kenworth, and its unjust enrichment claim fails. 
However, Kenworth also argues that they paid $7,073.17 to GE TF Trust for back 
rent owed by Skinner. This amount is roughly three times the monthly rent owed for one 
vehicle. Testimony at trial established that Skinner was in fact, $7,073.17 behind in 
lease payments on one of the trucks. As already established, when one party "satisfies 
the debt of the other" a benefit is conferred. Med. Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395. 
Thus, the first prong of unjust enrichment is met on the past-due lease payments. 
Even assuming the other two prongs of unjust enrichment can be met in both 
claims, the doctrine of the officious intermeddler should be examined. As stated, if a 
plaintiff has volunteered to confer a benefit on another person, there can be no unjust 
enrichment claim. However, a valid reason to give such a benefit, such as protecting an 
interest, will prevent the plaintiff from being an officious intermeddler. Thus, the court 
will examine whether or not Skinner requested Kenworth's assistance in paying the 
residual value or past due lease payments, whether Kenworth volunteered to confer a 
benefit, and whether Kenworth had a valid reason, such as an interest in the property, 
to confer this benefit. 
Testimony at trial has indicated (and the court has determined in its findings of 
fact) that Skinner did not request assistance from Kenworth in paying either the residual 
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value or the past due lease amounts on the vehicles in questic:,n Thus, Kenw1Jrth 
volunteered to make the payments. The only queistion left is whether KEmworth had a 
valid reason to do so. Testimony at trial established that the only reason Kenworth h;id 
for purchasing the vehicies from GE is that they wanted to heip keep Skinner in 
I 
business. There was no testimony indicating that Kenworth had an in1mest in the trud:s, 
and while they had a pas1 relationship with Skinner, there is no indication that Kenwo,th 
had an expectation that Skinner would continue to do business with them. Thus. 
Kenworth voluntarily purchased the vehicles, voluntarily paid Um past due lease 
amounts, both without request from Skinner, and is an officious 'nterrneddler in this 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment shall be entered for Skinner on an claims. There was no debt owed to 
GE Trust regarding residual values on the trucks. and Kenworth is an officious 
intermeddler as to the past due lease amount. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
I-
DATED this / '/day cf December, 2017. 
RandyJ~ 
Distric1 Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IOAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF lWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING INC., JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendant 
Case Ne. CV-42-16-2539 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff Kenworth's claim cf unjust enrichment is DENIED, and the case is 
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. 
2. Each party shall bear its own costs. _ fv' 
DATED this t q dav. 
Randy J. St 
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CASE NO.  CV42-16-2539  
 
MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS 
 
I.R.C.P. 54 and 68 
 COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby submit 
this memorandum of fees and costs. This memorandum is supported by the attorney declaration of 
Joe Rockstahl showing the basis and method of computation, filed herewith.  
STANDARDS FOR AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Offer of Judgment Fees: “If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the 
offer, then the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred 
after the making of the offer.” (I.R.C.P. Rule 68(d)(1)(B)(i)).  
Prevailing Party Fees: “In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when 
provided for by any statute or contract.” (I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(1)).  
Electronically Filed
12/29/2017 12:14 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Angela Hubbard, Deputy Clerk
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Attorney Fees Taxed as Costs: “Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, are 
costs in an action and processed in the same manner as other costs and included in the memoran-
dum of costs. A claim for attorney fees as costs must be supported by an affidavit of the attorney 
stating the basis and method of computation. (I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(5)).  
Commercial Transaction Fees: “In any civil action to recover on an open account, ac-
count stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale 
of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” Idaho Code § 12-120(3).  
Frivolous Litigation Fees: “In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute that otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organiza-
tion, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.” Idaho Code § 12-121.   
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Defendants made an offer of judgment to Kenworth on 07/12/2017. The amount of the 
offer of judgment was $7,500.00. Kenworth failed to recover any amount of damages at trial. De-
fendants are now entitled to mandatory attorney fees for any work done after offer of judgment.  
RULE 68(d) ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants incurred $12,213.80 in attorney fees after the offer of judgment, including par-
alegal fees, which fees are awardable under Rule 68(d) as a matter of right:   
Name Role Rate Hours Total 
Joe Rockstahl Attorney $250.00/hr. 37.25 $9,312.50 




RULE 54(e) ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants incurred $5,786.50 in attorney fees before the offer of judgment, i.e., Defend-
ants’ remaining attorney fees, which fees are awardable under Rule 54(e):  
Name Role Rate Hours Total 
Joe Rockstahl Attorney $250.00/hr. 23.15 $5,786.50 
TOTAL $5,786.50 
TOTAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants are entitled to a total award of attorney fees of $18,000.30. The Court should 
award Defendants $12,213.80 in fees under Rule 68. The Court should award Defendants 
$5,786.50 in remaining fees under Rule 54(e) and Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The basis and method 
of computation, along with supporting details, is set out in the accompanying attorney declaration.   
STANDARDS FOR COSTS 
“Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to 
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court…in determining which 
party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound dis-
cretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties 
in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained.” (I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(1)(A)(B)).  
RULE 68(d) COSTS 
Defendants incurred the following amounts of post-offer of judgment costs, which costs 
are awardable under Rule 68(d) as a matter of right:   
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Type Date Description Amount 
Expense 09/13/2017 Deposition Transcripts—James Skinner $81.25 
Expense 09/13/2017 Deposition Transcripts—Pahl $209.04 
Expense 12/07/2017 Trial Transcripts $134.00 
TOTAL $424.29 
RULE 54(d) COSTS 
Defendants incurred the following amounts of pre-offer of judgment costs, which costs are 
awardable under Rule 54(d) as a matter of right:   
Type Date Description Amount 
Expense 08/24/2017 Court Filing Fee—Answer $140.00 
TOTAL $140.00 
TOTAL AWARD OF COSTS 
Defendants ask for a total award of attorney fees of $564.29. The amount of $424.29 in 
costs is mandatory under Rule 68. The remaining amount of $140.00 in costs should be awarded 
under Rule 54(e) and Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Court should award Defendants the following fees and costs: 
 $12,213.80 in attorney fees under Rule 68(d) as a matter of right;  
 $5,786.50 in attorney fees under Rule 54(e) as prevailing party fees;  
 $424.29 in costs under Rule 68(d) as a matter of right;  
 $140.00 in costs under Rule 54(d) as a matter of right.  
 $18,564.59 as a total award of fees and costs.  
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The Court should confirm this amount of fees and costs to Defendants in an amended judg-
ment under I.R.C.P. 59, or as otherwise ordered by the Court.  





     JOE ROCKSTAHL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, ) CASE NO. CV42-16-2539
)
Plaintiff, )
) DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONv.
)
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, JAMES E. 
SKINNER, an individual and DAVID 







I, Joe Rocktahl, make the following declaration pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 in support 
of Defendants’ motion for reconsideration:
1. Iam the attorney of record for Defendants in this matter, and I make this declaration based 
on my personal knowledge and observations of the facts stated herein.
I have attached a true and correct copy of Defendants offer of judgment, dated 07/12/2017. 
See “Exhibit A,” attached.
Defendants offered to pay Kenworth $7,500.00 in judgment to settle their claims. 
Kenworth failed to accept the offer, as required by Rule 68 or otherwise.
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I have attached a true and correct copy of selections from the “rough” transcripts for trial, 
dated December 6, 2017. See attached, “Exhibit B.” In the attached selections, Kenworth admits
6.
that it acted as GE’s agents during the commercial lease process.
CERTIFICATION
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, doing business in the 
state of Idaho,
) CASE NO: CV42-16-2539
)
)




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 







Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants by and
through their counsel of record, Joe Rockstahl of Rockstahl Law Office, Chtd., hereby
offers Plaintiff Kenworth Sales Company judgment in the amount of Seven Thousand
Five Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($7,500.00).
The amount offered includes all applicable and accrued costs, and also
specifically and expressly includes any and all liens or subrogation interests that may be
r A
Exhibit ft
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involved. This offers is made as full settlement of all claims against Defendants and shall
remain effective for fourteen (14) days after service on counsel for Plaintiffs.
DATED: July 12.2017
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COURTROOM OF THE DISTRICT COURT1
2 THERON WARD JUDICIAL BUILDING
Twin Falls County, Twin Falls, Idaho3
Wednesday, December 6, 2017, 9:55 a.m.4
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY v. SKINNER TRUCKING, INC.5 et al .
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.THE COURT:6
It's 9:55 by the courtroom clock December the 6th,7
We're taking up Kenworth Company versus Skinners2 017.8
First I apologize to the parties for the last9
start this morning. I advised counsel I had a medical10
appointment this morning I couldn't change and as11
no disrespect to any doctors, but never on time.usual12
I'm sure nobody else ever experienced that.13
Anyhow, I think we're ready for trial this14
The plaintiffs are represented here by Michaelmorning.15
Danielson and at counsel table, is this your client?16
This is Susan lieu an corporateMR. DANIELSON:17
representative.18
Good morning,19 THE COURT: Ima'am.
At the end of the table is Joe Rockstahl and20
his assistant representing defendants. I take it your21
clients don't wish to sit at it you counsel table.22
As a preliminary matter, two things I want to23
discuss with you. First, you have stipulated to the24
rintroduction of numerous exhibits, and maybe25 e should
l
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(208) 736-4039 
But it's dated October 30th, 2015?Q1
A Uh-huh.2
Q So is this this is when Kenworth bought the3
two trucks they turned in the end of October; correct?4
I think it says buyer, Skinner Trucking.A5
Q Yeah. But that's the end of the lease.6
They're not7
A I think this is this is a copy of what8
the of the agreement that was drafted up front and9
this is just their I think that they've reprinted it10
so this is who the buyer is and it spells out what the11
balance is for the residual, that's what that number is,12
it's 174,153. That's basically saying, we're ending the13
contract, and here's the amount.14
Turn four more pages backQ Okay. the request15
for advance.16
A Okay.17
And this is where Kenworth purchases the twoQ18
trucks turned in October of 2015.19
This basically is our flooring agreementA Yeah.20
that basically says, we're going to buy these trucks for21
this amount of money.22
And that $116,102.40 would have been wired to23 Q
GE to pay for the residuals on these?24
A Yeah.25
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Q But it's dated October 30th, 2015? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q So is this this is when Kenworth bought the 
two trucks they turned in the end of October; correct? 
A I think it says buyer, Skinner Trucking. 
Q Yeah. But that's the end of the lease. 
They're not 
A I think this is this is a copy of what 
the -- of the agreement that was drafted up front, and 
this is just their -- I think that they've reprinted it, 
so this is who the buyer is, and it spells out what the 
balance is for the residual, that's what that number is, 
it's 174,153. That's basically saying, we're ending the 
contract, and here's the amount. 
Q Okay. Turn four more pages back, the request 
for advance. 
A Okay. 
Q And this is where Kenworth purchases the two 
trucks turned in October of 2015. 
A Yeah. This basically is our flooring agreement 
that basically says, e're going to buy these trucks for 
this amount of money. 
Q And that $116,102.40 would have been wired to 
GE to pay for the residuals on these? 
A Yeah. 
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(208) 736-4039 
And then up in this paragraph it mentions1 Q
financing agreement. Did Kenworth have a financing2
agreement with GE?3
As our flooring source, what that verbiage4 A
really means is that they don't have a representative5
from GE fly into Boise and look at these trucks to6
confirm that yeah, they are what we say they are.7 We
have an agreement with them that they trust us to say8
yeah, we've looked at the trucks, they are what we say9
they are. That's what that means.10
So this full amount got to wired to GE11 Q
the residual for these two trucks?12 correct
A Uh-huh.13
So now Kenworth owns them at that point;14 Q
15 correct?
Actually, technical gentlemen has the paper,16 A
but we're responsible.17
Kenworth has paid in full the residualQ18 don ' t
they own them?19
Basically we borrowed the money.20 A
Q From GE?21
It's no different than if you went andA Yeah.22
bought a car and financed it.23
I was trying the make senseQ Okay. if you've24
paid for them in full, why is there a flooring cost25 but
95





























Q And then up in this paragraph it entions 
financing agree ent. Did Kenworth have a financing 
agreement with GE? 
A As our flooring source , what that verbiage 
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from GE fly into Boise and ook at these trucks to 
confirm that , yeah, they are what we say E ey are. We 
have an agree ment with them that they trust us to sa , 
yeah , we've looked at the trucks, they are what we say 
they are. That ' s what t hat means . 
Q So this full amount got to wired to GE, 
correct , the residual for these two trucks? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q So now Kenworth owns them at that point; 
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A Ac tually , technical gentlemen has the paper, 
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CASE NO.  CV42-16-2539  
 




 COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby move 
for reconsideration of the Court’s Judgment, dated December 19, 2017, on the issue of attorney 
fees and costs. This motion is supported by a memorandum and declaration, filed herewith.  
 





     JOE ROCKSTAHL 





Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the date below a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt Efile System   and I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individ-
uals by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
 
 
Attorney for Plaintiffs    
Michael Danielson 
Bren Mollerup 
Benoit, Alexander, Harwood & High 
126 2nd Ave N 
PO Box 366 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366 







[   ] First Class Mail 
[X] iCourt eFile 
[   ] Hand Delivery 
[   ] Facsimile 
[   ] electronic  








Joe Rockstahl, or 
     Legal Assistant 
 
162
JOE ROCKSTAHL JD & LLM [ISB #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Telephone: (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile: (208) 734-8820 
Email: joe@joerockstahl.com 
iCourt: service@joerockstahl.com  
 
Attorney for Defendants 
  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY,
   




 SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation, JAMES E.  
SKINNER, an individual and DAVID 















CASE NO.  CV42-16-2539  
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF  




 COMES NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, and submit this 
memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration, as follows: 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to re-examine of the correctness of 
an order.” Int'l Real Estate Sols., Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014).              
“The case law applying Rule 11(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a 
motion is brought under that rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new 
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LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
 Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its order that each party bears its costs. Defendants 
are entitled to a substantial part of their fees and costs under I.R.C.P. 68. Moreover, Defendants 
are the prevailing parties under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(B), and the Court should award Defendants their 
remaining fees and costs under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) or 12-121, as detailed below.  
1. Defendants are Entitled to Fees Under I.R.C.P. 68(d)(B): 
Defendants made an offer of judgment to Kenworth on 07/12/2017. (See Declaration of 
Joe Rockstahl, ¶ 2). Defendants offered to pay Kenworth $7,500.00 to settle their claims. (Id., ¶ 
3). Kenworth did not accept the offer. Instead, Kenworth went to trial and failed to recover any 
damages on their claims. (Id., ¶ 4-5). Defendants incurred $12,213.80 in attorney fees following 
the offer, and Defendants are now entitled to these fees under Rule 68(d)(B). Defendants have 
detailed the fees in their memorandum of costs and attorney declaration, filed herewith.  
Rule 68 serves an important policy purpose. “[It] is designed to encourage settlement and 
to avoid the expense and time of unnecessary trials.” Gilbert v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 398, 732 
P.2d 355, 367 (Ct. App. 1987). The Rule is automatic in nature. Defendants made an offer of 
judgment, and Kenworth had a burden to accept the offer or to recover more in damages at trial. 
Kenworth failed to do either and is now required to pay Defendants’ fees and costs incurred after 
the offer. This is a mandatory outcome. Rule 68 says, in pertinent part:   
(a) Making an offer; Judgment on an accepted offer. At least 14 days before the date 
set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party, but not file 
in court, an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, which offer is deemed to include 
all costs and fees accrued… 
(b) Unaccepted offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not pre-
clude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding 
to determine costs. 
* * * 
(d) Paying costs after an unaccepted offer.  
(1) Claims for monetary damages.  In cases involving claims for monetary dam-
ages, any costs under Rule 54(d)(1) awarded against the offeree must be based upon 
a comparison of the offer and the ‘adjusted award.’  
164
(B) Adjusted award less than offer. If the adjusted award obtained by the 
offeree is less than the offer, then: 
(i)  the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under 
Rule 54(d)(1), incurred after the making of the offer; 
 ((I.R.C.P. 68) (emphasis added)). This rule is well established in Idaho case law. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals explains: “Where a party has made an offer of judgment greater than the opponent's 
recovery and the offeror also is the prevailing party at trial, that party may receive its justified costs 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d).” Masters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 576, 580, 709 P.2d 149, 153 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The rule also extends to parties, such as Defendants, who are completely successful at trial 
and who are otherwise entitled to a full award of attorney fees under Rule 54:  
“Rule 68(b) cannot be applied literally, allowing [only] partial recovery of costs by the 
defeated plaintiff under Rule 68(b)(ii). In such cases, the prevailing defendant is entitled to 
full recovery of costs as allowed under Rule 54(d). Nevertheless, a defendant who has made 
an offer of judgment should not lose the benefits of Rule 68 merely because the defendant 
has completely prevailed. In this circumstance, the defendant should at least receive the 
benefit of the Rule 68(b)(i) provision making an award of allowable post-offer costs in-
curred by the defendant mandatory rather than discretionary as would otherwise be the case 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Otherwise, a defendant could be penalized for being "too success-
ful" by losing the mandatory entitlement of I.R.C.P. 68(b)(i).” 
 (Stewart v. McKarnin, 141 Idaho 930, 932, 120 P.3d 748, 750 (Ct. App. 2005)).  
Importantly, the Rule 68 definition of costs includes attorney fees which are taxed as costs. 
As set out below, Defendants are entitled to have their attorney fees taxed as costs. Defendants are 
the prevailing parties. This case involves a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
As per the language of Section § 12-120(3), the Court must tax prevailing party fees as costs.1 In 
addition, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) says that fees may be taxed as costs under Rule 54(d) as permitted by 
statute, e.g., § 12-120(3). The Court should award Defendants $12,213.80 in attorney fees as Rule 
68 costs, with the balance of fees and costs awarded as set out below.      
  
1 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) says: “…the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” This language is mandatory.  
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2. Defendants are the Prevailing Parties in this Case:  
Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(B) says: “In determining 
which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound 
discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties.” (emphasis added). The Court denied Kenworth’s lawsuit in its entirety, which 
means Defendants prevailed both as to the claims and as to the final litigation outcome. The 
Court’s decision was a one-sided legal victory for Defendants.  
In Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals reversed a trial Court’s decision to withhold fees and costs from Paintball 
Sports—the prevailing party in the lawsuit. Paintball Sports had a purchase account with Daisy. 
After some time, Paintball Sports sold its assets to a new company and the new company continued 
to make purchases on the account. When the new company failed to pay off the account, Daisy 
sued Paintball Sports. Just prior to trial, Daisy’s attorney learned that it had sued the wrong party, 
i.e. Paintball Sports instead of the new company. Daisy moved to dismiss the case, and Paintball 
Sports moved for fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion because it felt that Paintball 
Sports was not the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining:  
“In our view, the district court did not properly apply the criteria of Rule 54(d)(1)(B) in 
holding that Paintball was not the prevailing party. The ‘result obtained’ in this case was a 
dismissal of Daisy's action with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly 
be achieved by Paintball as defendant. Daisy gained no benefit as a consequence of the 
litigation. There were not multiple claims or issues, but a single claim…Although the pre-
vailing party determination is discretionary in nature, this discretion must be exercised 
within the bounds of governing legal standards. Under some circumstances application of 
these standards requires a holding that one party is the prevailing party on a particular claim 
as a matter of law. This is such a case, for application of the Rule 54(d)(1)(B) factors can 
lead only to a conclusion that Paintball was the prevailing party.” 
(Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 262, 999 P.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2000) (em-
phasis added, internal citations omitted)). Defendants are prevailing parties for similar reasons. 
The Court denied Kenworth claims—the most favorable outcome for Defendants. Kenworth also 
gained no benefit from its litigation. Under these circumstances, the Court should find that De-
fendants are prevailing parties under I.R.C.P. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(B) as a matter of law.        
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3. The Court Should Award Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3):  
As prevailing parties, the Court should award Defendants their remaining attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) in the amount of $5,786.50. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). This case in-
volves a commercial vehicles sale by Kenworth. Kenworth coordinated the vehicle purchase order, 
which encompassed the commercial lease terms. The combined order/lease document was not only 
commercial in nature but also the gravamen of Kenworth’s unjust enrichment claims: 
“[Idaho Code § 12-120(3)] mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
any civil action to recover on ‘any commercial transaction.’ ‘Commercial transaction’ is 
defined as ‘all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.’ The 
test for application of this statutory directive is ‘whether the commercial transaction com-
prises the gravamen of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral 
to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.’” 
(Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 31, 936 P.2d 219, 229 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). This 
commercial transaction test applies even though Kenworth was not the actual lessor.2 Kenworth’s 
litigation claims were based in terms of the lease and would not have arisen but-for the existence 
of the lease: “A party is entitled to attorney fees under section 12-120(3) where the claim ‘would 
not have arisen absent the claimed commercial transaction.’” Simono v. Turner House, 160 Idaho 
788, 793, 379 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2016)). Defendants are entitled to Section § 12-120(3) fees even 
if the commercial lease was not ultimately enforceable by Kenworth:   
“It is well-settled in Idaho that one who successfully defends against the enforcement of a 
contract, when the gravamen of the transaction is a commercial transaction, nevertheless 
may be entitled to attorney fees even though the court has ruled that no contract exists or 
it is unenforceable.”  
(Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 752, 864 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1993)).  
The important points are that Kenworth tried to recover damages based on the commercial 
lease, and that Defendants prevailed at trial. Kenworth is required to pay Defendants their attorney 
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The Court should adjust this award to encompass the remain-
ing fees of $5,786.50, as set out in the memorandum of costs and attorney declaration.  
2 Importantly, Kenworth was responsible for structuring the commercial transactions by selling the trucks to GE, 
who then leased them to Defendants. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2. Also, Kenworth admits at 
trial that it acted as GE’s representatives in the lease. (See Declaration of Joe Rockstahl, ¶ 6).  
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4. The Court Should Award Fees Under Idaho Code § 12-121: 
In the alternative, the Court should award Defendants their full attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-121. Kenworth purchased the trucks from GE at the full residual lease value. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 7-8). Kenworth did not enrich the Defendants in the form of 
debt relief, or otherwise. (Id.).3 Kenworth’s attempt to recover for unjust enrichment in these cir-
cumstances was “…so plainly fallacious that it can be termed frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation.” Gulf Chem. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 
1096 (Ct. App. 1984). Had it purchased the trucks for less than the residual value, Kenworth would 
still be unable to get the alleged enrichment back from the Defendants—as those claims belonged 
to GE under the lease. The truth is that Kenworth made this a business decision, i.e., to purchase 
the trucks from GE at full lease value to try and save its relationship with Defendants. It was bad 
faith for Kenworth to later refashion this decision into an unjust enrichment.   
Kenworth’s claim for the value of the missed lease payments was also frivolous, as Ken-
worth made those payments voluntarily and not by Defendants’ request. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, pp. 9-10). Kenworth was trying to save its relationship with Defendants at 
the time. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3). Kenworth cannot simply demand the 
return value of these gifted payments once the parties’ relationship had soured.  
Importantly, these two claims, i.e., the appraisal-value claim and the missed payments 
claim, were presented together as part of the same faulty litigation. It was not possible for Defend-
ants to separate their defense efforts between the two claims. Even if the missed payments claim 
had a semblance of reason, it was not segregable from the whole. Thus, if the Court somehow 
denies an award of fees under Rule 68 and Section § 12-120(3), the Court should still award De-
fendants their fees under § 12-121 for having to defend against an unfounded lawsuit.   
 
3 This outcome is the same as if Defendants had been fortunate enough to have a third-party pay the full residual lease 
value at a public sale. In that scenario, the third-party would have the benefit of what he or she bargained for, and the 
Defendants would not have received a financial windfall. It is nonsense to think that the Defendants would then have 
to pay the third-party some enrichment discount for their having overpaid at the sale.  
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5. The Court Should Award Costs as a Matter of Right: 
The Court should award Defendants $424.29 in costs under Rule 68(d). The Court should 
also award Defendants their $140.00 filing fee cost under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(i). See Memoran-
dum of Fees and Costs, filed herewith.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should also award Defendants their attorney fees in the amount of $18,000.30, 
and their costs in the amount of $564.29, as set out in the memorandum of fees and costs.  
 





     JOE ROCKSTAHL 
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                                   Plaintiff,  
 
          vs.  
 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
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 COMES NOW, the above entitled Plaintiff, Kenworth Sales Company, by and through its 
attorneys or record, Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC, and submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration for the Court’s 
consideration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter was heard at a one-day court trial on 12/6/17, on the issue of unjust enrichment.  
The Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 12/19/17 and issued a Judgment 
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1/4/2018 2:57 PM
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that same day.  In both documents the Court ordered that each party was to bear its own costs.1  On 
12/29/17, the Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well as a supporting memorandum, 
seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision regarding costs.2  Plaintiff hereby objects to that 
Motion on the basis that the Court, in its discretion, already decided the matter and the Defendants’ 
have offered nothing new upon which the Court should change its mind. 
II. ARGUMENT 
 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) states that “[e]xcept when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are 
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court” 
(emphasis added).  The award of costs is therefore a matter of discretion for the trial court.  It is also 
a matter on which the Court, in its discretion, has already ruled. 
The Defendants are correct in citing to Int’l Real Estate Sols., Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 
819, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014) for the proposition that the “purpose of a motion for reconsideration 
is to re-examine the correctness of an order.”  However, such a re-examination must either be based 
on new facts, new law, or some combination thereof.  Id.  The Defendants have presented neither 
new facts nor new law and are simply asking this Court to reverse its previously made decision.   
The Court’s decision was one of discretion and is entirely supportable under Idaho’s civil 




1 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 9; see also Judgment, ¶ 2. 
2 The Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider its decision regarding “attorney fees and costs,” but the Court 
made no mention of attorneys’ fees in either document. 
3 For an in-depth response to the Defendants’ arguments regarding the applicability of Idaho’s statutes and rules 





For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the Defendants’ Motion. 
 DATED this 4th day of January, 2018.  
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           HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter was heard at a one-day court trial on 12/6/17, on the issue of unjust enrichment.  
The Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 12/19/17 and issued a Judgment 
that same day.  In both documents the Court ordered that each party was to bear its own costs.1  On 
12/29/17, the Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well as a supporting memorandum, 
seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision regarding costs.2  The Defendants have also filed a 
Motion for Fees and Costs (the “Motion”), a Memorandum of Fees and Costs (the “Memorandum”), 
and a Declaration in Support of Memorandum of Fees and Costs (the “Declaration”). 
Plaintiff hereby objects to the Motion on the bases that (1) the Court has previously ruled that 
each party is to bear its own costs and (2) there is no basis under Idaho’s civil rules or statutes for the 
award of fees in this case. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The Defendants argue in their Memorandum that they are entitled to costs and fees under 
I.R.C.P. 54 and 68 as well as I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.  For the reasons set forth below, the 
Defendants’ Motion should be denied. 
1. Costs in This Matter Have Already Been Denied. 
The Defendants are seeking $564.29 in costs.3  They argue that these costs are awardable 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 68(d) “as a matter of right”4 and that $424.29 of that amount is 
“mandatory.”5  However, these rules make it clear that instead of being mandatory, an award of costs 
is discretionary.  
1 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 9; see also Judgment, ¶ 2. 
2 The Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider its decision regarding “attorney fees and costs,” but the Court 
made no mention of attorneys’ fees in either document. 
3 See Defendants’ Memorandum of Fees and Costs, p. 4. 
4 Id. at pp. 3-4. 
5 Id. at p. 4. 
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 I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) states that “[e]xcept when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are 
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court” 
(emphasis added).  The award of costs under Rule 54 is therefore a matter of discretion for the trial 
court and this Court has already exercised its discretion in denying costs. 
Similarly, Rule 68 also doesn’t mandate costs.  Instead, the rule is intended to encourage 
settlement and to protect a defendant against a plaintiff’s claim for costs where the defendant made a 
reasonable offer of judgment and where the verdict recovered by the plaintiff is less favorable than 
said offer.  Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1987).  It therefore includes a 
formula on which rule 54 costs, if ordered at the court’s discretion, may be limited by such an offer.   
This Court, in its discretion and consistent with these rules, chose not to award costs for either 
party.  Therefore, the Defendants’ claim for costs should be denied. 
2. The Defendants’ Fees Request Should Also Be Denied. 
The Defendants are seeking $18,000.30 in attorneys’ fees.6  As there is no valid statutory 
basis for these fees, the Defendants’ request should be denied. 
I.R.C.P. 54 is not a basis for an award of attorneys’ fees.  Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 278 n.1, 
647 P.2d 730, 733 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Turner v. City of Lapwai, 107 Idaho 659, 
339 P.3d 544 (2014).  In fact, the rule specifically states that “[i]n any civil action the court may 
award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined 
in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.”  I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) (emphasis 
added).  The same is true of Rule 68.  See Haley, 112 Idaho at 859, 736 P.2d at 1313 (“Rule 68 does 
not include attorney fees.”).  Therefore, unless a contract or statute allows for a fees award in this 
case, the Defendants are not entitled to them. 
6 Id. at p. 4. 
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No claim has been made that there is a contract at issue in this case that provides for attorney 
fees.  Instead, the Defendants argue that they should be awarded fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-
121.  Each of these statutes will be addressed in turn. 
I.C. § 12-121 states that “[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  Idaho’s appellate courts have determined that 
attorney fees may not be awarded under this statute if “there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a 
legitimate issue of law….”  Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 447, 235 P.3d 387, 
397 (2010).  A claim or defense is not frivolous or groundless merely because one loses.  Lowery v. 
Bd. of County Com'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431, 436 (Ct.App. 1988).  Instead, 
the question is whether the position that was pursued was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious 
that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.  Id. 
In their Memorandum, the Defendants fail to provide any argument detailing how Plaintiff 
pursued its case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation or that a legitimate, triable issue of 
fact or law was lacking.  Instead, the Defendants address this issue in their Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Reconsideration.  This is improper, but even if the Court considers the Defendants’ 
argument, it comes nowhere near meeting the standard detailed above. 
The Defendants’ argument essentially amounts to this: that because Plaintiff lost, its attempt 
to recover for unjust enrichment was “so plainly fallacious that it can be termed frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.”7  This is not the standard applicable under the statute. 
 
7 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6. 
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Plaintiff brought its suit in equity, seeking unjust enrichment.  If the Defendants believed that 
Plaintiff’s claim was so plainly fallacious that it can be termed frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation, they were free to move for summary dismissal at any time during the year and a half in 
which the case was pending.  This they never did.  In fact, the Defendants’ success in this case was 
predicated on the Court’s application of a defense—that of an officious intermeddler—that the 
Defendants never bothered to plead.8 
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim involved both triable issues of fact and legitimate 
questions of law.  Therefore, the Defendants’ fee claim under I.C. § 12-121 should be denied. 
The Defendants also argue that I.C. § 12-120(3) authorizes fees in this case.9  I.C. § 12-120(3) 
states that  
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided 
by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by 
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
 
The term “commercial transaction” is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term “party” is defined to mean 
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
 
The Defendants have maintained throughout this litigation that there was absolutely no contract or 
agreement of any kind between them and Plaintiff10 and Plaintiff never disputed that claim.  In fact, 
that is exactly why Plaintiff sued the Defendants not in contract, but in equity.  Therefore, in order 
8 The Defendants also admit in ¶ 5(b) of their Declaration that this defense was “novel” and “rare,” which runs counter 
to their argument that Plaintiff’s claim was plainly fallacious. 
9 Again, the defendants only cite to 12-120(3)’s statutory language in their Memorandum, choosing to argue the merits 
of the statute in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. 
10 In their Trial Brief, the Defendants argued that “Plaintiff is an outside third party not in privity of contract with the 
defendants who purchased the subject vehicles of their own accord.”  Defendants’ Trial Brief, p. 5.  In their Closing 
Brief the Defendants argue that “[t]here was no vehicle ownership interest between the parties and no purchase/sales 
relationship” and that Kenworth was simply an “officious intermeddler.”  Defendant’s Closing Argument, pp. 4-5. 
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for fees to be awardable under this statute, the Defendants must show a commercial transaction 
between the parties for attorney fees to be awarded under this statute.  See Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. 
Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 426, 374 P.3d 585, 589 (2016) (“[O]nly the parties to the commercial transaction 
are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12–120(3).”). 
 The Defendants argue that because the “gravamen of Kenworth’s unjust enrichment claims” 
was a vehicle purchase order/commercial lease, 12-120(3) applies despite the fact that the only parties 
to the purchase order were Plaintiff and GE finance and the only parties to the lease were GE finance 
and the Defendants.  However, the fact that there was no commercial transaction between Plaintiff 
and the Defendants upon which Plaintiffs claim for relief was based is dispositive under the statute.  
See Id. (holding that a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit must form the basis 
of the claim); DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 758, 331 P.3d 491, 500 (2014) 
(holding that “even where no commercial transaction occurs between the parties, we have allowed 
attorney fees to a prevailing party where the losing party has alleged a commercial transaction 
between the parties.”); Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 470, 259 P.3d 608, 616 (2011) (holding that 
“allegations in the complaint that the parties entered into a commercial transaction and that the 
complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are sufficient to trigger the 
application of I.C. § 12–120(3)”)). 
Put simply, a commercial transaction between Plaintiff and the Defendants (1) was never 
alleged by Plaintiff and (2) was vigorously denied by the Defendants.  Therefore, the Defendants’ 
argument to the contrary now that fees are on the line is disingenuous at best.  Because Plaintiff and 
the Defendants were never parties to a commercial transaction even remotely at issue in this case and 
because Plaintiff never based its claim and the Defendants never based any defense on the existence 
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of a commercial transaction between the two, the Defendants’ fee claim under I.C. § 12-120(3) should 
be denied. 
3. Many of the Defendants Claimed Attorney’s Fees are Vague and Unsupported. 
As mentioned above, the Defendants are seeking $18,000.30 in attorneys’ fees.  However, 
even if the Court were to find that fees should be awarded in this case, many of the specific fees 
claimed by the Defendant are not allowable by rule. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) states that, when provided for by statute or contract, a court “may award 
reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees…”  However, nowhere in the rules is a court 
granted authority to award secretarial fees and the Defendants are seeking $1,502.80 in such fees.  
Therefore, these fees should be denied. 
Furthermore, Rule 54 fees must also be reasonable.  I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).  This applies equally 
to attorney and paralegal fees.  But, $759.24 of the Defendants’ “paralegal” fees set forth in their 
Declaration are described merely as “work in office.”  There is no way for a court to determine, based 
on that description, whether this time was even spent on this case, let alone whether or not the fees 
are reasonable. 
Finally, the Defendants are seeking attorney fees for 4.5 hours spent on 12/27/17, after 
judgment was entered in this case, drafting a motion to reconsider the Court’s decision denying 
costs.11  Nowhere does any statute or rule authorize attorney fees incurred post judgment for drafting 









For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants request for costs and fees in this case should 
be denied.  However, if the Court decides in its discretion to award fees and/or costs, the fees sought 
by the Defendants should be reduced, at a minimum, by $3,387.04.  
 DATED this 4th day of January, 2018.  
     BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD,  
           HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC  
 
 
     By /s/ Michael D. Danielson     
       Michael D. Danielson  
       Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Conclusions of Law and subsequent Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on 
the 19th day of December, 2017, Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker presiding. A copy of 
the judgment and order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
order described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to I.A.R. 
ll(a). 
3. The issues which the Appellant intends to raise on appeal include the following: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in both considering and then applying the 
affirmative defense of "officious intermeddler," which was never pied by the 
Defendants in their Answer or asserted either at trial or in any brief filed by the 
Defendants/Respondents prior to their closing brief filed after trial; 
b. Whether the trial court erred in its analysis/application of the elements of 
Appellant's unjust enrichment claim; 
c. Whether the trial court erred in its analysis/application of the "officious 
intermeddler" defense, including whether or not the court improperly shifted the 
burden to Appellant to disprove such defense. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript of the following hearings is requested in electronic format only: 
A. 2/21/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale regarding the Defendants' Motion to Permit Withdrawal of Deemed 
Admissions. 
B. 3/20/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale regarding Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Fees. 
C. 8/21/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale regarding pre-trial matters. 
D. 9/18/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
E. 10/2/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
F. 12/6/17 trial before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by Tracy 
Barksdale. 
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G. 1/16/18 hearing before the Honorable Judge Jon Shindurling and reported by Candy 
Childers regarding the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Fees 
and Costs. 
6. The Plaintiff/Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
A. Deposition transcripts for the following depositions: 
a. Deposition of James E. Skinner dated 3/23/17; 
b. Deposition of James E. Skinner dated 9/11/17; 
c. Deposition of Bill Pahl dated 9/11/17; 
d. Deposition of Nicole Steward dated 3/23/17. 
B. Plaintiffs Closing Brief, filed 12/11/17 
C. Defendants' Closing Argument, filed 12/11/17 
D. Plaintiffs Trial Brief, filed 11/29/17 
E. Defendants' Trial Brief, filed 11/29/17 
F. Stipulation Re Trial Exhibits, filed 10/10/17 
G. Pre-trial Order, issued 8/21/17 
H. Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, filed 7 /6/17 
I. Defendants' Countermotion for Summary Judgment, filed 3/1/17 
J. Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 3/1/17 
K. Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
3/1/17 
L. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/17 
M. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/17 
N. Affidavit of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
2/2/17 
0. Memorandum of Fees and Costs, filed 12/29/17 
P. Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 12/29/17 
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Q. Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
R. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
S. Declaration in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
T. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, filed 1/4/18 
U. Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Pees and Costs, filed 1/4/18 
7. The Plaintiff/ Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered and 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and submitted to the Supreme Court: 
All trial exhibits (Joint Exhibits 1-11). 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
b. That the respective court reporters have been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript(s). 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 2018. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-4 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
By __ ,·_:_~_ ...  · ~De:::__~_.__::(~.....,,~~~-=~~==-
Michael D. Danielson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
186
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of January, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following attorney in the following manner: 
Joe Rockstahl 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
(Attorney for Defendants/Respondents) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-5 
Hand Delivered 
U.S. Mail 
Fax (208) 734-8820 
Email 
Electronic Court Filing 
ioe@ioerockstabl.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Court for trial sitting without a jury on December 6, 
2017. Plaintiff Kenworth was represented by Michael Danielson. Defendants Skinner 
(collectively) were represented by Joe Rockstahl. Post-trial briefing was received 
December 11, 2017 and this matter is deemed under advisement as of that date. This 
document constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FACTS 
Kenworth is a licensed dealer engaged in the business of selling and buying 
commercial trucks. Skinner Trucking, Inc. is a local business engaged in the commodity 
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transportation business. The company has done business with Kenworth for more than 
forty years and is considered a good customer of Kenworth. GE TF Trust is a 
subdivision of General Electric Capital Corporation which is a financing entity. Among 
other things the Trust (hereinafter GE) acts as a Lessor of Kenworth products that have 
been selected by Kenworth's customers such as Skinner. 
The Lease transaction in this case was structured as follows. Skinner selected 
three new Kenworth trucks on 08/18/2011. Kenworth arranged lease financing with GE. 
Upon approval Kenworth sold the three trucks to GE who in tum leased those trucks to 
Skinner pursuant to a TRAC lease. The provisions of the TRAC lease established a 
residual payoff at the end of the lease and in the absence of Skinner purchasing each 
truck required Skinner to return the trucks to GE at the end of the lease term. Upon 
return of the trucks, GE is required to sell each vehicle at either private of public sale for 
the highest cash offer received. If the sales amount is larger than the lease residual, 
the surplus is given to defendants; if the sales amount is less than the lease residual, 
the deficiency must be paid to GE by Skinner. James and David personally guaranteed 
the lease obligations. 
At the end of the lease period of four years in October of 2015 Skinner was 
unable to either sell the trucks, payoff the residual and thus purchase them or obtain 
financing to pay off the residual balance. By this time Skinner also owned 
approximately $7,000 for two missed lease payments on one truck. Kenworth was 
aware of Skinner's financial problems and attempted to help Skinner work out of this 
financial problem. Kenworth was sympathetic to Skinner's position and did not wish to 
see get Skinner get into a worse financial position by having the trucks sold at auction. 
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GE would not refinance any of the trucks; nor would any other lender. Neither Kenworth 
nor Skinner were able to find an acceptable purchaser for any truck. 
Ultimately Skinner voluntarily surrendered two of the trucks in the late fall of 
2015. The residual value on each of these trucks before sale as required by the TRAC 
lease was $58,051.20 each. Skinner held on to the third truck for a period of time but 
also voluntarily returned it. The residual value on this truck was likewise $58,051.20. 
The amount of the delinquent two lease payments on this vehicle was $7,073.17. 
Kenworth and James had some discussions about what to do with the trucks. 
The trial record is not clear precisely what those discussions were. The Court can, and 
does, however make a finding that there was no agreement between the two entities of 
what would be done. Nor, more importantly, did Skinner ever request that Kenworth 
pay off its debt. Kenworth did in fact pay off the residual amounts and delinquent 
payments. The most substantial evidence supporting the reason for this decision was 
that Skinner was a good customer and they wanted to help them. There was no 
agreement between Kenworth and Skinner what would happen if the trucks could not be 
sold for sufficient monies to repay those monies expended by Kenworth. 
During this time Kenworth valued each vehicle at $42,000. Credible evidence 
from the Kenworth representatives convinces the Court that this is a reasonable value. 
The market for used trucks had significantly declined and these particular models had a 
history of engine problems. One truck had been wrecked, but repaired. Tires had to be 
replaced. In January, 2016, Kenworth sent Skinner a bill for the difference between 
their appraised value of the vehicles and their respective residual values, as well as the 
lease payments Kenworth made for Skinner, which totals $55,226.77. Skinner had 
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never received a "delinquency noticen from Kenworth in their previous dealings. At the 
time these invoices were generated the trucks remained unsold. The trucks have now 
been sold in the spring of 2017 for $34,500 each. Kenworth knew at the time of payoff 
to GE that there would be a deficiency. 
KENWORTH'S CLAIM 
Kenworth's claim in this case is for $55,226.77 based upon a theory of unjust 
enrichment. None of the Affirmative Defenses pied in Skinner's Answer appear to have 
any relevance to this issue. However, Skinner is entitled to argue that the elements of 
unjust enrichment have not been met. 
GOVERNING AUTHORITY 
There are three elements to an unjust enrichment claim, which include: "1) a 
benefit conferred upon a defendant by a plaintiff; 2) appreciation of that benefit by the 
defendant; and 3) acceptance of that benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Med. Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 
157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). A benefit is conferred when "he or she 
gives the other some interest in money, land, or possessions, performs services 
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or in any 
other way adds to the other's advantage." Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395, 
quoting 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 9 (2013) (emphasis added). 
As explained in Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 
Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974): 
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Basically the courts have recognized three types of contractual 
arrangements. Restatement of Contracts, s 5, comment a, at p. 7 (1932); 
3 Corbin on Contracts, s 562 at p. 283 (1960). First is the express 
contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. 
Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 316. 267 P.2d 730 (1954). Secondly, there is 
the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but the 
conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 408 P.2d 810 (1965). 
The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract. 
However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an 
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and 
equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, 
in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. Hixon v. 
Allphin. 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955): McShane v. Quillin, 47 
Idaho 542, 277 P 554 (1929): 3 Corbin on Contracts, s 561, at p. 276 
(1960). It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally 
as if it were a contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust 
enrichment, implied in law contract or restitution. In discussing a quasi 
contract or an action founded on unjust enrichment, the California 
Supreme Court stated in Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 
(1959): 
'The promise is purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to 
circumvent rigid common-law pleading. It was invoked not to deny a 
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remedy, but to create one 'for the purpose of bringing about justice 
without reference to the intention of the parties.' 1 Williston, Contracts 
(rev. ed.) p. 9; ... ' 336 P.2d at 538. 
Whether a benefit has been conferred is generally dispositive in unjust 
enrichment cases, and several cases look to whether there was a third party that 
actually conferred a benefit to the defendant. See Beco Const. Co. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 467, 797 P.2d 863, 867 (1990) (holding that Beco did not 
confer a benefit on Bannock Paving since a third party awarded a contract that both 
companies bid on to Bannock); Stevenson v. Windemere Real Estate/Capital Group 
Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 829, 275 P.3d 839, 844 (2012) (holding that plaintitrs payment to a 
"middleman" who then paid defendant did not constitute a benefrt conferred to 
defendant by plaintiff); Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 399 (holding that a plaintiff 
did not confer a benefit to a defendant when defendant mistakenly received money from 
a third party that was subject to a garnishment order filed by plaintiff); Independent 
School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 
P.3d 382, 389 (2011) (holding that there is no benefit conferred when a plaintiff sells 
land to a defendant who then sells the land for profit to a state agency that can 
condemn restrictive covenants via eminent domain that the original land sale was 
subject to). 
The "officious intermeddler" doctrine operates to prevent a claim of unjust 
enrichment where a "mere volunteer who, without request therefor, confers a benefit 
upon another[.]" Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 354, 941 P.2d 350, 382 (Ct. App. 
1997). However, an individual is not "an intermeddler if such a person has a valid 
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reason for conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
In this case, Kenworth has alleged that it paid two debts belonging to defendants, 
specifically, the residual lease values on all three vehicles, and the past due lease 
payments on one vehicle. For these two unjust enrichment claims, the court needs to 
determine: 1) Whether Kenworth's purchase of the vehicles at residual value, or 
payment of the past-due lease amount conferred a benefit to Skinner; 2) whether 
Skinner accepted the benefit; 3) whether it is inequitable for the Skinner to retain the 
benefit without paying the value thereof to Kenworth. However, if Kenworth is an 
officious intermeddler, it cannot bring an unjust enrichment claim. 
The terms of the lease show what obligations defendant had to the lessor 
regarding both the residual value of the vehicles, and whatever amount was owed as 
lease payments. A final adjustment paragraph in the lease refers to an "Addendum 
Schedule 'A"' of the lease. Defendant's Exhibit 1, ,I 8. Schedule A establishes the lease 
residual amount at $58,051.20, and establishes the monthly payment amount at 
$2,357.72. Defendant's Exhibit 2. A third document, the "TRAC Addendum" establishes 
that if the vehicle is sold for less than the "termination value" the deficiency is to be paid 
to the lessor by the lessee within ten days of receiving notice of the deficiency from the 
lessor. Defendant's Exhibit 3, § 2(a). The "termination value" is defined as the residual 
value for dates after the termination of the lease. Id. at § 2(a)(i). Thus, under the lease, 
defendants would not owe anything to GE TF Trust until after being informed that GE 
TF Trust sold the vehicles for less than the termination value, or the residual amount. In 
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this case, the vehicles sold for exactly the residual amount. Joint Exhibit 3, p. 2. Since 
Kenworth paid GE TF Trust, they cannot be said to have given defendants any interest 
in money, land, or possessions. Since the vehicles sold for the residual amount there 
was no debt owed by defendants to GE TF Trust in regards to the residual value of the 
vehicles, Kenworth did not satisfy Skinner's debt. Without a debt to satisfy there is no 
benefit conferred upon Skinner by Kenworth, and its unjust enrichment claim fails. 
However, Kenworth also argues that they paid $7,073.17 to GE TF Trust for back 
rent owed by Skinner. This amount is roughly three times the monthly rent owed for one 
vehicle. Testimony at trial established that Skinner was in fact, $7,073.17 behind in 
lease payments on one of the trucks. As already established, when one party "satisfies 
the debt of the other" a benefit is conferred. Med. Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395. 
Thus, the first prong of unjust enrichment is met on the past-due lease payments. 
Even assuming the other two prongs of unjust enrichment can be met in both 
claims, the doctrine of the officious intermeddler should be examined. As stated, if a 
plaintiff has volunteered to confer a benefit on another person, there can be no unjust 
enrichment claim. However, a valid reason to give such a benefit, such as protecting an 
interest, will prevent the plaintiff from being an officious intermeddler. Thus, the court 
will examine whether or not Skinner requested Kenworth's assistance in paying the 
residual value or past due lease payments, whether Kenworth volunteered to confer a 
benefit, and whether Kenworth had a valid reason, such as an interest in the property, 
to confer this benefit. 
Testimony at trial has indicated (and the court has determined in its findings of 
fact) that Skinner did not request assistance from Kenworth in paying either the residual 
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value or the past due leaae amounts on the vehicles in question Thus. Kenworth 
volunteered to make the payments. The only question left Is whetr1er Kenworth had a 
valid reason to da so. Testimony at trial established that the 0nly reason Kenworth had 
for purchasing the vehicles from GE is that they wanted t0 help keep Skinner In 
I 
business. There was no testimony Indicating tllat Kenworth had an in1orest in the trucks. 
and while they had a past relationship with Skinner, there rs no Indication that Kenworth 
had an expectation that Skinner would continue to do business with them. Thus. 
Kenworth voluntarily purchased the vehicles, voluntarily paid Um past due lease 
amounts, both without request from Skinner, and Is an officious 'ntermeddler in this 
0189. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment shall be entered for Skinner on al claims.. There was no debt owed to 
GE Trus1 regarding residual values on the trucks, and Kenworth is an officious 
intermeddler as to the past due lease amaunt. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
1-
DATEDthls / '/day cf December, 2017. 
Ramjy JIJI:lC: 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC:T OF THE. 
STATE OF IOAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ,WIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING INC., JAMES 
SKINNER ANO DAVID SKINNER 
Defendant 
Case Na. CV-42-16-2539 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff Kenworth's claim af unjust enriohment is DENIED, and the case Is 
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. 
2. Each party shall bear Its own costs. fv' 
OATEO this t q day_ 
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I hereby certify that on the Ji day of December 2017, I caused to be served a 
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the following: 
Michael Danielson 
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Joe Rockstahl 
Attorney for Defendant 
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 This matter came before the Court for a hearing on defendant’s Motion to 
Reconsider on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs on January 16, 2018. Plaintiff 
Kenworth was represented by Michael Danielson. Defendants Skinner were 
represented by Joe Rockstahl.  The Court took the matter under advisement as of 
January 16, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED. 
FACTS 
Kenworth paid off the residual lease amounts and past due lease payments on 
trucks leased by Twin Falls GE to Skinner in the fall of 2015. There was no agreement 
between Kenworth and Skinner as to these payments. Skinner did not request 
By: Deputy Clerk - 
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
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Kenworth to make these payments. The payments were made by Kenworth directly to 
Twin Falls GE. The Court ruled in favor of Skinner, finding that the unjust enrichment 
claim failed because there was no benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff. 
This is because upon payment of the residual lease amount, no debt was owed to Twin 
Falls GE by Skinner. Additionally, the Court found that Kenworth was an “officious 
intermeddler” in regards to the past due lease payments, and ruled for Skinner in 
regards to any past due lease amounts. Skinner now requests attorneys’ fees and costs 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), or alternatively under I.C. § 12-121. Kenworth opposes 
this motion. 
AUTHORITY 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides: 
  
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term 
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
 
Recovery of attorney’s fees under IC § 12-120(3) requires a commercial 
transaction between two parties, but it does not require a contract between two parties. 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 472, 36 P.3d 
218, 224 (2001). When there is no transaction between the two parties involved in the 
litigation there can be no attorneys’ fees awarded under IC § 12-120(3). Id., 136 Idaho 
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at 473; 36 P.3d at 225; See also Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 
163 Idaho 105, 113, 408 P.3d 465, 473 (2017). 
I.C. § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney’s fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
 
The Court has discretion under I.C. § 12-121 to award attorneys’ fees for cases 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Lincoln Land 
Company, 163 Idaho at 113, 408 P.3d at 473. “Where questions of law are raised, 
attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party 
advocates a plainly fallacious, and therefore, not fairly debatable, position. Lowery v. 
Board of County Com’rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 
1988) (internal citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
An award under I.C. § 12-120(3) is only proper if there was a commercial 
transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. The Court found there was no agreement 
or contract between the two parties, and that Kenworth paid Twin Falls GE for the trucks 
on Kenworth’s own volition. There was no transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. 
Thus, there is no basis to award fees and costs under I.C. § 12-121. 
An award under I.C. § 12-121 is only proper if Kenworth advocated a claim that 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. At trial, Kenworth presented 
evidence supporting their allegation that there was an agreement between Kenworth 
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and Skinner. Therefore, even though Kenworth did not prevail, they nonetheless had a 
good faith, factual basis to proceed with their claim. Not-prevailing in the underlying 
claim does not equate to being frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Skinner 
has not shown that Kenworth’s claims meet the required standard under the statute to 
grant attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no commercial transaction between the two parties in this litigation. 
Plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous. The Motion for Reconsideration regarding attorneys’ 
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205
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER- 5 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 










Counsel for Defendant 
(  ) U.S. Mail 
(  ) Hand delivered 
(  ) Faxed 
(  ) Court Folder 
(  ) Email 
 
(  ) U.S. Mail 
(  ) Hand delivered 
(  ) Faxed 
(  ) Court Folder 




     
 
            








2071 of 1 sheets 
TO: Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals 
Post Office Box 83720 
BISTfUCT COWl[ 
1 WlH FALLS Cl. S~Mt 
FlLE® 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 2018 HAR -8 PM I : 2 I 
DOCKET NO. 45764 







SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., et al., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
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Notice is hereby given that on March 5, 2018, 
I lodged one transcript of 25 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk 
of the County of Twin Falls in the Fifth Judicial District and the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
Hearing date of January 16, 2018. 
(Signature of Reporter or Transcriber) 
CANDACE J. CHILDERS, CSR No. 258 
(Typed Name of Reporter or Transcriber) 
March 2, 2018 
(Date) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
 






SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 




Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
 
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM 
OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 
PARTIALLY GRANTING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 




 This CORRECTED MEMORANDUM is issued under I.R.C.P. 60 to include a 
discussion of attorneys’ fees granted under I.R.C.P. 68 as an offer of judgment which 
was inadvertently left out of the original opinion, as well as a discussion of granting 
costs to the prevailing party under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). 
INTRODUCTION 
 This matter came before the Court for a hearing on defendant’s Motion to 
Reconsider on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs, and defendant’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs on January 16, 2018,. Plaintiff Kenworth was represented by Michael 




Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County
Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -
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matter under advisement as of January 16, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the 
motion to reconsider is DENIED. And for the reasons stated on the record, the 
defendant’s Motion for Fees and Costs is partially GRANTED 
FACTS 
Kenworth paid off the residual lease amounts and past due lease payments on 
trucks leased by Twin Falls GE to Skinner in the fall of 2015. There was no agreement 
between Kenworth and Skinner as to these payments. Skinner did not request 
Kenworth to make these payments. The payments were made by Kenworth directly to 
Twin Falls GE. Skinner made an offer in judgment of $7,500.00 on July 13, 2017, which 
was rejected by Kenworth.  
At trial, the Court ruled in favor of Skinner, finding that the unjust enrichment 
claim failed because there was no benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff. 
This is because upon payment of the residual lease amount, no debt was owed to Twin 
Falls GE by Skinner. Additionally, the Court found that Kenworth was an “officious 
intermeddler” in regards to the past due lease payments, and ruled for Skinner in 
regards to any past due lease amounts. Skinner now requests attorneys’ fees and costs 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), I.C. § 12-121, or alternatively under I.R.C.P. 68(d)(1). 
Kenworth opposes this motion. 
AUTHORITY 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides: 
  
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
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The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term 
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
 
Recovery of attorney’s fees under IC § 12-120(3) requires a commercial 
transaction between two parties, but it does not require a contract between two parties. 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 472, 36 P.3d 
218, 224 (2001). When there is no transaction between the two parties involved in the 
litigation there can be no attorneys’ fees awarded under IC § 12-120(3). Id., 136 Idaho 
at 473; 36 P.3d at 225; See also Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 
163 Idaho 105, 113, 408 P.3d 465, 473 (2017). 
I.C. § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney’s fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
 
The Court has discretion under I.C. § 12-121 to award attorneys’ fees for cases 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Lincoln Land 
Company, 163 Idaho at 113, 408 P.3d at 473. “Where questions of law are raised, 
attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party 
advocates a plainly fallacious, and therefore, not fairly debatable, position. Lowery v. 
Board of County Com’rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 
1988) (internal citations omitted). 
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 “A party who has made an offer of judgment under [I.R.C.P.] 68 is entitled to 
recover its costs, as allowable under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred after the making of the 
offer, if the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer. 
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261, 269, 833 
P.2d 119, 127 (Ct. App 1992). I.R.C.P. 68 “mandates such an award where a defendant 
makes an offer of judgment that is rejected by a plaintiff and the ultimate result is less 
favorable to the plaintiff than was the defendant’s offer.” Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 
111 Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (1986). However, Rule 68 is inapplicable when 
the plaintiff does not prevail in the underlying law suit. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 
444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009). “Where a party has made an offer of judgment 
greater than the opponent’s recovery and the offeror also is the prevailing party at trial, 
that party may receive its justified costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d).” Masters v. Dewey, 109 
Idaho 576, 580, 709 P.2d 149, 153 (Ct. App. 1985). 
ANALYSIS 
An award under I.C. § 12-120(3) is only proper if there was a commercial 
transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. The Court found there was no agreement 
or contract between the two parties, and that Kenworth paid Twin Falls GE for the trucks 
on Kenworth’s own volition. There was no transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. 
Thus, there is no basis to award fees and costs under I.C. § 12-121. 
An award under I.C. § 12-121 is only proper if Kenworth advocated a claim that 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. At trial, Kenworth presented 
evidence supporting their allegation that there was an agreement between Kenworth 
and Skinner. Therefore, even though Kenworth did not prevail, they nonetheless had a 
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good faith, factual basis to proceed with their claim. Not-prevailing in the underlying 
claim does not equate to being frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Skinner 
has not shown that Kenworth’s claims meet the required standard under the statute to 
grant attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
DENIED. 
An award of costs is only allowed under I.R.C.P. when an offer made by a 
defendant is more favorable than a judgment obtained by a plaintiff. Zenner 147 Idaho 
at 450, 210 P.3d at 558. In the present case, the plaintiff is not the prevailing party, as 
judgment was entered for Skinner on all claims. As such, I.R.C.P. 68 does not apply, 
and costs cannot be awarded to Skinner under I.R.C.P. 68. However, under Masters, a 
prevailing party may receive justified costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d). 109 Idaho at 580, 709 
P.2d at 153. These costs have been briefed, but not argued in court. As such, the Court 
directs Skinner to notice up for hearing and determination the issue of costs under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d).  
CONCLUSION 
There was no commercial transaction between the two parties in this litigation. 
Plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous. The Motion for Reconsideration regarding attorneys’ 
fees is DENIED, costs under I.R.C.P. 68 are DENIED, and costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) 






Jon J. Shindurling 
District Judge 
Signed: 3/13/2018 10:10 PM
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KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, doing 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; 
JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
Individual; and DAVID C. 
SKINNER, an individual; 
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To: THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on March 15, 2018, 
I lodged a transcript of 186 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
Twin Falls County in the Fifth Judicial District. The 
transcript includes: MOTION HEARING dated February 21, 
2017; MOTION HEARING dated March 20, 2017; PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE HEARING dated August 21, 2017; MOTION HEARING 
dated September 18, 2017; MOTION HEARING dated October 
2, 2017; and COURT TRIAL dated December 6, 2017. 
A PDF copy of the transcript will be emailed to 
sctfilings@idcourts.net. 
RPR, CSR 999 
1 
TRACY E. BARKSDALE, RPR, CSR 999 
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To: THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on March 16, 2018, 
I lodged a transcript of 187 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
Twin Falls County in the Fifth Judicial District. The 
transcript includes: MOTION HEARING dated February 21, 
2017; MOTION HEARING dated March 20, 2017; PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE HEARING dated August 21, 2017; MOTION HEARING 
dated September 18, 2017; MOTION HEARING dated October 
2, 2017; and COURT TRIAL dated December 6, 2017. 
A PDF copy of the transcript will be emailed to 
sctfilings@idcourts.net. 
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JOE ROCKSTAHL JD & LLM [ISB #6576] 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
510 Lincoln Street 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
Telephone: (208) 734-8810 
Facsimile: (208) 734-8820 
Email: joe@joerockstahl.com 
iCourt: service@joerockstahl.com 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTHSALESCOMPANY,aUtah 




SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 
individual; and DAVID C. SKINNER, an 
individual; 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Twin Falls County District Court 
Case No. CV42-16-2539 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER KENWORTH SALES 
COMPANY, THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD BREN E. MOLLERUP AND 
MICHAEL D. DANIELSON OF BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, HIGH & 
MOLLERUP, PLLC., 126 2ND A VENUE NORTH, TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 83303, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Defendant/Respondent, Skinner Trucking, Inc., James E. Skinner, 
and David C. Skinner, appeals against the above named Plaintiff/Petitioner to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
subsequent Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on the 19th day of 
December, 2017, Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker presiding, as well as from the 
Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, entered in the 
above entitled action on the 28th day of February, 2018, Honorable Judge Jon J. 
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Shindurling presiding, and the Corrected Memorandum Opinion Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Partially Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, entered in the above entitled action on the 14th day of 
March, 2018, Honorable Judge Jon J. Shindurling presiding. A copy of the 
judgment or order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
2. The Defendant/Respondent has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the judgment and order described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a). 
3. The issues which the Defendant/Respondent intends to raise on appeal include the 
following: 
A. Whether the trial court erred in its finding that each party shall bear its own 
costs. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in its finding that there was no commercial 
transaction between the two parties in this litigation in denying the 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
C. Whether the trial court erred in its finding that I.R.C.P. 68 does not apply 
because Plaintiff was not the prevailing party and costs cannot be awarded 
to Defendant. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript of the following hearings is requested in electronic format 
only: 
A. 2/21/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported 
by Tracy Barksdale regarding the Defendant's Motion to Permit Withdrawal 
of Deemed Admissions. 
B. 3/20/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported 
by Tracy Barksdale regarding pre-trial matters. 
C. 8/21/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported 
by Tracy Barksdale regarding pre-trial matters. 
D. 9/18/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported 
by Tracy Barksdale regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
E. 10/2/17 hearing before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported 
by Tracy Barksdale regarding Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
F. 12/6/17 trial before the Honorable Judge Randy J. Stoker and reported by 
Tracy Barksdale. 
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G. 1/16/18 hearing before the Honorable Judge Jon Shindurling and reported 
by Candy Childers regarding the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
and Motion for Fees and Costs. 
6. The Defendant/Petitioner requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
A. Deposition transcripts for the following depositions: 
a. Deposition of James E. Skinner dated 3/23/17; 
b. Deposition of James E. Skinner dated 9/11/17; 
c. Deposition of Bill Pahl dated 9/11/17; 
d. Deposition of Nicole Steward dated 3/23/17. 
B. Plaintiffs Closing Brief, filed 12/11/17 
C. Defendant's Closing Argument, filed 12/11/17 
D. Plaintiff's Trial Brief, filed 11/29/17 
E. Defendant's Trial Brief, filed 11/29/17 
F. Stipulation Re Trial Exhibits, filed 10/10/17 
G. Pre-trial Order, issued 8/21/17 
H. Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, filed 7 /6/17 
I. Defendants' Countermotion for Summary Judgment, filed 3/1/17 
J. Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 3/1/17 
K. Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 3/1/17 
L. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 2/2/17 
M. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
2/2/17 
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N. Affidavit of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 2/2/17 
0. Memorandum of Fees and Costs, filed, 12/29/17 
P. Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 12/29/17 
Q. Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
R. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
S. Declaration in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/29/17 
T. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, 
filed 1/4/18 
U. Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Fees and Costs, filed 1/4/18 
V. Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, filed 1/26/18 
W. Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, filed 1/30/18 
X. Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, 2/28/18 
Y. Corrected Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider and Partially Granting Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees 
and Costs, filed 3/14/18 
7. The Defendant/Petitioner requests the following documents, charts, or pictures 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and submitted to the Supreme Court: 
All trial exhibits (Joint Exhibits 1-11). 
8. I certify: 
A. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
B. That the respective court reporters have been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript(s). 
C. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
D. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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E. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20. 
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 
Digitally signed 
by Joe Rockstahl 
Date: 2018.03.21 
16:17:13 -06'00' By: __________ _ 
JOE ROCKSTAHL 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theJc;Q~day of March, 2018, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the iCourt eFile 
System and I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each 
of the following individ-uals by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Bren E. Mollerup, ISB No. 7959 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Ave. North 
PO Box 366 
Email: mollerup@benoitlaw.com 
Service Email: benoitlaw@benoitlaw.com 
Michael D. Danielson, ISB No. 9672 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
126 2nd Ave. North 
PO Box 366 
Email: danielson@benoitlaw.com 
Service Email: benoitlaw@benoitlaw.com 
[ ] First Class Mail 
[ ] iCourt eFile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[~] Electronic 
[ ] First Class Mail 
[ ] iCourt eFile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[><J Electronic 
Joe ckstahl, or 
Legal ssistant 
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D~~TmCT COURT 
r,:~·.i: .)u.~;ci.tl District 
\iOUmy Qf fwln Falls • state of Idaho 
DEC 1ft 2017 
cML~.;-- Di Cler11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Court for trial sitting without a jury on December 6, 
2017. Plaintiff Kenworth was represented by Michael Danielson. Defendants Skinner 
(collectively) were represented by Joe Rockstahl. Post-trial briefing was received 
December 11, 2017 and this matter is deemed under advisement as of that date. This 
document constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FACTS 
Kenworth is a licensed dealer engaged in the business of selling and buying 
commercial trucks. Skinner Trucking, Inc. is a local business engaged in the commodity 
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transportation business. The company has done business with Kenworth for more than 
forty years and is considered a good customer of Kenworth. GE TF Trust is a 
subdivision of General Electric Capital Corporation which is a financing entity. Among 
other things the Trust (hereinafter GE) acts as a Lessor of Kenworth products that have 
been selected by Kenworth's customers such as Skinner. 
The Lease transaction in this case was structured as follows. Skinner selected 
three new Kenworth trucks on 08/18/2011. Kenworth arranged lease financing with GE. 
Upon approval Kenworth sold the three trucks to GE who in turn leased those trucks to 
Skinner pursuant to a TRAC lease. The provisions of the TRAC lease established a 
residual payoff at the end of the lease and in the absence of Skinner purchasing each 
truck required Skinner to return the trucks to GE at the end of the lease term. Upon 
return of the trucks, GE is required to sell each vehicle at either private of public sale for 
the highest cash offer received. If the sales amount is larger than the lease residual, 
the surplus is given to defendants; if the sales amount is less than the lease residual, 
the deficiency must be paid to GE by Skinner. James and David personally guaranteed 
the lease obligations. 
At the end of the lease period of four years in October of 2015 Skinner was 
unable to either sell the trucks, payoff the residual and thus purchase them or obtain 
financing to pay off the residual balance. By this time Skinner also owned 
approximately $7,000 for two missed lease payments on one truck. Kenworth was 
aware of Skinner's financial problems and attempted to help Skinner work out of this 
financial problem. Kenworth was sympathetic to Skinner's position and did not wish to 
see get Skinner get into a worse financial position by having the trucks sold at auction. 
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GE would not refinance any of the trucks; nor would any other lender. Neither Kenworth 
nor Skinner were able to find an acceptable purchaser for any truck. 
Ultimately Skinner voluntarily surrendered two of the trucks in the late fall of 
2015. The residual value on each of these trucks before sale as required by the TRAC 
lease was $58,051.20 each. Skinner held on to the third truck for a period of time but 
also voluntarily returned it. The residual value on this truck was likewise $58,051.20. 
The amount of the delinquent two lease payments on this vehicle was $7,073.17. 
Kenworth and James had some discussions about what to do with the trucks. 
The trial record is not clear precisely what those discussions were. The Court can, and 
does, however make a finding that there was no agreement between the two entities of 
what would be done. Nor, more importantly, did Skinner ever request that Kenworth 
pay off its debt. Kenworth did in fact pay off the residual amounts and delinquent 
payments. The most substantial evidence supporting the reason for this decision was 
that Skinner was a good customer and they wanted to help them. There was no 
agreement between Kenworth and Skinner what would happen if the trucks could not be 
sold for sufficient monies to repay those monies expended by Kenworth. 
During this time Kenworth valued each vehicle at $42,000. Credible evidence 
from the Kenworth representatives convinces the Court that this is a reasonable value. 
The market for used trucks had significantly declined and these particular models had a 
history of engine problems. One truck had been wrecked, but repaired. Tires had to be 
replaced. In January, 2016, Kenworth sent Skinner a bill for the difference between 
their appraised value of the vehicles and their respective residual values, as well as the 
lease payments Kenworth made for Skinner, which totals $55,226.77. Skinner had 
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never received a "delinquency notice" from Kenworth in their previous dealings. At the 
time these invoices were generated the trucks remained unsold. The trucks have now 
been sold in the spring of 2017 for $34,500 each. Kenworth knew at the time of payoff 
to GE that there would be a deficiency. 
KENWORTH'S CLAIM 
Kenworth's claim in this case is for $55,226.77 based upon a theory of unjust 
enrichment. None of the Affirmative Defenses pied in Skinner's Answer appear to have 
any relevance to this issue. However, Skinner is entitled to argue that the elements of 
unjust enrichment have not been met. 
GOVERNING AUTHORITY 
There are three elements to an unjust enrichment claim, which include: "1) a 
benefit conferred upon a defendant by a plaintiff; 2) appreciation of that benefrt by the 
defendant; and 3) acceptance of that benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Med. Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 
157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014). A benefit is conferred when "he or she 
gives the other some interest in money, land, or possessions, performs services 
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or in any 
other way adds to the other's advantage." Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395, 
quoting 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 9 (2013) (emphasis added). 
As explained in Continental Forest Products. Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 
Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974): 
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Basically the courts have recognized three types of contractual 
arrangements. Restatement of Contracts, s 5. comment a, at p. 7 (1932); 
3 Corbin on Contracts, s 562 at p. 283 {1960). First is the express 
contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. 
Alexander v. O'Neil, 77 Ariz. 316, 267 P.2d 730 (1954). Secondly, there is 
the implied in fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but the 
conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in 
contract exists. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,408 P.2d 810 {1965). 
The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi contract. 
However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an 
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and 
equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, 
in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. Hixon v. 
Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); McShane v. Quillin. 47 
Idaho 542, 277 P 554 (1929): 3 Corbin on Contracts, s 561, at p. 276 
(1960). It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally 
as if it were a contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust 
enrichment, implied in law contract or restitution. In discussing a quasi 
contract or an action founded on unjust enrichment, the California 
Supreme Court stated in Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal.2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 
(1959): 
'The promise is purely fictitious and unintentional, originally implied to 
circumvent rigid common-law pleading. It was invoked not to deny a 
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remedy, but to create one 'for the purpose of bringing about justice 
without reference to the intention of the parties.' 1 Williston, Contracts 
(rev. ed.) p. 9; ... ' 336 P.2d at 538. 
Whether a benefit has been conferred is generally dispositive in unjust 
enrichment cases, and several cases look to whether there was a third party that 
actually conferred a benefit to the defendant. See Beco Const. Co. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 467, 797 P.2d 863, 867 (1990) (holding that Beco did not 
confer a benefit on Bannock Paving since a third party awarded a contract that both 
companies bid on to Bannock); Stevenson v. Windemere Real Estate/Capital Group 
Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 829, 275 P.3d 839, 844 (2012) (holding that plaintiff's payment to a 
"middleman" who then paid defendant did not constitute a benefit conferred to 
defendant by plaintiff); Med Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 399 (holding that a plaintiff 
did not confer a benefit to a defendant when defendant mistakenly received money from 
a third party that was subject to a garnishment order filed by plaintiff); Independent 
School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583, 590, 249 
P .3d 382, 389 (2011) (holding that there is no benefit conferred when a plaintiff sells 
land to a defendant who then sells the land for profit to a state agency that can 
condemn restrictive covenants via eminent domain that the original land sale was 
subject to). 
The "officious intermeddler" doctrine operates to prevent a claim of unjust 
enrichment where a "mere volunteer who, without request therefor, confers a benefit 
upon another[.]" Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 354, 941 P.2d 350, 382 (Ct. App. 
1997). However, an individual is not "an intermeddler if such a person has a valid 
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reason for conferring the benefit, such as protecting an interest." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
In this case, Kenworth has alleged that it paid two debts belonging to defendants, 
specifically, the residual lease values on all three vehicles, and the past due lease 
payments on one vehicle. For these two unjust enrichment claims, the court needs to 
determine: 1) Whether Kenworth's purchase of the vehicles at residual value, or 
payment of the past-due lease amount conferred a benefit to Skinner; 2) whether 
Skinner accepted the benefit; 3) whether it is inequitable for the Skinner to retain the 
benefit without paying the value thereof to Kenworth. However, if Kenworth is an 
officious intermeddler, it cannot bring an unjust enrichment claim. 
The terms of the lease show what obligations defendant had to the lessor 
regarding both the residual value of the vehicles, and whatever amount was owed as 
lease payments. A final adjustment paragraph in the lease refers to an "Addendum 
Schedule 'A"' of the lease. Defendant's Exhibit 1, 1J 8. Schedule A establishes the lease 
residual amount at $58,051.20, and establishes the monthly payment amount at 
$2,357.72. Defendant's Exhibit 2. A third document, the "TRAC Addendum" establishes 
that if the vehicle is sold for less than the "termination value" the deficiency is to be paid 
to the lessor by the lessee within ten days of receiving notice of the deficiency from the 
lessor. Defendant's Exhibit 3, § 2(a). The "termination value" is defined as the residual 
value for dates after the termination of the lease. Id. at§ 2(a)(i). Thus, under the lease, 
defendants would not owe anything to GE TF Trust until after being informed that GE 
TF Trust sold the vehicles for less than the termination value, or the residual amount. In 
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this case, the vehicles sold for exactly the residual amount. Joint Exhibit 3, p. 2. Since 
Kenworth paid GE TF Trust, they cannot be said to have given defendants any interest 
in money, land, or possessions. Since the vehicles sold for the residual amount there 
was no debt owed by defendants to GE TF Trust in regards to the residual value of the 
vehicles, Kenworth did not satisfy Skinner's debt. Without a debt to satisfy there is no 
benefit conferred upon Skinner by Kenworth, and its unjust enrichment claim fails. 
However, Kenworth also argues that they paid $7,073.17 to GE TF Trust for back 
rent owed by Skinner. This amount is roughly three times the monthly rent owed for one 
vehicle. Testimony at trial established that Skinner was in fact, $7,073.17 behind in 
lease payments on one of the trucks. As already established, when one party "satisfies 
the debt of the other" a benefit is conferred. Med. Recovery Services, 157 Idaho at 395. 
Thus, the first prong of unjust enrichment is met on the past-due lease payments. 
Even assuming the other two prongs of unjust enrichment can be met in both 
claims, the doctrine of the officious intermeddler should be examined. As stated, if a 
plaintiff has volunteered to confer a benefit on another person, there can be no unjust 
enrichment claim. However, a valid reason to give such a benefit, such as protecting an 
interest, will prevent the plaintiff from being an officious intermeddler. Thus, the court 
will examine whether or not Skinner requested Kenworth's assistance in paying the 
residual value or past due lease payments, whether Kenworth volunteered to confer a 
benefit, and whether Kenworth had a valid reason, such as an interest in the property, 
to confer this benefit. 
Testimony at trial has indicated (and the court has determined in its findings of 
fact) that Skinner did not request assistance from Kenworth in paying either the residual 
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value or the past due lease amounts on the vehicles in question Thus. Kenworth 
volunteered to make the payments. The only question left Is whetl'ier Kenworth had a 
valid reason to da so. Testimony at trial established that the only reason Kenworth had 
far purchasing the vehiC,es from GE is that they wanted to help keep Skinner In , 
business. There was no testimony indicating tttat Kenworth had an in1erest in the trucks, 
and while they had a past relatlonshlp with Skinner, there rs no Indication that Kenworth 
had an expectation that Skinner would continue to do business with them. Thus. 
Kenwarth voluntarily purchaaed the vehicles, vol1.1ntarily paid thu past due lease 
amounts. both without request from Skinner. and Is an officious 'ntermeddler in this 
c;;aee. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment shall be entered for Skinner on al claims. There was no debt owed to 
GE Trust regarding residual values on the trucks. and Kenworth is an .officious 
intermeddler as to the past due lease amen.mt. Each party shall bear Its own costs. 
I-
DATED this / 'f day c.f December, 2017. 
RandyJ{CC 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider on the issue of attorneys' fees and costs on January 16, 2018. Plaintiff 
Kenworth was represented by Michael Danielson. Defendants Skinner were 
represented by Joe Rockstahl. The Court took the matter under advisement as of 
January 16, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED. 
FACTS 
Kenworth paid off the residual lease amounts and past due lease payments on 
trucks leased by Twin Falls GE to Skinner in the fall of 2015. There was no agreement 
between Kenworth and Skinner as to these payments. Skinner did not request 
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Kenworth to make these payments. The payments were made by Kenworth directly to 
Twin Falls GE. The Court ruled in favor of Skinner, finding that the unjust enrichment 
claim failed because there was no benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff. 
This is because upon payment of the residual lease amount, no debt was owed to Twin 
Falls GE by Skinner. Additionally, the Court found that Kenworth was an "officious 
intermeddler'' in regards to the past due lease payments, and ruled for Skinner in 
regards to any past due lease amounts. Skinner now requests attorneys' fees and costs 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), or alternatively under I.C. § 12-121. Kenworth opposes 
this motion. 
AUTHORITY 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term 
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Recovery of attorney's fees under IC § 12-120(3) requires a commercial 
transaction between two parties, but it does not require a contract between two parties. 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,472, 36 P.3d 
218, 224 (2001 ). When there is no transaction between the two parties involved in the 
litigation there can be no attorneys' fees awarded under IC§ 12-120(3). Id., 136 Idaho 
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER- 2 
237
at 473; 36 P .3d at 225; See a/so Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 
163 Idaho 105,113,408 P.3d 465,473 (2017). 
I.C. § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
The Court has discretion under I.C. § 12-121 to award attorneys' fees for cases 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Lincoln Land 
Company, 163 Idaho at 113, 408 P.3d at 473. 'Where questions of law are raised, 
attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party 
advocates a plainly fallacious, and therefore, not fairly debatable, position. Lowery v. 
Board of County Com'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P .2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 
1988) (internal citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
An award under I.C. § 12-120(3) is only proper if there was a commercial 
transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. The Court found there was no agreement 
or contract between the two parties, and that Kenworth paid Twin Falls GE for the trucks 
on Kenworth's own volition. There was no transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. 
Thus, there is no basis to award fees and costs under I.C. § 12-121. 
An award under I.C. § 12-121 is only proper if Kenworth advocated a claim that 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. At trial, Kenworth presented 
evidence supporting their allegation that there was an agreement between Kenworth 
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and Skinner. Therefore, even though Kenworth did not prevail, they nonetheless had a 
good faith, factual basis to proceed with their claim. Not-prevailing in the underlying 
claim does not equate to being frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Skinner 
has not shown that Kenworth's claims meet the required standard under the statute to 
grant attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the request for attorneys' fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no commercial transaction between the two parties in this litigation. 
Plaintiff's claims were not frivolous. The Motion for Reconsideration regarding attorneys' 
fees and costs is DENIED in its entirety. 
DATED: Signed: 2/26/201 B 04:45 PM -,....---
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Kristina Glascock, Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC, JAMES 
SKINNER AND DAVID SKINNER 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 42-16-2539 
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM 
OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 
PARTIALLY GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
CORRECTION 
This CORRECTED MEMORANDUM is issued under I.R.C.P. 60 to include a 
discussion of attorneys' fees granted under I.R.C.P. 68 as an offer of judgment which 
was inadvertently left out of the original opinion, as well as a discussion of granting 
costs to the prevailing party under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider on the issue of attorneys' fees and costs, and defendant's Motion for Fees 
and Costs on January 16, 2018,. Plaintiff Kenworth was represented by Michael 
Danielson. Defendants Skinner were represented by Joe Rockstahl. The Court took the 
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matter under advisement as of January 16, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the 
motion to reconsider is DENIED. And for the reasons stated on the record, the 
defendant's Motion for Fees and Costs is partially GRANTED 
FACTS 
Kenworth paid off the residual lease amounts and past due lease payments on 
trucks leased by Twin Falls GE to Skinner in the fall of 2015. There was no agreement 
between Kenworth and Skinner as to these payments. Skinner did not request 
Kenworth to make these payments. The payments were made by Kenworth directly to 
Twin Falls GE. Skinner made an offer in judgment of $7,500.00 on July 13, 2017, which 
was rejected by Kenworth. 
At trial, the Court ruled in favor of Skinner, finding that the unjust enrichment 
claim failed because there was no benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff. 
This is because upon payment of the residual lease amount, no debt was owed to Twin 
Falls GE by Skinner. Additionally, the Court found that Kenworth was an "officious 
intermeddler" in regards to the past due lease payments, and ruled for Skinner in 
regards to any past due lease amounts. Skinner now requests attorneys' fees and costs 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), I.C. § 12-121, or alternatively under I.R.C.P. 68(d)(1). 
Kenworth opposes this motion. 
AUTHORITY 
I.C. § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
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The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term 
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Recovery of attorney's fees under IC § 12-120(3) requires a commercial 
transaction between two parties, but it does not require a contract between two parties. 
Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,472, 36 P.3d 
218, 224 (2001). When there is no transaction between the two parties involved in the 
litigation there can be no attorneys' fees awarded under IC § 12-120(3). Id., 136 Idaho 
at 473; 36 P.3d at 225; See a/so Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 
163 Idaho 105, 113, 408 P .3d 465, 473 (2017). 
I.C. § 12-121 provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. This section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that 
otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
The Court has discretion under I.C. § 12-121 to award attorneys' fees for cases 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Lincoln Land 
Company, 163 Idaho at 113, 408 P.3d at 473. "Where questions of law are raised, 
attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 only if the nonprevailing party 
advocates a plainly fallacious, and therefore, not fairly debatable, position. Lowery v. 
Board of County Com'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 
1988) (internal citations omitted). 
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"A party who has made an offer of judgment under [I.R.C.P.] 68 is entitled to 
recover its costs, as allowable under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred after the making of the 
offer, if the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer. 
Mountain Restaurant Corp. v. ParkCenter Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261, 269, 833 
P.2d 119,127 (Ct. App 1992). I.R.C.P. 68 "mandates such an award where a defendant 
makes an offer of judgment that is rejected by a plaintiff and the ultimate result is less 
favorable to the plaintiff than was the defendant's offer." Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 
111 Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (1986). However, Rule 68 is inapplicable when 
the plaintiff does not prevail in the underlying law suit. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 
444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009). "Where a party has made an offer of judgment 
greater than the opponent's recovery and the offerer also is the prevailing party at trial, 
that party may receive its justified costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)." Masters v. Dewey, 109 
Idaho 576, 580, 709 P.2d 149, 153 (Ct. App. 1985). 
ANALYSIS 
An award under I.C. § 12-120(3) is only proper if there was a commercial 
transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. The Court found there was no agreement 
or contract between the two parties, and that Kenworth paid Twin Falls GE for the trucks 
on Kenworth's own volition. There was no transaction between Kenworth and Skinner. 
Thus, there is no basis to award fees and costs under I.C. § 12-121. 
An award under I.C. § 12-121 is only proper if Kenworth advocated a claim that 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. At trial, Kenworth presented 
evidence supporting their allegation that there was an agreement between Kenworth 
and Skinner. Therefore, even though Kenworth did not prevail, they nonetheless had a 
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good faith, factual basis to proceed with their claim. Not-prevailing in the underlying 
claim does not equate to being frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Skinner 
has not shown that Kenworth's claims meet the required standard under the statute to 
grant attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the request for attorneys' fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
DENIED. 
An award of costs is only allowed under I.R.C.P. when an offer made by a 
defendant is more favorable than a judgment obtained by a plaintiff. Zenner 147 Idaho 
at 450, 210 P.3d at 558. In the present case, the plaintiff is not the prevailing party, as 
judgment was entered for Skinner on all claims. As such, I.R.C.P. 68 does not apply, 
and costs cannot be awarded to Skinner under I.R.C.P. 68. However, under Masters, a 
prevailing party may receive justified costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d). 109 Idaho at 580, 709 
P.2d at 153. These costs have been briefed, but not argued in court. As such, the Court 
directs Skinner to notice up for hearing and determination the issue of costs under 
I.R.C.P. 54{d). 
CONCLUSION 
There was no commercial transaction between the two parties in this litigation. 
Plaintiffs claims were not frivolous. The Motion for Reconsideration regarding attorneys' 
fees is DENIED, costs under I.R.C.P. 68 are DENIED, and costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) 
are GRANTED, which amount will be determined at hearing that is yet to be scheduled. 
DATED: __ signed_~_,_~_01s_,0_1_0P_M ____ _ 
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2018 APR 12 AH lO: 52 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
APPEALS FOR RECORD AND 
TRANSCRIPTS ONLY 
Supreme Court Docket No. 45883-2018 
Twin Falls County No. CV 42-16-2539 
WHEREAS, it appears related appeal Nos. 45764 and 45883 should be consolidated for 
preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts only; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appeal Nos. 45764 and 45883 shall be CONSOLIDATED 
FOR PURPOSES OF THE RECORD AND TRANSCRIPTS ONLY. The District Court shall 
prepare a LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in this 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, together with a copy of this Order but, shall not duplicate any document 
included in the Clerk's Record filed in related appeal No. 45764. Further, the REPORTERS' 
TRANSCRIPTS requested in related appeal No. 45883 having been previously prepared and lodged 
with the Court in related appeal No. 45764, no further transcripts shall be prepared unless otherwise 
Ordered by this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon this Court's receipt of the CLERK'S RECORD 
AND REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPTS in appeal Nos. 45764 and 45883, these consolidated appeals 
shall be severed and the due date for filing APPELLANTS' BRIEFS in appeal Nos. 45764 and 
45883 shall be set. 
1 
~ 
DA TED this ../fL-- day of April, 2018. 




: ' cc: Counsel of Record 
ill District Court Clerk 
//[ District Judge Jon J. Shindurling 









IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) 
Corporation, doing business in the ) 
State of Idaho, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs 
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an 














SUPREME COURT NO. 45764 
CASE NO. CV42-16-2539 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents 
requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a Utah ) 
Corporation, doing business in the ) 






SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation; JAMES E. SKINNER, an ) 




SUPREME COURT NO. 45764 
CASE NO. CV42-16-2539 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits to the record that have been filed during the 
course of this case. 
2017 
2017 
Joint Exhibit 1, Lease and various addenda (18pgs), Admitted Court Trial December 6, 
Joint Exhibit 2, Appraisal paperwork (4pgs), Admitted Court Trial December 6, 2017 
Joint Exhibit 3, Payoff paperwork from October, 2015 (5pgs), Admitted December 6, 
Joint Exhibit 4, Payoff paperwork from December, 2015 (5pgs), Admitted December 
6,2017 
Joint Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Bill Pahl in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment (20pgs), Admitted December 6, 2017 
Joint Exhibit 6, Affidavit of James Skinner in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (19pgs), Admitted December 6, 2017 
Joint Exhibit 7, All three Defendants Answers to Plaintiff s First Set of Interrogatories 
(35pgs), Admitted December 6, 2017 
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Joint Exhibit 8, All three Defendant s Responses to Plaintiff s First Set of Requests for 
Admissions (12pgs), Admitted December 6, 2017 
Joint Exhibit 9, 2015 Income Tax Return for the Defendant Skinner Trucking (42pgs), 
Admitted December 6, 2017 
2017 
Joint Exhibit 10, Email and invoices re trucks at issue (5pgs), Admitted December 6, 
Joint Exhibit 11, Lease payment schedule (4pgs), Admitted December 6, 2017 
Deposition of Nicole Steward Dated 3/23/2017 
Deposition of James E. Skinner Dated 3/23/2017 
Deposition of Bill Pahl Dated 9/11/2017 
Deposition of James Edward Skinner Dated 9/11/2017 
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 19th day of March, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 2 
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Clerk of the District Court 
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